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Abstract 
 
Mira Wilkins argues that the free-standing company was an important form of foreign 
investment in the pre-1914 period, although its implications for economic development 
in home and host countries remain unclear.  The free-standing company, here defined as 
a company that invested abroad without any domestic operations, was held to be at an 
immediate disadvantage since it lacked competitive advantage and core competencies, 
and had to rely on intermediaries. Scotland was home to at least 400 free-standing 
companies between 1862 and 1900. A core debate around these firms has been the 
extent to which they were entrepreneurial firms or merely devices for speculation. This 
thesis examines five of these companies to analyse the role of their Scottish Head 
Offices within the company. Two of these five companies operated in Australasia and 
three operated in the USA. The thesis finds that the two firms operating in Australasia 
were more effective in establishing control over their operations there by devising clear 
command structures. They were more adept than the U.S.-based firms at using their 
head office presence to establish marketing links in the United Kingdom, and also better 
at internalising information and innovating to create new combinations.  The 
Australasian companies further had the advantage that the UK formed their main 
marketplace, while domestic consumption was the main focus for the companies 
operating in the US. The thesis concludes that the role of the principal based in the 
home country was important for free-standing companies in establishing competitive 
advantage in their operations in the host country.  The Home Office is therefore key in 
overcoming the lack of initial competitive advantage that Wilkins claimed 
disadvantaged them.   This can be attained either by a relationship of direct hierarchical 
control or by close monitoring. 
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ACC  Arizona Copper Company  
Edinburgh based US hosted copper mining Free-Standing Company – 
see Chapter 6. 
 
C&O Canterbury and Otago Association – New Zealand pastoral FSC 1866-77 
  New Zealand hosted pastoral Free-Standing Company, 1866-77. 
 
CRC  California Redwood Company 
Edinburgh based Californian hosted Free Standing Company in the 
timber trade  
 
FSC  Free-Standing Company 
The core concept of the thesis – a company that has its head office in one 
country, but which exclusively operates overseas, usually in just one host 
country. 
 
NZALC New Zealand and Australian Land Company 
Australia and New Zealand hosted pastoral Free-Standing Company, 
which absorbed the Canterbury and Otago Association and went on to 
pioneer frozen meat exports from New Zealand. 
 
SIC  Standard Industrial Classification 
US Government system for categorising economic activity according to 
sectors, now adopted internationally. 
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Chapter 1 – Historical Background 
 
This chapter provides the background to this thesis and outlines the aims and purpose 
of the thesis as well as the methodology followed in its production. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter looks firstly at the theory behind the Free-Standing Company (FSC) 
concept, defining the term clearly as it is to be understood for the rest of the thesis.  
Secondly it considers the intellectual justification for the study, emphasising the 
distinctive nature of the thesis and the weight of its contribution to the existing 
literature.  This chapter sets out clearly the need for a consolidated study of this subject 
and how this thesis will improve upon the inadequate literature surrounding the topic.  
This thesis has created a consolidated survey using a business history style methodology 
firstly to examine the origins, strategy and direction of Scottish Free-Standing 
Companies in general, before looking more closely at the way these unusual businesses 
were structured.  This is especially the case at present, when there is great interest in the 
long term impact of foreign investment on the Scottish economy and society after about 
1850, yet little attempt has been made to separate the various strands of foreign 
investment in the high Victorian and Edwardian periods.  This thesis will also look 
inside the company, (something not usually done by writers investigating the history of 
foreign investment in general) to discover how these companies were actually run from 
Scotland and whether the location of management was an important factor in the 
success or failure of Free-Standing Companies.  A further reason for this part of the 
study is that case study literature to date has proved to be much too company-specific. 
 
 
 11 
1.2 Theoretical Background 
 
 
The term ‘Free-Standing Company’ was initially used by the business historian Mira 
Wilkins,  first in a short 1986 book chapter ‘Defining a company’, then in a seminal 
1988 article entitled ‘The Free-Standing Company, 1870 – 1914: an important type of 
British foreign direct investment’.2  In these papers Wilkins advances the idea that a 
Free-Standing Company (FSC) was a company which was headquartered in one country 
but carried out its operations entirely in one or more other countries, outside the Head 
Office country.  In the 1986 chapter Wilkins confined her analysis to the US between 
1865 and 1900, comparing the form to family multinationals such as Faber’s and 
Merck’s who sent family members abroad to set up companies otherwise unrelated to 
the parent.
3
 The important element in this was the location of the company’s 
registration, although the implications of a company being unincorporated in a host 
country are not considered. Instead it is argued that the UK’s registration legislation 
created the advantage that directors were responsible for monitoring overseas operations 
to ensure that shareholders’ funds were not abused.  Meanwhile the company’s capital 
could be held in sterling with the resulting access to wider financial markets.  However, 
in the longer run a UK-based Head Office and board of directors could become a 
disadvantage since, according to Wilkins, it would cause an unnecessary expense for the 
company.  The need to communicate over long distances was a further disadvantage 
since it slowed down the decision making process. 
 
Wilkins made the case for this differentiation by arguing that studies of multinationals 
paid little attention to companies that did not conform to the traditional Chandlerian 
                                                 
2
 M. Wilkins, "Defining a Firm: History and Theory," in Multinationals: Theory and History, ed. P. 
Hertner, and Jones, G. (Aldershot: 1986), M Wilkins, "The Free-Standing Company, 1870 - 1914: An 
Important Type of British Foreign Direct Investment," Economic History Review second series XLI 
(1988). 
3
 Wilkins, "Defining a Firm: History and Theory," pp. 83-84. 
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model of multinational,
4
 despite the possibility that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century UK FSC enterprises may have been the most typical form of UK 
foreign investment.  This, she suggested, was typical in the cases of overseas operating 
companies based not only in London but also in other British cities: ‘notably Edinburgh, 
Glasgow and possibly Dundee’.5  Wilkins did not do any direct research on Scotland, 
but noted that Ranald Michie had identified the prominence of a number of Scottish-
based companies that operated only overseas in his 1981 study of the Scottish stock 
exchanges, Money, Mania and Markets.
6
  For Wilkins the FSC existed to bring together 
specific profitable opportunities overseas and UK based investors.  Wilkins, heavily 
influenced by the work of Stanley Chapman, and possibly that of Charles A. Jones,
7
 
also drew our attention towards the fact that FSCs were often formed in interdependent 
clusters, an idea that would later be developed by Harvey and Press among others.
8
   
 
Clusters, according to Wilkins, were groupings of individuals, often consultants or 
general traders who cumulatively made up an informal, unincorporated multinational 
style structure with unclear firm boundaries.  This may have meant that FSCs were 
vehicles for a sort of vertical integration within much larger organisations, but exactly 
                                                 
4
 Wilkins found that when researching her history of FDI in the US prior to 1914 there were numerous 
British firms that entered the US market that did not fit the profile of the US based multinationals she had 
studied before.    M. Wilkins, "The Free Standing Company Revisited," in The Free Standing Company in 
the World Economy 1830-1996, ed. M. Wilkins and H. Schröter (1998), pp. 4 - 5. This history was 
published as Mira Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: 1989). Very simply, a multinational is usually assumed to be a company which has established a 
competitive advantage in its home country and then replicates this business model in others, or establishes 
direct investments in other countries to supply its home operations.  An example of the first would be 
International Harvester’s expansion into the Russian market for agricultural equipment before the First 
World War because of the similarities between Russian agriculture and US agriculture; an example of the 
second would be Lever Brothers’ expansion into the Belgian Congo to obtain supplies of palm oil. 
5
 Wilkins, "The Free-Standing Company, 1870 - 1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct 
Investment.", p. 261. 
6
 R. C. Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in 
Nineteenth - Century Scotland (Edinburgh: 1981). 
7
 S. D. Chapman, "British Based Investment Groups before 1914," Economic History Review 2nd Series 
38 (1985).  Wilkins does not cite Jones, but Jones’ book was contemporary with Wilkins’ writing and 
studies the role of English and Scottish emigrant merchant houses operating in clusters in the British 
Empire and South America. Charles A. Jones, International Business in the Nineteenth Century: The Rise 
and Fall of a Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie (Brighton, UK: 1987). 
8
 C. Harvey, and Press, J., "The City and International Mining, 1870 - 1914," Business History 32 (1990). 
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why this made them ‘free-standing’ was left unclear.  Wilkins’ account of this is 
confusing, particularly when identifying sets of people who were likely to be involved 
in clusters such as promoters, solicitors or accountants.  It is left unclear if these people 
would exclusively, as groups of promoters, solicitors or accountants set up clusters 
alone, or set up clusters in a more beneficial pattern as a team of promoters solicitors 
and accountants with the opportunity to share complementary competences.  A further 
source of confusion, and one that relates back to the themes dealt with in Charles A. 
Jones’ book, is that it is not specified whether these clusters were home or host country 
groups, or could be both. 
 
In terms of host countries Wilkins also leaves things a little vague, only suggesting that 
FSCs were as common in non-Empire countries as in Empire countries.
9
  She suggests 
that the concept may have been most useful in countries with little indigenous 
management experience such as Spain or Burma,
10
 although this would seem to 
contradict her conclusion in the same article that Free-Standing Companies failed due to 
an inability to create suitable management structures to survive in the long term.
11
  It 
would be interesting to consider the parts of the world where FSCs were hosted in more 
detail than Wilkins does, particularly as she used evidence from ten different clusters to 
claim that FSCs followed ‘identical patterns’ no matter what country or countries they 
invested in.
12
  This is a bold claim, considering the obvious diversity of institutions and 
other background factors affecting the operation of FSCs.  Such possible institutions 
and factors can range from widely varying government systems, to countries at differing 
levels of economic development and to differences in the economics of industries that 
                                                 
9
 Wilkins, "The Free-Standing Company, 1870 - 1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct 
Investment," pp. 262 and 265. 
10
 Ibid., p. 276. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 278 - 280. 
12
 Ibid., p. 265. 
 14 
FSCs entered in their chosen host countries.  It might also seem reasonable to assume 
that for British companies it might be easier to operate in Empire countries than in 
others.    
 
FSCs seem to have specialised in lower technology or extractive industries rather than 
newly emerging high technology or complex assembly industries, such as electrical 
engineering or chemicals. Wilkins argues that this was a consequence of the typically 
lean governance structure of FSCs – the lack of a managerial hierarchy made it difficult 
to facilitate the transfer of such knowledge from home to host country.
13
  Again, 
Wilkins contended that the Free-Standing Company was disadvantaged as a start-up, 
since it did not have the time to develop internal expertise in the home market first, and 
that a young FSC would have to purchase any expertise required from outside the 
company, such as from an associated cluster of merchants.  The strong impression given 
is that Wilkins believes the FSC to be at an inherent disadvantage in the host country 
compared to indigenous firms. Of course, this ignores the fact that companies set up 
merely to exploit a domestic market have often had no time to develop a research and 
development capacity either, and may have to purchase technology themselves. A rare 
and short lived high tech example provided by Wilkins is that of the photography 
company Eastman Kodak which started as an English FSC but quickly naturalised itself 
in the US, though Wilkins’ choice of this example is strange as she also notes that it 
naturalised in the US for tax reasons.
14
  Generally, however, Wilkins’ article is fairly 
short on historical detail, although this is to an extent understandable as many thousands 
of examples existed, as she suggests. 
 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., p. 277. 
14
 Ibid. 
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The way in which Wilkins develops a theory about the problem of FSCs failing is 
interesting, but has an obvious shortcoming from a British perspective. She drew on 
Chandler’s work and her own to claim that US companies were easily able to grow 
across international boundaries because they had become used to operating over large 
distances, in multiple regions and varying jurisdictions within the US domestic 
economy.  The same was true of management and other key personnel. Since they were 
happy to move around the country, it was not so difficult for them to transfer to 
operating in a different country altogether.
15
  This was not so for UK domestic firms as 
they could not easily gain experience in operating over such wide distances, or within 
different jurisdictions.  According to Wilkins, in some cases British firms set up Free-
Standing Companies as an alternative to expanding the boundaries of their own firms 
abroad due to their own lack of experience in operating over distance.
16
   
 
Comparing the types of companies that Wilkins classified as Free-Standing (mostly 
drawing on the work of previous scholars) with classical vertically integrated 
Chandlerian multinationals is somewhat unfair, particularly in the era of the mid-late 
19
th
 century when the Chandlerian companies themselves were only just emerging.
17
  
The business model behind the classic FSC, that of a company based in the financial 
district of a UK city but operating entirely overseas, usually on a single project (and 
often a single site) in a single country was not without parallel in the US.  East Coast 
entrepreneurs and investors, particularly in New York, were also interested in the 
settlement of the US West and of Latin America and set up companies on a similar basis 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., p. 264. 
16
 Ibid., p. 267. 
17
 Before the Sherman Acts, and in some cases even afterwards, many large US ‘companies’ were really 
federations such as the Standard Oil Trust – the main large integrated companies prior to the late 1880s 
were railroads.  See Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial 
Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: 1962), Chapter 1. 
 16 
to take part in this.
18
  In the 1880s a company with its board of directors in New York 
City and operations in Texas did not face hugely different challenges from one which 
operated in Texas but had its Head Office in London, or in the case of the companies 
studied here, in Edinburgh or Dundee.  Both relied upon writing to and telegraphing 
their operational departments although the letters would take substantially longer (and 
telegrams a little longer) to travel from the UK than from New York City.  The two 
companies would suffer similar disadvantages relating to legal differences from 
operating in multiple jurisdictions, although the Scottish company might have a slight 
disadvantage as it crossed an international boundary rather than state lines.   Currency 
arbitrage, then, would become the main cost disadvantage and Wilkins provides little 
evidence on this. 
 
1.3 Historical Background – The emergence of Scottish FSCs as a 
distinct category of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
A core aim of the early part of this thesis is to clarify the role of the Free-Standing 
Company in Scottish foreign investment by demarking it as a distinct category from the 
investment trust, portfolio holding or overseas registered company held by a Scottish 
investor.  Foreign investment as an umbrella term can cover a wide range of different 
activities from lending to governments or businesses abroad all the way to direct control 
over assets abroad.  Further, the distinction between direct and portfolio investment is 
                                                 
18
 There is plenty of evidence from already published literature that companies like this, operating from a 
remote single site somewhere in the newly opened up West but with their registered Head Office in an 
advantageous location on the east coast or in the Midwest were common, and in fact may have been more 
common than FSCs coming in from the UK.  The Francklyn Land and Cattle Company was registered in 
New Jersey with its administrative Head Office in New York City but ran a ranch in Texas - see L. F. 
Sheffy, The Francklyn Land and Cattle Company (Austin, Texas: 1963). Meanwhile the Detroit Copper 
Company was based in Detroit but mined on a single site in Arizona – see Charles K. Hyde, Copper for 
America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times to the 1990s (Tucson, AZ: 1998).  
More broadly many US companies have registered in states such as New Jersey or Delaware to take 
advantage of more advantageous company law, while not operating there, although often only the 
legislation remains in that state. 
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somewhat blurred.  Perhaps the core contribution of Wilkins’ 1988 article was to 
identify companies that had their Head Office in one country and their operations 
abroad as direct investors – such schemes were previously considered portfolio 
investments.  In fact some, such as Christopher Schmitz, who in a 1997 article 
considered FSCs among his sample of Scottish portfolio investments, claimed that 
Charles A. Jones and then Wilkins had managed to confuse matters, by categorising 
these ‘traditionally’ defined portfolio investments as ‘Free-Standing Multinationals’.19  
On this topic this thesis will clarify matters more in Chapters 4-8, when we will look 
inside the firm to identify how much control the Scottish Head Offices of FSCs actually 
had over the assets that they were responsible for overseeing on behalf of their 
shareholders. 
 
Free-Standing Companies based in Scotland, like their English counterparts, emerged 
against the backdrop of a capital market which had grown wealthy from the proceeds of 
industrialisation and the mercantile links with the outside world that had developed over 
two previous centuries of global trading, particularly from Glasgow.  By 1860 the Scots 
already had a long history of establishing companies or businesses abroad that at least 
represented investments, even if direct control of such enterprises was not yet possible 
or intended.  Probably the earliest proto-FSC established in Scotland was the infamous 
Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies, established by government 
charter in 1695.  Finding itself unable to operate within the English imperial system due 
to the Navigation Acts of 1660, and attract English capital as a result, it was decided to 
colonise the Darien region of Panama instead.  This company was a spectacular failure, 
consuming at least £153,631 of shareholders’ funds and plunging Scotland into a 
                                                 
19
 C. Schmitz, "The Nature and Dimensions of Scottish Foreign Investment," Business History 39, no. 2 
(1997): pp. 62 - 63. 
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financial crisis that contributed to the union with England.
20
  This scheme collapsed 
partly because the climate in Panama proved too inhospitable for the Scots, with fewer 
than 500 of 2,500 colonists originally sent surviving, and partly because the remaining 
Scots were forced to abandon their colony when the Spanish sent an army to assert their 
territorial rights.  The real risk of running an enterprise over such a long distance 
without fast communication technology was revealed when a second expedition was 
dispatched from Scotland in 1699 because the governors of the company had no way of 
knowing that the first had already had to abandon the colony.
21
 
 
After the embarrassment of Darien, and probably the influence of the South Sea Bubble 
of the 1720s, the next notable Scottish wave of interest in investing in joint-stock 
companies intended to operate overseas surfaced in the early 19
th
 century. In the 
meantime mercantile links continued to expand. Early links with Australia were 
important: trading companies based in Scotland such as the short lived Australian 
Company of Edinburgh and Leith (1822-1833) started to play an important role in 
mercantile activity.  This firm was not greatly successful but from the late 1830s various 
new firms were started in Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow to carry on a range of 
commercial enterprises in Australia.  Perhaps most notable was the Clyde Company, a 
co-partnership formed in 1836 to farm sheep on a group of properties in the newly 
opening up Port Philip district (later Victoria) and backed by five big Glaswegian 
shareholders as well as two from Van Diemen’s Land.22  The Clyde Company was an 
admirable early venture though it represented more of an arms’ length portfolio 
investment on the Scottish side.  The Clyde Company was dominated by its managers 
Phillip and George Russell, emigrant sons of a Fife farmer.  Under the Russells the 
                                                 
20
 S. G. E. Lythe and J. Butt, An Economic History of Scotland 1100 - 1939 (Glasgow: 1975), p. 66.  
£153,631 in pre-Union Scottish currency was worth around £12,802 in English currency. Ibid., p. 74. 
21
 J. Prebble, The Darien Disaster (London: 1968), pp. 232 - 239. 
22
 P. L. Brown, ed., Clyde Company Papers, Prologue 1821 - 35 (London: 1941), p. xi. 
 19 
Clyde Company quickly outgrew its Scottish shareholders, and the main run, Golfhill, 
was sold freehold in 1858 to George Russell who preferred to operate on his own 
account rather than for a group of invisible principals, and the rest of the company was 
broken up.
23
  Among numerous other similarly successful early proto-FSC ventures in 
Australia were the Scottish Australian Company and the Aberdeen Australian Company 
which channelled funds into sheep farming in Australia with reasonable success.
24
  
 
W. Turrentine-Jackson, in his classic 1968 study of Scottish investment in the US, The 
Enterprising Scot, tells us that similar investment enterprises started to appear in the US 
from 1837 with the Illinois Investment Company.
25
  Aberdeen financiers were again 
important in this field, staking £120,000 on pioneering ventures such as the North 
American Investment Company and the Michigan Investment Company (both 1839) 
and the Galena Investment Company (1840).  These firms were apparently relatively 
successful, paying dividends of 12-14% per annum, with the exception of Galena, a lead 
mining venture, which failed to become profitable.
26
 
 
It is difficult to assess the performance of these early firms because they left little 
documentation, and in many cases, such as that of the Clyde Company, they did not 
always strictly fit the Free-Standing pattern as Wilkins specified it.  Shareholding in 
them was relatively limited, although one firm, the North British Australian Company, 
had as many as 419 ‘partners’.27   
 
                                                 
23
 M C Prentis, The Scots in Australia (Sydney: 2008), p. 85.  George Russell’s success was quite 
spectacular – in 1839 the Clyde Company was paying him £100 a year to manage 8,000 sheep – by his 
death in 1887 he was worth £318,110. E Richards, "Australia and the Scottish Connection, 1788-1914," 
in The Scots Abroad, Labour, Capital, Enterprise, 1750-1914, ed. R. A. Cage (Beckenham: 1985), p. 126. 
24
 D. S. Macmillan, "Scottish Enterprise in Australia, 1798-1879," in Studies in Scottish Business History, 
ed. P. L. Payne (London: 1967), pp. 334 - 339. 
25
 W. Turrentine Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 1873 (Edinburgh, 
UK: 1968). p. 8. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Macmillan, "Scottish Enterprise in Australia, 1798-1879," p. 336-339. 
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Limited Liability was first introduced as a concept applicable to all Joint Stock 
Companies that registered for it by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856, in both 
Scotland and England.
28
  Before 1856 the situation was somewhat more confused and 
impeded the formation of overseas companies. Joint Stock Companies were legally 
allowed in Scotland but the Limited Liability situation was uncertain.  The implication 
of this was that the partners (or shareholders) in old style partnerships or unincorporated 
companies were potentially liable for the full extent of their share of the debts should a 
company fail.
 29
  This high risk then restricted involvement to those with pockets deep 
enough not to be affected if the worst were to happen.   Trust appears to have been a key 
problem for many of these earlier concerns. The Clyde Company merchants or 
managers based in the field were effectively entirely responsible for carrying out 
business since communications were restricted to the sailing times between host 
economies and home.  This information asymmetry, coupled with an underdeveloped 
capital market and the continuing expansion of industry at home, seems to have 
restricted international business until the coming of limited liability gave both 
entrepreneurs and shareholders clear legal protection against scams or poorly planned 
schemes by restricting the possible losses to the capital of the company.   
 
Thus, only after 1856 do we start to see the emergence of Free-Standing Companies as 
Wilkins portrays them, with a Head Office based in a Scottish city and operations 
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entirely abroad.  Wilkins’ concept requires a very specific set of circumstances.  The 
1856 Act obliged companies to register a specific Head Office address in the United 
Kingdom (even if this was not their actual centre of operations) thus tying them in some 
specific way to British premises.  Companies registering their Head Office address in 
Scotland filed them with the branch of Companies House located in Edinburgh, but 
there was no legal requirement for operations to be in Scotland.
30
  Hence any future 
schemes along the lines of the Clyde Company could be registered under the Joint Stock 
Act. Their shareholders could now enjoy the protection of Limited Liability in return for 
having some form of nominal presence in Scotland: filing a simple annual return 
showing the company’s capitalisation structure and submitting a shareholder register.31  
However, it should be noted that there was no obligation that the shareholders should be 
in Scotland either, nor that the directors, secretary, management or employees be 
Scottish.  The only characteristic that necessarily made companies ‘Scottish’ was this 
Head Office presence and the file held by the registrar in Edinburgh.  Company 
registration in Scotland could therefore be used as a flag of convenience for operating 
either in jurisdictions that did not allow joint stock companies limited liability or in 
those where registration requirements were more onerous.
32
  In this way free-standing 
companies, as opposed to the earlier overseas companies, came into being. 
 
As an alternative for Scots investing abroad, there were occasional cases of companies 
registered in foreign countries but with Scottish owners. Shares in foreign registered 
companies were frequently traded on the stock exchanges, particularly in London, 
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which Scottish investors were able to access easily even before the telegraph since 
London stockbrokers could find agents in Scotland.
33
 Such firms competed for funds 
with Scottish FSCs, as well as with English FSCs.
34
  In cases where foreign registered 
companies were traded, transaction costs may generally have been higher due to the 
need to purchase shares in foreign currencies (rather than convert the proceeds inside 
the company) and receive any dividends or sale proceeds in that foreign currency too.  
Further problems existed with the development of joint stock companies in countries 
with poorly developed legal systems, particularly with respect to the specialist area of 
corporate law. Not all jurisdictions allowed for limited liability, especially given that 
Scotland only formally allowed it from 1856 with a very slow rate of take-up.
35
  
Although limited liability at home was a new concept, the lack of limited liability 
protection abroad no doubt remained a barrier to entry for entrepreneurs unfamiliar with 
conditions in a foreign country. Such a barrier could prevent investment in a country 
even if a good opportunity existed there, and some more risk averse investors may have 
been put off investing entirely. 
 
Another competing channel of foreign investment that attempted to spread risk existed 
in the capital market. These were the investment trusts which started to appear in 
Scotland after the foundation of the Scottish American Investment Trust in Dundee and 
the Scottish American Investment Co. in Edinburgh in 1873.  These companies were 
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founded by the investment trust pioneers Robert Fleming and William J. Menzies, who 
would both later feature on the boards of FSCs.
36
  By 1914 Edinburgh had twenty-five 
trusts and Dundee eight, with the Scottish investment trust industry punching somewhat 
above its weight compared with the size of its English counterpart.
37
   Investment trusts 
were different from FSCs in that they did not concentrate on internalising a single 
project.  Instead they bought a portfolio of securities, usually in companies registered in 
the US, and were not closely involved in the management of these companies.  Trusts 
also directed their operations from home, although their representatives visited the US, 
and some had active agents there.
38
  These trusts also offered mortgages in the US in 
some cases,
39
 and carried out some domestic short term lending and took deposits in the 
short term.
40
  Unlike the FSCs, they appear to have been extremely well documented 
and much published financial data remains about them, especially in George Glasgow’s 
1932 general volume about the Scottish Investment Trust Companies and J. C. Gilbert’s 
1938 history of the Dundee Investment Trusts.
41
  Although the investments of these 
trusts were not disclosed for reasons of commercial confidentiality Glasgow’s volume 
contains tables for each company.  These tables detail the value of debentures and 
preference stocks issued by each company as well as visible cash reserves, percentage 
returns earned and dividends paid, as well as market stock prices.  These statistics 
suggest that in general the investment trusts were very successful and capable of 
surviving for long periods; many of those detailed in these volumes were founded in the 
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1870s and 1880s and still in existence in the 1930s.  The Barings crisis of 1890 
appeared to make investors cautious, temporarily slowing down interest, although a new 
set of trusts were brought into being in the 1900s.
42
  The trusts were purely financial 
devices with no intention of carrying out any commercial activities of their own. Instead 
their aim was to invest in other companies and land abroad as well as carrying out 
activities such as mortgaging. 
 
There were also some borderline investment trusts/FSCs such as the London-based but 
largely Aberdeen financed Texas Land and Mortgage Company, which were formed as 
overseas mortgage companies. They had more specific commercial purposes than those 
trusts with diversified portfolios.
43
  According to Kerr, Texas Land and Mortgage was 
key in establishing some ranches, most famously in providing the finance for the 
privately owned JA Ranch in the Texas Panhandle, which was managed by the well 
known cattleman Charles Goodnight, meaning that the FSC route to raising capital for 
ranching could be avoided.  In some cases the distinction between portfolio investment 
and direct investment is not clear. It is difficult to know how entrepreneurial the 
intentions of those backing FSCs actually were, especially in areas where cross-overs 
between trusts and FSCs are apparent.  Certainly, promotional links between trusts and 
FSCs existed - for example Robert Fleming, the London correspondent for the First, 
Second and Third Scottish American Trust Companies of 1879, was involved in 
promoting the Matador Land and Cattle Company.
44
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The free-standing company, then, was not the only mode of investment open to Scots in 
this period.  Because they also placed funds into operations abroad, free-standing 
companies tend to be associated with the investment trusts or mortgage companies. 
Historians studying foreign investment originating in Scotland in this period such as W. 
Turrentine Jackson and William Kerr have tended to group these firms together simply 
because they were forms of foreign investment.
45
  Nevertheless, the free-standing 
company is worthy of attention on its own because it was not a mere collection of 
financial instruments.  The free-standing company usually intended to enter an industry 
that was not related to finance, and though it was intended to make a profit, the aim was 
usually to do so by producing a tangible product.  Generally, it targeted its investment 
within a single country and a single project, thus constituting a venture of higher risk 
but potentially one which could create a very valuable asset if managed correctly.  This 
thesis examines what projects free-standing companies were involving themselves in 
and how well managed they were. 
 
Its worth noting briefly that it might be reasonable to expect the industrial north of 
England, Wales and Ireland to have produced some FSCs, as well as Scotland’s cities.  
There has been little study pursued in this direction.  Rory Miller, in his work on British 
FSCs in South America, has noted that Liverpool merchant houses did float some FSCs 
involved there.
46
  Most notably, the promoter Colnel John Thomas North, working in 
partnership with Wm. & Jno. Lockett, a Liverpool merchant house, and W. R. Grace & 
Co. of New York, had set up a cluster of FSCs in South America in the nitrate, railways 
and utility industries.  Miller notes that many Liverpool merchant houses moved their 
headquarters to London in the Edwardian period and took the administration of FSCs 
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with them.  It seems likely that if any FSCs were registered in other English provincial 
cities or Wales that they gradually moved their headquarters to London to maintain 
links with the mercantile community.  In Ireland there was surprisingly little activity. In 
his history of Irish stock exchanges, W. A. Thomas tells us that while Irish investors 
were interested in purchasing the shares of foreign mining and land companies, none 
were registered in Ireland.
47
    There was also some interest in purchasing foreign 
government and railway securities, but the actual operation of assets abroad does not 
seem to have attracted Irish entrepreneurs or capitalists.
48
   
 
1.4 Archival Sources 
 
 
Chapter 3 makes use of the Companies House registration files held in the National 
Archives of Scotland under collection BT2, which contains all companies dissolved or 
liquidated before 1980. These are used to collect as far as possible the population of 
Scottish Free-Standing Companies established in this period.  Data pertaining to the first 
116 such companies (all those registered until the end of 1885) were collected for the 
entire population including the available capitalisation details, details regarding the size 
of shareholding and paid capital, and also details from the Articles of Association and 
Memoranda of Association pertaining to the aims of companies.  Company purpose 
details were divided into Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories to give the 
first breakdown of Scottish FSC activity to divide FSCs into SIC categories.  Available 
profit and dividend data for these periods were collected, although this information is 
scant since companies were not obliged even to file balance sheets until 1908. 
 
                                                 
47
 W. A. Thomas, The Stock Exchanges of Ireland (Liverpool: 1986), p. 150. 
48
 Ibid., p. 131. 
 27 
Chapters 4 and 5 make use of the archives of the New Zealand and Australian Land 
Company Limited, deposited in the National Archives of Scotland in Edinburgh under 
collection GD435.  These files appear not to have been used by previous scholars, yet 
are probably among the larger collections of records left by any Scottish Free-Standing 
Company.  This collection is particularly vast, including 620 different files. It was not 
possible to look at all of these, although the records of the Canterbury and Otago 
Association are also included, and these were consulted alongside the NZALC records.  
The selection was narrowed down by confining the enquiry to those files from before 
1910, as the company continued until 1968. The choice was also limited to those files 
that reflect the activities of the Head Office, the regional managements used by the 
company or the actual farms in New Zealand or Australia.  While some financial data 
was collected as evidence of performance (though recognising the limitations of 
nineteenth-century accounts) the main focus was on collecting qualitative information.  
Firstly, to analyse the role of the Head Office, the minute books of board meetings, 
which are extremely detailed, were used to show how active the board and Scottish 
management actually were in decision making.
49
  These books also allow some analysis 
of the frequency and level of communication between Australasia and the firm’s board 
and how this was carried out, since communications from Australasia were frequently 
reproduced in the minute books. From this it was possible to look at how far the 
information was internalised within the firm.  The various boxes of loose papers were 
consulted in order to gauge the level of interaction between the different parts of the 
company.  Reports made on the company’s properties in Australasia during the visits of 
James Melvin,
50
 a director, in 1866 and newly appointed William Soltau Davidson in 
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1878 were also of use.
51
 These long booklets provide evidence that the Scottish 
directors were actually interested enough in the properties to visit them and examine 
them in detail, and to provide a report on them for the other directors and shareholders 
in Scotland to read.  These reports were also used to direct future investment decisions 
and again provide evidence that the NZALC had a highly integrated structure in which 
authority spread from Scotland to the Australasian colonies. 
 
A different set of materials, also held by the National Archives of Scotland, was used 
for Chapter 6.  These are the records held by Messrs Davidson and Syme, W.S., 
solicitors who represented the Arizona Copper Company and California Redwood 
Company and which are grouped with a wide body of other records under reference 
GD282.  Although the records for these companies are not as comprehensive as those 
for the NZALC, they still contain useful evidence in relation to the research question.  A 
particular problem here is the lack of any comparable minutes from either company, 
although some other internal documents are available.  In the case of the California 
Redwood Company the file GD282/13/123 containing reports and correspondence was 
of particular value, as this contains much of the surviving correspondence from within 
the firm as well as the reports made by emissaries sent to inspect the company property 
in California. A further item of use was the scrapbook GD282/13/143, which includes 
the report of the company’s first general meeting as well as the report of a visit by 
Messers Blyth and Menzies, two of the directors, to the company’s operations in 
California, and the report of the subsequent EGM into the visit.  The 1884 report of the 
visit of John Blair and Francis More to California is also included, and provides much 
useful information on the agency problems encountered by the company’s Scottish 
Head Office, particularly the obstructionism of their agents in California.  The CRC is 
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comparatively rare as an FSC failure that left a significant amount of archival material 
behind, and this thesis represents a useful opportunity to bring these sources to wider 
attention.   
 
In the case of the ACC a number of files were very useful, particularly GD282/13/154, 
155 and 158.  GD282/13/154 includes a report on the ACC’s operations in Arizona by 
J.A. Robertson, who was sent by the directors to inspect the business at a time when 
finances were becoming particularly precarious, from 1884.  GD282/13/155 includes 
some very useful documents on principal-agent lines including a list of remittances to 
America, a listing of debts for which the company was liable in America, and various 
documents reviewing the company’s situation in Arizona and attempts by the Edinburgh 
Head Office to rectify them.  GD282/13/158 contains a miscellany of useful accounting 
information relating to performance and information about the actual mining properties 
themselves operated by the ACC at Clifton, Arizona, as well as the railway built to 
serve them.  Again, these sources were useful in building up a picture of how far the 
ACC went in attempting to develop a managerial system to combat the principal-agent 
problems associated with the Free-Standing form of company. 
 
In Chapter 7, which focuses upon free-standing companies in the range cattle industry, 
two bodies of archival primary source material were utilized as well as one major 
published primary source.  Records of the Matador Land and Cattle Company held by 
the University of Dundee Archives and copied from those held by Texas Tech 
University Archives include some useful letters and other internal correspondence 
within the company in its formative years and later under the influential management of 
Murdo Mackenzie.  In addition the Lamb Collection at Dundee City Library holds some 
published reports and accounts from the earlier years of the company as well as those of 
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the Hansford Land and Cattle Company and the Texas Land and Cattle Company.  
These reports are useful in gauging how an FSC reported its performance to 
shareholders as well as providing useful evidence in relation to the relation between the 
Matador’s head office and its operations in the US.  An additional source used in 
Chapter 7 was the memoirs of John Clay, a Scottish emigrant who became an 
influential ranching consultant in the 1880s and 1890s.  Although Clay’s memoirs have 
the obvious shortcoming of being written from a nostalgic perspective, he usefully 
analyses how Scottish FSCs actually ran their ranches in this period, and this 
information is much too useful to ignore.
52
   
 
 
1.5 The Distinctive Nature of the Thesis 
 
 
This thesis has two main aims.  Firstly it examines the FSC population in Scotland 
globally, aiming to give as complete an account as possible of the patterns of 
entrepreneurship and investment in those FSCs that were registered until the end of 
1885.  No study of this type has previously been undertaken. As Chapter 2 notes in 
more detail, previous studies of this sort have either not differentiated FSCs from other 
types of foreign investment, or have been country specific in focus.  This part of the 
thesis augments previous knowledge in that it shows exactly in what parts of the world 
and in what economic activities Scottish FSCs were investing and operating.  
Additionally, this part of the thesis investigates some neglected issues from Wilkins’ 
original writing about FSCs. The first of these clarifies the importance of Scottish cities 
as centres of FSC formation. Wilkins suggests that Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee 
had a role to play in this.  Local historians in Dundee have noted this a little, but 
concentrated on the social side, while those FSCs based in Glasgow and Edinburgh 
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seem to have attracted relatively little interest from Scottish historians.
53
  Aberdeen’s 
role remains ambiguous, but as we have noted above, it had been a centre for 
investment in proto-FSCs in the US and Australia, and therefore it would be reasonable 
to expect some FSCs to be based there.  This thesis usefully groups FSCs with their 
cities of origin to show which centres were most important in terms of grouping Head 
Office, and in some cases looks at how much local involvement there was with these 
companies.   
 
Contributing to the debate over the lifetimes of FSCs will be another aim of Chapter 3. 
Schmitz found that an Edinburgh-based mining FSC could expect on average a lifetime 
of 8.1 years and P. L. Payne calculated a span of 6.4 years for all Scottish based mining 
FSCs.
54
  Kerr’s examination of ranching FSCs provides some clear results with 
companies surviving for only five to six years at best.
55
  These analyses tell us little 
about the specific circumstances and historical development of the companies involved.  
Consideration is rarely given to how the demise of the Free-Standing status of the 
company came about – for instance through bankruptcy, merger with another company 
(perhaps Free-Standing), or by selling to owners in the host country or re-registering 
there.  Chapter 3 presents some conclusions on the reasons for FSC failure, a theme 
which is returned to in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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The second contribution of this thesis is one which has a much wider impact than that 
just on Scotland.  This thesis seeks to go inside the “black box” to examine the internal 
structure and operational history of a carefully selected group of FSCs, in order to 
investigate the effectiveness of the management style and structure used to run these 
companies.  This thesis agrees with Wilkins that the Free-Standing Company existed, 
and still exists, as a separate form of organisation from the multinational company.  
However, there are grounds for further investigation – of core interest here will be the 
importance of the Scottish Head Office to the company and the role that it had within 
the firm.  A key area of inquiry has been to gather evidence relating to the Head Office 
– principally how big it was physically, what was done there and whether the company 
shared it with others or occupied it solely, and even whether it purchased the Head 
Office outright.  On the role of the FSC Head Office the core issue at the extremes has 
been the distinction between a ‘brass nameplate’ presence with perhaps only a secretary 
based there,
56
 or the company being administered through a legal or accountancy 
practice at the address. At the other extreme was a full scale headquarters with a 
secretariat employing a large number of people who held a wide range of 
responsibilities, as described by T. A. B. Corley in his book on one of the larger 
Scottish FSCs, Burmah Oil.
57
 There has been little consideration of the possibility that 
some FSC Head Offices could lie between the extremes. These companies, with no 
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previous operational history in Scotland, came to be based there because of the location 
of their Head Office and its role. 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5 the first two free-standing companies to be examined are the 
Canterbury and Otago Association (C&O), and its better known partner, the New 
Zealand and Australian Land Company (NZALC).  The NZALC had the largest 
capitalization of any Scottish FSC before 1885, with a nominal capital of £2 million at 
its foundation in 1866 which was increased to £2.5 million after merging with the 
smaller C&O in 1877.
58
  Both were farming and land companies: the NZALC operated 
in both Australia and New Zealand, and the C&O concentrated on the Canterbury and 
Otago regions in New Zealand. The NZALC is also unusual in being a large company 
but one whose history is mostly unpublished, apart from the memoirs of William Soltau 
Davidson, its general manager from 1879 to 1915.
59
  Outwardly these two companies 
would have appeared to be mere ‘brass nameplates’ at their shared headquarters in 
Glasgow, but as Chapter 4 makes clear this office had a real administrative role.  The 
management of the C&O and the NZALC is examined to clarify its role within the 
company. 
 
Chapter 6 studies two FSCs operating in the US: the Arizona Copper Company (ACC) 
and the California Redwood Company (CRC).  The US offers an interesting selection of 
case studies as Wilkins based her original thesis that FSCs often failed because of their 
weak management structures primarily on British based FSCs operating in the US.  
These two companies also represented large investments: the Arizona Copper Company 
was the largest mining FSC floated in Scotland before World War I with a nominal 
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capital of £875,000,
60
 and also represented an investment into the copper pyrites 
industry, one of the biggest drivers of industrialisation in the later nineteenth century as 
it supplied the emerging chemical industry.  The section on the California Redwood 
Company studies the structure of a Scottish FSC in the timber industry, a sector not 
usually associated with Scottish investments abroad.
61
  The CRC also makes an 
interesting case study because it was a failure: the core of the business was purchased 
by the Edinburgh based company in 1883 but it entered liquidation in 1885.  A 
legitimate critique of Business History as a discipline is that failures are rarely studied 
in detail because they seldom leave much evidence behind.
62
  In the CRC’s case some 
evidence was left behind and this study has used it to analyse the organisational 
structure of the company.  The role of the CRC’s Head Office will be considered 
important, particularly the issue of whether the company was controlled from Scotland 
or from California, and even whether it could be considered a unified firm, as its 
structure was fairly complex.  Again the issue of crucial importance will be how 
Scottish the company actually was.  Both the ACC and the CRC were mentioned by 
Jackson in The Enterprising Scot, and the ACC was also mentioned by Charles K. Hyde 
in his Copper for America and by Clark C. Spence in British Investments and the 
American Mining Frontier 1860 - 1901.
63
  This study does not aim to present a 
complete history of the ACC or the CRC, but to analyse them from the point of view of 
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their structure as FSCs.  Jackson is closest to this approach and presents a good history 
but tells us little about how the ACC was structured and who was effectively taking 
entrepreneurial control, while Hyde and Spence are more interested specifically in the 
study of the ACC as a mining company.  Jackson’s study of the CRC is also good, but 
again does not highlight the complex structure of the company, and exaggerates the 
importance of the company’s implication in a fraud regarding land ownership as a 
reason for its failure, when in fact it would probably not have been a viable proposition 
in any case. 
 
Chapter 7 studies perhaps the best known category of Scottish FSC investment in the 
late nineteenth century – the involvement of Scottish FSCs in the US range cattle 
industry after 1880.  The main company analysed is the Matador Land and Cattle 
Company, the longest surviving Scottish FSC in the industry.  The main reason for 
looking at cattle in the US has been to provide a comparison between Scottish 
entrepreneurship and investment in the livestock industry in Australasia and that in the 
US.  Further, the Matador, as an important US hosted Scottish FSC, deserves a 
reappraisal in terms of its structure and why it operated effectively when the ACC and 
the CRC ran into so many organisational problems.  A company history, William 
Pearce’s The Matador Land and Cattle Company, has been published, although in 
places Pearce does little more than reproducing the primary sources, and his work also 
lacks a comparative perspective.
64
 Claire Swan has also provided us with a social 
history of the Matador Land and Cattle Company which has traced the careers of many 
of the key participants in the scheme, but does not look in depth at the actual operation 
of the company.
65
   This chapter additionally uses some of the other evidence available 
to come to some conclusions about the organisation of other Scottish ranching FSCs of 
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the period.  Again, the principal priority for this research has been to establish how far 
these companies were actually controlled from Scotland and whether the Scottish Head 
Office had a positive role to play in the organisation of the business. 
Chapter 8 brings the previous chapters together to compare the approaches of all five 
companies studied.  The focus is on examining how far Scottish principals controlled 
their agents in Australasia or the US and looking at what principals were able to do well 
and what they did less well within the five different companies studied.  The 
entrepreneurial motives behind each of the companies are compared and the role of the 
Head Offices contrasted.  Little writing about FSCs has so far examined the role of the 
Head Office within the company, and how important it actually was as an organising 
force.  Again its physical size and what activities were carried out there will be 
considered – perhaps most important here being the location of executive power within 
the firm and whether this was located in Scotland or in the host country.  Those 
companies where management was concentrated in the host country would clearly tend 
towards seeing the FSC as almost a portfolio investment, and if a company based its 
management in Scotland this would tend to regard the FSC as a direct investor.  The 
role of the board is also important here as directors may choose to actively oversee the 
operations of their company in the host country, or take a more laissez-faire approach 
with little or no interest in operations.  Important in this is the question of whether 
Scottish management and/or oversight had anything to offer these businesses in terms of 
an outlet to market, increasing productivity, introducing new skills or resources, or 
recruitment, or whether such a presence simply created an internal rent seeking element 
which impeded corporate performance. 
 
Overall the thesis intends to create a new account of Free-Standing Companies 
headquartered in Scotland. It examines to what extent the FSC being headquartered in 
 37 
Scotland was important in the success or failure of these companies. More widely it will 
add to the debate around the management of FSCs, looking not only at the extent to 
which they were managed from the home country but also at how far they internalised 
information flows.  An important facet of the enquiry has been the examination of the 
borders of the FSCs as firms, looking at which functions were internalised and which 
were not, to assess how far these companies could be considered to fit with Wilkins’ 
prescribed pattern or perhaps had a wider role than she suggested.  The cross country 
comparison adds to this, as this thesis examines how far FSCs hosted in different 
countries were managed differently and management of FSCs in the British Empire 
(represented here by Australia and New Zealand) differed from that of FSCs in the US.  
The choice of companies also allows for some comparison between those whose host 
countries were relatively more or less distant from Scotland. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Survey 
 
 
This chapter lays a historiographic and empirical foundation for the rest of the thesis.  
The chapter examines the existing literature relating to this topic, and its shortcomings 
and places this thesis within the literature. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
This literature survey examines a selection of secondary literature relating to the 
concept of the  free-standing company (FSC) as well as looking at some broader 
literature around the topic of British foreign investment.   It mostly relates to studies of 
the behaviour and formation of free-standing companies originating in Great Britain in 
general (or indeed in other countries such as the Netherlands), as this is the side of the 
topic much of the literature deals with.  It critically examines the existing literature that 
looks at Scottish FSCs in particular.  Some work looking at the specifics of the 
international sides of the industries involved in the thesis is examined, particularly in 
the cases of the livestock farming and copper industries.  Most of the studies looked at 
are based on the period roughly between 1850 and 1914 although the principle of free-
standing companies is in no way unique to this time period.  Indeed, free-standing 
companies continue to emerge in the present era – one such recent example at the time 
of writing has been the Australian based gold exploration project of Scotgold Resources 
Ltd.
66
  However, 1870-1914 is considered to have been the most important period for 
FSC formation. 
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2.2 Wilkins and her followers 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the term ‘free-standing company’ was coined by the American 
business historian Mira Wilkins,
67
 first in her 1986 book chapter ‘Defining a firm: 
history and theory’ and then in her 1988 article ‘The Free-Standing Company, 1870 – 
1914: an important type of British foreign direct investment’.68  Wilkins looked at the 
FSC as a general theme and used a few examples of FSCs to illustrate her thesis.  She 
suggested that FSCs were rarely integrated firms as such, instead being reliant on 
networks, or clusters of agency houses or other intermediaries for management 
purposes. This was necessitated by the characteristic inexperience of FSCs, and Wilkins 
put forward the view more generally that a lot of FSCs failed because they were unable 
to develop a management system suitable for their purposes. There is a Chandlerian 
influence to Wilkins’ hypothesis here, particularly as some of Wilkins’ examples of 
failed FSCs are those operating in the US.  She also contends that many of the surviving 
FSCs based in the US converted to US registration.  The pro-Chandlerian bent of 
Wilkins’ work provoked a strong reaction from business historians, especially those 
studying the UK. 
 
The reaction to Wilkins’ work brought a number of different responses, some of them 
more complimentary than others. As many as 38 articles have appeared citing Wilkins 
1988 article,
69
 some being single company studies seeking to place the experience of 
certain companies within the Free-Standing bracket, others more theoretical and seeking 
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to criticise the concept in general.
70
 Wilkins later followed up the original article in the 
introductory chapter of a 1998 edited collection on FSCs in which she surveyed the 
work done by other historians on the topic and provided some new analysis.
71
  In this 
she widened the field of interest somewhat, realising that free-standing companies were 
not tools of British capitalists alone but were common to those in a wider range of 
‘source-of-capital countries’, particularly other European countries such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium, and even the US.
72
  With reference to Schmitz,
73
 who will be 
discussed in more detail below, she further differentiates the free-standing form from 
the investment trust model as the investment trusts did not make direct investments 
abroad.   At the end of the chapter is a short explanation in which she suggests that 
British entrepreneurs went overseas in search of new opportunities due to a lack of such 
opportunities at home, while American firms were still concentrating on meeting the 
potential of their home market.
74
  Britain also had a competitive advantage in its 
financial infrastructure, which was at that stage the best developed in the world and had 
an enabling web of trading links.  Certainly Scotland appears at that time to have 
possessed a financial structure of high sophistication, with a comparatively large 
number of banks.  It also had a web of existing trading links with other parts of the 
world, much as its English counterparts did. 
 
Moving on to other theorists, in 1994, T. A. B. Corley made reference to the concept in 
two articles.  In the first, ‘Britain’s Overseas Investments in 1914 Revisited’,75 Corley 
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briefly considers the distinction between a Free-Standing Company and a multinational, 
suggesting along with Wilkins that a multinational lies closer to American practice in 
having more activities in its home country than a purely symbolic head office.  He 
furthers the idea slightly by suggesting that British FSCs had a particular competitive 
strength originating in the background of their directors who often came from 
overlapping social groups.  While the expected solicitors and accountants as well as 
managers of trading companies might be there, individuals with backgrounds in mining, 
brewing, and foodstuffs manufacture were also involved. It is worth considering in 
more detail what these people’s links with these industries in Britain were.  These issues 
will be considered further in Chapters 5 and 7 where the links between Free-Standing 
Companies investing in livestock industries in Australasia and the US and the meat 
import industry in the UK will be expanded upon.  If these individuals were closely 
linked to these industries, then presumably their expertise would be called upon in 
establishing the new FSCs, at least in an advisory capacity.  Most usefully for the 
purposes of this thesis, Corley adds that the core issue here is to what extent FSC type 
companies were controlled from their home country and whether the control was often 
so weak that these companies could actually be considered portfolio investments.   
 
Corley notes that in a 1974 article focusing on manufacturing multinationals John 
Stopford had identified a third group of investments apart from portfolio and direct, 
‘expatriate’.  This concept sounds a little like Wilkins’ later FSC concept in that these 
were companies that were not controlled directly from the UK but sometimes had a 
financial shell in Britain.
76
  Corley suggests that all such expatriate companies should 
correctly be considered distinct from direct investment, but overlooks that Stopford 
mentions that these expatriate firms might have a financial shell in the UK, which 
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would suggest some sort of Head Office function, even if very nominal.  Wilkins also 
argues that not all Stopford’s expatriate firms are FSCs, but what all three authors seem 
to overlook is that the term expatriate suggests a firm that is owned by emigrants 
(though perhaps with some home shareholding), has its Head Office in the country to 
which its owners had migrated, and has its operations in that country too.  Arguably, 
then, such a business would not represent any form of foreign investment if there were 
no home shareholders, and if there were, it could be categorised as a portfolio 
investment. 
 
Corley’s other 1994 article77 was written in response to an article by Hennart78 in which 
it was suggested that FSCs had emerged as a means of exporting capital.  This was a 
type of ‘internalisation of intermediate factors’ with finance as an intermediate factor 
substituting for those more often held by multinational enterprises such as knowledge, 
raw materials, or distribution services.  According to Hennart, FSCs were often found in 
high risk undertakings, particularly mining, in which capital could not be invested into 
collateral and were thus unable to raise loan finance, meaning that equity based 
solutions were the answer to this problem.
79
  This contention arises from the idea that 
FSCs were concentrated in the speculative mining industry – although as Chapter 3 
will illustrate the speculative mining industry was important, but not the sole area of 
interest to Scottish FSCs.  A mine is worthless if it contains nothing but on the other 
hand a cattle ranch, if it fails, still has its land which can probably be put to a more 
profitable alternative use.  The assumption is made here by Hennart that FSCs usually 
emerged in sectors requiring little capital; yet mining often requires a large amount of 
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engineering work which would suggest a necessity for higher capital, in larger scale 
cases at least.   
 
Hennart also seems to assume that the entrepreneurial impetus for the FSC must always 
come from the host country rather than the home country, and that the company 
internalises only the raising of capital.
80
 Corley, by contrast, argued that FSCs were 
capable of more internalisation than Wilkins’ original specification may have allowed 
for. The existence of capital and the need to provide a conduit for it were not the sole 
motivations for establishing a Free-Standing Company.  Corley argues that 
entrepreneurship was at least equally essential.  Indeed, he goes further and uses 
practical examples to challenge Wilkins’ original assertion, quoting Nicholas, that the 
headquarters of most FSCs consisted of little more than “a brass nameplate some place 
in the City”.81  Corley contends this probably depended in part upon the industry 
structure in which the Free-Standing Company operated, and uses the example that the 
Burmah Oil Company may have left routine sales to be carried out by its managers in 
Burmah but overall marketing policy remained in the hands of Head Office.
82
  It would 
seem unlikely that a company such as Burmah whose main market remained in its 
country of origin would leave marketing to management in its host country, as sales 
relationships would be better built up with close contact with potential customers.  This 
seems particularly likely to be the case with companies which targeted their sales in the 
United Kingdom, but would be less likely in the case of a ranching and meat packing 
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company operating in the American Mid-west and marketing its products on the US 
East Coast. 
 
Hennart
83
 and Corley
84
 returned to this discussion in 1998 with their respective chapters 
in Wilkins and Schroter’s edited collection The Free-Standing Company in the World 
Economy 1830 – 1996. Hennart continued to develop the transaction cost rationale for 
the FSC by suggesting that trading companies might create FSCs that could act as their 
own customers.  For instance, Hennart draws on the work of Peter Hertner to show that 
electrical equipment firms in Germany created FSCs that were dependent upon them in 
some way, such as establishing electric tramways or electrical supply companies.
85
  
This linked back to Wilkins’ original hypothesis that trading houses acted as a nexus for 
much FSC activity – Hennart extended this by implying that such houses could attempt 
to control all stages of the production chain.  Risk in setting up extractive ventures 
could be divested with equity, and the trading firms were kept ‘small and nimble’ and 
presumably safely within private hands.
 86
  Thus according to this account FSCs were 
not really Free-Standing but only part of larger unincorporated multinational structures.  
Hennart might have taken this a little further; unfortunately he does not examine 
whether these chains of dependency were long lasting.   
 
Meanwhile Corley built upon his earlier work with Burmah Oil by suggesting that 
Wilkins’ idealised model of a firm operating in one country with a minimal Head Office 
in another was unlikely to exist in practice, again arguing that Head Offices in ‘overseas 
firms’, which he argued were not identical to FSCs, would inevitably expand their 
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activities to the governance of the whole business.  Corley argued that Wilkins’ typical 
FSC with a minimal Head Office did not exist, although most of the evidence he uses 
comes from successful companies in the oil industry.
87
 Corley makes the point that 
individual firms perhaps need to be analysed on a case-by-case basis, with 
generalisation being difficult if not impossible, arguing that the concept of the Free-
Standing Company should be re-examined along more scientific lines than hitherto.
88
  
However, this thesis has found plenty of evidence that ‘overseas companies’, or FSCs 
with only minimal Head Offices, did exist in Scotland – two of these are examined in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
 
A more useful theoretical chapter in Wilkins’ edited 1998 volume was contributed by 
Mark Casson,  who used a series of matrices and diagrams to explore different types of 
Free-Standing Companies, usefully identifying four types based on whether they 
exported information or technology.
89
  This was partly intended to be a critique of 
Hennart’s transaction costs approach, but is useful as Casson is arguing that FSCs could 
operate as quasi-multinationals if their role was to export information or technology – 
but could potentially still fall into the category of FSC, at least superficially. Casson 
argued that FSCs could be tools for networks to avoid concentrating too much risk into 
the same firm – and that even the use of managing agencies could be key to this as the 
separation of ownership from management helped further diminish this risk. Hold-up 
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problems encountered in one area of a large firm’s operations were less likely to have 
financial knock-on effects for the entire firm.  Another crucial contribution is the idea 
that a lot of management activity could still take place in the home country, but not at 
the legal headquarters of the firm.  Instead access to markets, either to raise Bills of 
Exchange to finance trade, or to hedge risks by purchasing futures, as well as for 
marketing purposes could be important for FSC principals.
90
  This work has some 
relevance to this thesis in looking at the different internalisation models encountered, 
although the managing agency itself does not seem always to have been crucial to the 
operations of FSCs – in fact, two of the companies looked at in this thesis, the Arizona 
Copper Company and the Matador Land and Cattle Company, did not rely on managing 
agencies at any stage in the host country.   
 
There is also the possibility that managing agencies themselves could be considered 
FSCs in the sense that they often had a base in the home country as well as in the 
operating country, but no interests in the home country except for their shareholding in 
the FSC.  Trading firms such as Jardine Matheson, the Swire Group and the Mackinnon 
Group among others often used their head offices in London or Scotland to promote 
free-standing companies before using their offices in host countries to help manage 
them.
91
  On the other hand, while such trading groups may arguably have constituted 
single firms they were not generally single companies in terms of registration, usually 
having more complex structures. Such trading groups generally used FSCs to contain 
risk within a certain business activity.  Some managing agencies, such as the stock and 
station agents of Australasia, did not have a home country base, and were examples of 
emigrant capitalism.  One such example is George Gray Russel & Co. of Dunedin and 
Timaru, established in 1864 by Scottish emigrants in New Zealand, which assisted the 
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New Zealand and Australian Land Company, dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5 to become 
established.
92
 
 
One of the earliest articles to take account of Wilkins’ theory of FSCs was published in 
1990 when Charles Harvey collaborated with Jon Press in a more general study of 
international mining, effectively applying Wilkins’ idea to this industry in cases 
previously considered to represent portfolio investment.
93
  This article concentrated 
exclusively on the contribution of the City of London to the phenomenon of FSCs that 
were formed to pursue mining claims outside the UK.  Harvey and Press examine in a 
broad way the use of the London stock exchange to float as many as 8,400 such 
companies between 1880 and 1914, although very few of these attempts generated any 
serious activity.  Harvey and Press carry out a survey of companies listed on the stock 
exchange in three years – 1875, 1894 and 1913 - to identify the levels of capital 
employed in these ventures.  It is unfortunate that the scope of a journal article and time 
constraints did not allow for a large survey of every year between 1870 and 1914. 
Unsurprisingly, the number of companies registered per annum rises from 39 in 1875 to 
957 in 1913 and the total invested rises from £11 million to £240 million, with no 
indication of any peaks or troughs that might have existed between the dates.
94
   
 
In spite of the difficulties with the quantitative side of Harvey and Press’ analysis, they 
provide us with a possible model of a typical free-standing company promotion in the 
mining industry.  In this they suggest that the usual pattern started with the purchase or 
discovery of a theoretical mineral claim by a professional promoter who would promote 
a company purely with the aim of selling the claim to the company.  This company 
would in many cases collapse quite quickly from simple lack of expertise either in 
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mining or administering an international business, while the promoter escaped relatively 
unharmed.
95
  H. Osborne O’Hagan, one such nineteenth-century company promoter, 
tells a similar story in his memoirs regarding the promotion of the Little Annie Gold-
Mine.
96
  This pattern seems plausible although Harvey and Press do not consider the 
realistic potential for such a pattern to continue in the marketplace unchecked for 
several years.  More usefully, Harvey and Press focus on the fact that the 
entrepreneurial impetus for FSCs in the mining industry often came from the host 
country. This could have further implications for control if a company was successfully 
floated, although here Harvey and Press seem to assume that such a company would 
always undergo a stock market flotation. 
 
An important recent contribution on the subject of international business is Geoffrey 
Jones’ Merchants to Multinationals of 2002, which aimed to test the theories of Wilkins 
and Chapman by focusing on the role of merchants and trading companies in clusters.
97
  
Here Jones was, like Chapman, primarily interested in the investment groups 
themselves rather than the Free-Standing Company – for Jones the FSC was merely a 
tool for these investment companies to operate within.  Jones focused largely on 
merchant groups based in London and involved in the trade with Southern and Eastern 
Asia, and on Free-Standing Companies based in London and hosted in the same region.  
The main Scottish groups of interest to Jones were the Finlays, and Mackinnon 
McKenzie & Co, both of whom were mostly interested in South Asia.
98
  According to 
Jones, trading companies were able to use the limited liability of FSCs to gain a ‘badge 
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of respectability’ to encourage individuals to invest in their extractive businesses.99 
Jones also argues that real management control was present within the FSCs in these 
groups, being exercised from Britain.  What remains unclear from Jones’ book, 
however, is how FSCs that were not part of a wider trading cluster were managed, or 
whether a trading cluster was essential for FSCs to operate successfully.  This thesis 
will look mostly at FSCs that, while often being associated with financial groupings, 
were not associated with trading houses as Jones would understand them, although a 
role often remained for local intermediaries. 
 
2.3 Scotland Specific Approaches 
 
 
Of some practical yet limited interest has been some of the literature on company 
formation in the second half of the nineteenth century.  H. A. Shannon’s 1933 survey of 
the limited companies registered in England between 1866 and 1883 made a modest 
start to evaluating the stock of limited companies but influenced later literature.
100
  
Shannon mostly provides statistics for the companies without considering the reasons or 
practicalities behind their formation except the existence of the 1856 Joint Stock 
Companies Act and subsequent adjustments.  In 1980 P. L. Payne made greater progress 
in this area of study with his statistical analysis of Scottish Limited Companies founded 
between 1856 and 1895.
101
  As well as studying the numbers of companies in existence 
some thought is put into explaining their existence as well as their longevity.  In doing 
this Payne finds that the ‘average’ (actually the mean) length of survival for a mining or 
quarrying ‘overseas company’ founded between 1856 and 1895 was 6.4 years.102  He 
also finds means for companies in other sectors but does not differentiate between the 
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domestic and overseas spheres.
103
  Payne gives some aggregate capitalisations for 
companies involved in ‘overseas investment’ between 1861 and 1895, and discusses the 
subject to some extent in the text, but with little analysis.
104
    He does not compare the 
amount of limited company activity involved, respectively, with foreign and domestic 
investment.  Doing this could shed some further light on the usefulness of the 
registration system and the attractiveness of the FSC to the small investor as compared 
to domestic based firms.  His most interesting piece of analysis is his attempt to test 
econometrically the hypothesis that called-up capital at the birth of a company in some 
way influences its longevity. His regressions turn out to be statistically insignificant and 
suggest that starting capital was irrelevant.
105
  Such factors may prove difficult to 
define, however; each case is empirically different and these analyses do not take into 
account managerial issues within firms particularly in terms of viability, productivity or 
demand based problems. 
 
Following on from Payne, Schmitz (1997)
106
 presents detailed numbers relating to 
Scottish foreign investment but makes only minor reference to Wilkins’ concept of 
Free-Standing Companies.  His rationale for this is that Wilkins has complicated the 
issue of portfolio investment. Schmitz sees that firms formed to operate overseas were 
intended to exist in a more speculative ‘hands off’ fashion than Wilkins suggests.  Many 
hundreds of FSCs were likely to be included in his survey of the registration files of 
some 784 companies formed to operate abroad. Indeed, Wilkins, in her 1998 book 
chapter,
107
 returns to his data and separates as many as 87 investment trusts from 
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Schmitz’s sample, suggesting that the remaining 697 are possible FSCs.108  The product 
of Schmitz’s survey is a quantitative analysis which gives some figures for survival and 
also considers the sector in which the companies were placed.  Most interestingly, 
Schmitz finds that the mean lifespan for all sectors was 19 years but only 8.1 years in 
mining, suggesting a higher failure rate in that sector.   
 
The scope of this article is somewhat limited as Schmitz is really only interested in 
capital export rather than extending into entrepreneurial initiative. On this topic Schmitz 
carries out a survey of the locations and types of persons that held foreign assets or 
shares in companies intended to operate abroad. However, more work needs to be done 
here to examine the hypothesis that Scottish investors often invested in firms 
headquartered close to their homes.  Schmitz also examined many limited companies in 
his survey but does not consider the Wilkins hypothesis that merchant houses acted as 
organisers of clusters of limited companies. Another problem is that Schmitz does not 
consider the fact that though investment trusts were founded with the primary intention 
of purchasing securities or selling mortgages abroad, their operations were largely 
carried out in Scotland. 
 
 
Another work which presents an overview of Scottish foreign investment is Ranald 
Michie’s 1981 study of Scottish financial history.109  When examining foreign 
investment Michie concentrates on activity centred on the regional Stock Exchanges in 
                                                 
108
 Schmitz principally used the National Archives of Scotland’s BT2 Companies House registration files 
on dissolved companies to carry out his survey – this is the same body of archives used in Chapter 3.  
Schmitz was sponsored by the ESRC, grant number R000232212 to undertake this research.  
Unfortunately this pre-dated the present (2009) ESRC practice of publishing reports on their website but 
the research was published as the aforementioned Schmitz, "The Nature and Dimensions of Scottish 
Foreign Investment." 
109
 Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in 
Nineteenth - Century Scotland. 
 52 
Scotland, and mentions a number of the more prominent Scottish FSCs.  He also 
theorizes a little about motives for investing abroad, suggesting that it may have become 
attractive because of a lack of other investment opportunities in Scotland at that time. In 
a country with rapid economic growth, land was at a premium and therefore relatively 
expensive, with little chance of improvement in value.  This problem was probably 
exacerbated by the feu duty system whereby the owners of land continued to pay an 
annual fee to its previous owners, potentially continuing along a long chain of 
owners.
110
  This could mean that property investment was restricted by very low 
margins above rents so may not have been such an attractive option, while in the post 
Napoleonic era the national debt was being reduced and so there were fewer and more 
expensive issues of government stock.  Evidence relating to returns from domestic 
stocks is contradictory.  Edelstein suggests that the returns from domestically-based 
public transport systems were very high in the 1870s and 1880s although little specific 
economic history has been written on this subject.
 111
  However, Michie gives much 
useful material about the stock exchanges as institutions, providing some useful 
background information.  An interesting fact is that the formation of the Dundee stock 
exchange in 1879 appears to slightly precede the rush of interest in ranching firms in the 
early 1880s, a possible link which authors on the topic seem not to have examined. 
 
2.4 Country- and case-based approaches 
 
 
The classic study of the topic of British foreign investment in general was by Davis and 
Huttenback,
112
  who examined the British Empire in general from an economic 
perspective, in terms of the direction of investment, as well as looking at the profit and 
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loss account of maintaining the Empire.  The emphasis is mostly on the relation of the 
UK as a whole, especially London, to the Empire, although the overall examination 
provides some useful figures.  Particularly of interest in the Scottish case is the claimed 
loss of $18m between 1884 and 1900 in US cattle ranching.  According to Davis and 
Huttenback, India was a more important destination for capital than many writers 
suggest; extractive industries were particularly important around the dependent Empire.  
Probably Davis and Huttenback’s most interesting question is whether it was rational 
for the UK’s economic actors to invest in the Empire.  However, their analysis perhaps 
suffers from being very general in scope without concentrating on (especially firm-) 
specific types of investment. Firm specific case studies can help us further in thinking 
about rationality and transaction cost issues, and as Chapters 4 and 5 show Free-
Standing Companies had an important role in binding together the imperial system. 
 
Turning to country and company studies relevant to this thesis, relatively little has been 
written about Scottish business in Australia or New Zealand in the business history 
literature, although social historians have helped by mentioning Scottish business in the 
emigration literature to some extent.  A pioneering contribution in this area was David 
Macmillan’s article in Payne’s classic 1967 compendium Studies in Scottish Business 
History.
113
  This article looks at the subject almost from the first settlement of Australia 
by the British in the late 18
th
 century, tracing the development of Scottish interest in 
commerce there from early merchant activity in Sydney through to the involvement of 
James Morton and the New Zealand and Australian Land Company (NZALC) in the 
1870s. Other subjects dealt with include the evolution of Scottish-Australian commerce 
through early trading firms and early trust style companies, although the article does not 
show clearly how these different trends blended together as the pastoral industry in 
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Australia became more established.  The page about James Morton and his entry to the 
Australian mercantile scene after the success of the Scottish Australian Company is of 
use, although it shows the need for more concentrated research on the NZALC.  
Macmillan refers to the NZALC as the ‘New Zealand Land Company’, and attributes its 
organisation to Morton in the early 1870s.
114
  As noted in Chapter 4, this company was 
established almost a decade earlier in 1866.  Further, Macmillan has comparatively little 
to say about the later activity of the NZALC and its development as a trading system, 
which became quite sophisticated even before the end of Macmillan’s period of 
reference in 1879.  Macmillan’s work concentrates on the NZALC’s role in the wider 
economy rather than examining the effects of its internal structure upon the wider 
economy. 
 
Among the emigration literature Gordon Donaldson’s 1966 The Scots Overseas is an 
important monograph looking at Scots emigration to a variety of countries, including 
Australia, New Zealand and the US.
115
  Donaldson does not deal with the links between 
emigration and foreign investment, and more specifically the possibility that the 
overseas companies that came to be known as FSCs, facilitated emigration by sending 
employees abroad.  This thesis asks how Scottish these FSCs actually were and how far 
managerial control extended into the host countries of FSCs. It is plausible to assume 
that would include sending Scottish employees to the host country, something that 
Wilkins does not specify.  Later work on emigration is a little more fruitful in this 
direction.  Tom Brooking’s article on New Zealand in R.A. Cage’s 1985 edited 
collection on Scottish emigration has a short section on the Canterbury and Otago 
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Association and the NZALC.
116
  There is little space to outline much of these two 
companies’ development as trading systems, although the NZALC’s later achievements 
in exporting frozen meat and dairy products as well as the company’s expertise in 
breeding are noted.  It is unclear how this material was sourced as the section lacks 
footnotes, but for certain it does not go far in explaining how the NZALC actually 
worked as an organisation.
117
  Eric Richards’s section on Australia in the same volume 
does not mention the NZALC but briefly considers the role of Scottish capital in 
Australia, although not FSCs.
118
  The role of the Scots in filtering funds for banking is 
considered as well as their part in founding early pastoral companies, and obviously 
these developments were instrumental in establishing the grounds for FSCs to come in 
later.  Bernard Aspinwall’s contribution, ‘Scots in the United States’, is perhaps least 
useful as it focuses almost entirely upon social mobility and entrepreneurism among 
Scots already in the US.
119
 
 
The most important recent contribution to the emigration literature has been Malcolm 
Prentis’s The Scots in Australia, of which a new and updated edition was published in 
2008.
120
  Prentis’s book is a social history of the migrants although he also extends the 
sphere into pastoralism and business more generally.  Prentis builds a relatively 
comprehensive view of the Scots’ contribution to Australian agriculture and commerce 
in this period, looking at involvement across a range of agricultural specialisms and 
business areas, particularly in mining, banking, shipping and manufacturing. The study 
takes a qualitative approach, looking at people and firms on a case by case basis, which 
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does make typicality within the book hard to establish.  Probably the most puzzling 
thing about Prentis’s study however, given the insistence on this approach, is the lack of 
any mention of the NZALC, not only an important Scottish influence in Australian 
economic development and pastoralism but, as Chapters 4 and 5 note, a source of 
young and skilled immigrants.  Although the exact number of immigrants that NZALC 
was responsible for remains unclear, Prentis’s book follows a qualitative model looking 
at individuals as well as large groups of immigrants, and so it might be thought that the 
skills of the NZALC staff would be worth a mention. 
 
Turning to the US side and back to the Business History literature, probably the most 
comprehensive book published on Scottish FSCs in this period was W. Turrentine 
Jackson’s 1968 classic The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 
1873.
121
  This landmark monograph is still the definitive work on Scottish investment 
activity in the Western US in this period, although there remains room for improvement.  
Jackson looks across the board at a range of activity – starting with the investment trusts 
in Edinburgh and Dundee, and then widening out into Scottish involvement in US 
mortgaging, railroads, cattle, mining and forestry.  Some of the companies looked at by 
Jackson, particularly in railroads, cattle, mining and forestry, fit into the FSC category, 
including an entire chapter on the cattle FSCs (actually based on his earlier work)
122
 and 
a further chapter on the Arizona Copper Company, which is also examined in Chapter 
6 of this thesis. The Enterprising Scot was also an important inspiration for Wilkins in 
defining the Free-Standing Company as she drew on it for her standard history of 
foreign investment in the United States, and she stated in the 1998 article that working 
on that project was an important reason for believing that a new term was required to 
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define such companies.
123
 Jackson’s real interest in The Enterprising Scot is in 
examining investment rather than management. The book is very readable but lacks a 
framework, and to a large extent does not analyse clearly enough the relations between 
the Scottish Head Office and shareholders and the operational staff in the US.  Jackson 
attempts to come up with a balance sheet to measure the overall success or failure of 
Scottish investment, but it is left unclear if successful firms shared any specific 
characteristics, or if there were any particular models for success.  When looking at the 
individual companies Jackson tends to concentrate on their activities in the US, without 
focusing much on the relative difficulty of controlling these assets from Scotland.  This 
thesis will improve upon Jackson by looking more closely at the relations between the 
Scottish side of companies and the operational side in the US, with a particular 
emphasis on where managerial power was located within the firm. 
 
Another key study in the history of Scottish FSCs is W. G. Kerr’s 1967 study of Texan 
ranching, which Kerr followed with a chapter in his 1976 book Scottish Capital on the 
American Credit Frontier.
124
  This studies in some detail the mania of the early 1880s 
for setting up ranching firms in Texas which seems to have pervaded the capital markets 
in Edinburgh and Dundee, and to some extent, London.  According to Kerr, however, 
most of the fascination with this involved Edinburgh and Dundee and as many as 
nineteen possible FSCs were formed there, although only about five were successful in 
the long run.  Kerr’s real interest in the later book is in the mortgage and investment 
trust business, although he suggests that the interest in the cattle industry helped to feed 
back into the mortgage industry, where linkages were possible via agent-sharing. Kerr 
carried out a lot of research into the boards of the various cattle companies in Edinburgh 
                                                 
123
 Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914.  Wilkins, "The Free Standing 
Company Revisited," p. 6. 
124
 Kerr, "Scottish Investment and Enterprise in Texas.", Kerr, Scottish Capital on the American Credit 
Frontier. 
 58 
or Dundee but fails to give the reader a good sense of what the role of these boards 
actually was.  Further, the point is made that the management of the Matador Land and 
Cattle Company was important to its success but the actual management of this 
company is not elaborated on to any great extent.
125
  Kerr does make the point that 
promoters of the earlier investment trusts often crossed over into the apparently more 
risky promotion of cattle firms (and, as Jackson had already shown, mining companies 
too).  However, this may miss the point somewhat as the cattle companies potentially 
allowed for some risk spreading away from the investment trusts.  A related investment 
in a complementary industry in newly opening areas of the US could encourage 
agglomeration.  Kerr also notes the significance of the JA Ranch, privately-owned but 
backed by the Texas Land and Mortgage Company. However, Kerr does not tell us a 
great deal about it, probably because its private ownership did not leave behind a lot of 
evidence.
126
   
 
The one company looked at in detail in this thesis that already has a corporate history 
written about it is the Matador Land and Cattle Company, the fortunes of which were 
chronicled by W. M. Pearce.
127
  The Matador was a Texan cattle ranching concern 
which was purchased by a Dundee based limited company during the ranching mania of 
the early 1880s.  Pearce provides us with a reasonable company history, although he 
gives relatively little financial data about the firm.  He focuses mainly upon the firm’s 
operations in the US and Canada and particularly upon the relationships between 
individuals within the firm.  Perhaps most interestingly for this study, he also spends 
some time looking at the communications which survive between Dundee and Texas, 
particularly the use of telegraph and the use of ciphers to save text length in telegrams. 
In addition many letters are reproduced in full.  Pearce draws our attention to the 
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difficulty of running an FSC well, without showing an awareness of the wider 
implications of his study. This is an issue particularly with reference to the great 
transaction cost and agency problems faced by the Matador as a company operating in a 
developing territory. In the early 1880s northern Texas was only newly settled, and 
property rights and other institutions were not well established there.  Pearce draws our 
attention to problems with banking: the Matador also required three different bank 
accounts held at three different banks to manage funds. Receipts were deposited with 
the Texas City National Bank in Fort Worth before being exchanged to the UK by New 
York City based specialists Jesup, Paton & Co., and finally deposited in the British 
Linen Company, at that time one of the UK’s larger commercial banks.128  Different 
sets of solicitors also had to be employed for the different jurisdictions, again adding to 
costs.  This could be taken further to find if these more complicated administrative 
procedures made FSCs more difficult to administer than single country firms.  In cases 
of apparent lean corporate governance it would appear to be a potentially disabling 
factor. 
 
Pearce’s main shortcoming is that as a case study he does not compare the Matador as a 
firm to its competitors, and particularly not to any indigenous US competitors (indeed it 
is unclear to the reader whether indigenous competitors exist at all).
129
  Wider context 
on the industry side in the US would be useful as well as on the Scottish side: at present 
it is unclear why the Matador should be considered important.  It would therefore be a 
useful exercise to compare the Matador further with other Scottish FSCs hosted in the 
US. 
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2.5 Shortcomings of the literature 
 
 
The literature approaches this topic from two essentially different directions. First, there 
is the Business History literature looking from an almost global perspective, and second 
a wide body of empirical literature investigating specific countries or firms.  In 
particular, previous writers in this topic area have not considered the implications of 
wider economic theory in relation to their findings about overseas investment 
originating in Scotland.  Part of the difficulty is that such studies have been pursued by 
specialists in Scottish, US, Australian or social history (as opposed to business history) 
and thus the question of typicality is not considered.  Analyses such as those by 
Schmitz, Kerr and Pearce also tend to be more empirically based and hence do not 
consider the enabling factors as much as the factual background involved in furthering 
overseas based investment.  Some, such as Kerr, are somewhat light on quantitative 
detail and in this way lack a depth which would make for improved understanding.  
Such articles are a little disappointing to the business historian seeking to test Wilkins’ 
theory on ‘overseas companies’ based in Scotland which by Wilkins’ own admission 
would appear to provide a very fertile testing ground. 
 
Free-Standing Companies seem to have been extremely important in the Scottish 
context. Many writers have seen them as merely a financial instrument but this appears 
unlikely as actual managerial and specialist expertise would have been required to 
operate successfully any firm with a non-financial purpose.  For example, Kerr 
mentions as many as nineteen different concerns involved in ranching, of which three 
survived for longer than about ten years in their Free-Standing form.
130
  It is not clear 
whether the failure of the others relates to a lack of expertise in cattle farming or 
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perhaps to the practical problems of operating a business over a long distance.  
Certainly many of these ranches emerged as a response to perceived specific investment 
opportunities: in the best documented case, that of the Matador, Dundonian investors 
formed a company specifically to take advantage of a perceived opportunity.  However, 
the Matador was not intended to be managerially ‘hands-off’.  The pattern set out by 
Wilkins was followed – it had a Dundee based board of directors and secretary, and a 
Texas based manager – but according to Pearce the manager was frequently expected to 
follow instructions and communicate with the directors by cable and letter.  Indeed it 
appears that the manager did not always stay in touch as much as the directors would 
have wished.
131
  The Dundonian directors also appear to have approached the business 
with a specific plan to apply their capital to improve the productivity and value of the 
existing ranch by erecting fences and improving the water supply on the land.  This is in 
contrast to the early practice of employing hands to patrol ranch boundaries; a practice 
which would appear wasteful in the extreme as cattle were free to wander into lands 
belonging to other ranches.
132
  This practice and the later further enclosure of cattle 
according to stages of growth may in part have been conditioned by typical Scottish 
practices, though as Chapter 7 shows there is little evidence of knowledge transfer in 
ranching FSCs. 
 
An important strategic aspect of more successful FSCs, such as the Matador and the 
NZALC, may have been the determination of Scottish directors to keep a close leash on 
the way that scarce company funds were utilised in the field. The cattle companies 
referred to by Kerr seem to have obtained substantial proportions of their capital from 
Edinburgh, Dundee or London and were formed in the midst of a mania.  Where Kerr 
and to some extent Jackson leave us in the dark is why so many firms chose to enter this 
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market and why they subsequently left it so rapidly.  Chapter 3 looks at the amount of 
capital poured into the American West by Scottish FSC shareholders in the 1880-5 
period and how far this capital followed economic growth.  On the management side 
Chapter 7 examines how the Matador was different from its more short-lived 
competitors.  An alternative scenario would be that the Matador managed to import 
expertise from Scotland while its rivals did not, or that it managed to find expertise in 
the US under the guidance of the Dundee board.   According to Pearce, the Matador’s 
assistant manager William Sommerville already had experience in the cattle industry in 
northern Britain; of course this was probably not on the same scale, and Pearce 
unfortunately does not elaborate.
133
  They may also have been helped by the agreement 
of Henry H. Campbell, one of the Matador’s founding managers, to stay on as manager 
of the new free-standing company.  It is possible that the Matador’s competitors had 
failed to make such useful connections, although ultimately numerous other factors such 
as poor weather or less advantageous geographical positioning of their ranches could be 
significant in their failure.   
 
Such difficulties may have arisen from problems with information and the likelihood 
that the proliferation of ‘pocket ranchers’ in the early 1880s referred to by Kerr led to 
some fraudulent promotions.
134
 For instance, Frank L. Underwood’s Kansas City based 
firm Underwood, Clark & Co. played a role in a variety of promotions both in ranching 
and in other industries, such as the Arizona Copper Company discussed in Chapter 6. 
Underwood’s role is unclear though he may have been similar to the mining promoters 
referred to by Harvey and Press who promoted FSCs apparently only to sell 
speculatively bought claims.  Possibly he attempted to hold some kind of consultancy 
role lending expertise to firms in the sense suggested by Wilkins, while not having to tie 
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up his own capital in the cluster of firms that he promoted.  It is particularly unclear 
why Underwood did not follow a more sustainable course such as setting up a single 
large ranching company under his own auspices.  Such a firm could have benefited from 
almost £4 million worth of capitalisation if Kerr’s figures on the paid-up capital of the 
eleven companies based in Dundee alone are to be believed.  Given the contemporary 
success of the NZALC as a large firm which combined a number of different interests in 
Australia and New Zealand, it is puzzling that merging together the American cattle 
interests of the numerous Scottish FSCs was not considered. 
 
A possible reason that such a large firm was not formed may have been the difficulty of 
persuading all of the potential board members to part with the necessary funds initially 
for what must have appeared to be a very high risk activity.  The ranches set up by these 
FSCs were among the first waves of permanent settlement in the American Mid-west - 
according to Pearce they filled the gap in land exploitation left by the over-hunting of 
buffalo on the prairies.
135
  These lands were often inhospitable
136
 and their realistic 
suitability for cattle grazing may originally have been unclear as grass resources were 
finite and access to water sources was crucial.  As was apparent to the Matador’s board, 
such difficulties could be circumvented only by careful management; and it is worth 
noting that considerable caution was employed in setting up this ranch.  Independent 
reports were sought into the condition of the property, for example, previous to the 
decision to purchase the firm.  One question not asked by Wilkins, Jackson, Kerr or a 
number of other authors is how far prospective FSC promoters researched their 
investments.  If little research was carried out, this may suggest that a new scheme was 
intended to be particularly speculative.  This is equally applicable to companies 
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involved in other spheres of primary production such as mining and plantations as it is 
to those involved in ranching. 
 
One potential argument is that this may not need to be such a concern to potential 
investors in a firm.  As Hart suggested in 1995, firms with a large numbers of small 
shareholders may experience a distinct lack of interest from their shareholders who may 
believe their influence to be too small to exercise any great interest in the firm.
137
  This 
problem is especially present if shareholders are widely dispersed and unlikely ever to 
meet or even in contact with each other.  Interestingly, in the Scottish case this may not 
be so; Payne, Schmitz, Kerr and Jackson have all suggested that many of the 
shareholders in Scottish FSCs were located close to the offices of promoters or the main 
stock exchanges.  Possibly, therefore shareholders, both small and large, were more 
likely to attend annual meetings and communicate with each other, to pay attention to 
their investments and put pressure on those elected to manage them. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
A final caveat may be necessary.  Some authors of case studies on this topic have 
pointed to the lean governance employed in some FSCs, as indeed did Wilkins.  
Measuring entrepreneurial failure may be difficult.  The role of entrepreneurs and their 
part within the larger economy is something business historians have disputed at length. 
Some suggest that entrepreneurs directly organise the creation of wealth and gain from 
trade while others suggest that they have a passive role, simply optimising factors of 
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production to generate profit.  According to Gordon Boyce and Simon Ville,
138
 
economists divide into three schools over this issue:  
 
1. Frank Knight is an example of those who suggested that entrepreneurs were key 
in bearing risk in the economy.
139
  
 
2. Schumpeter wrote that entrepreneurs were responsible for creative 
destruction,
140
  and that they introduced ground breaking new technologies that 
helped to change the dynamics of marketplaces.   
 
3. Kirzner wrote that entrepreneurs simply fulfilled a role of arbitrage, bringing 
markets into equilibrium by exploiting price and production gaps between other 
actors.
141
   
 
Thus differing schools see entrepreneurs as both creative and destructive forces.  
However we see the individual firm, whether as a nexus of contracts or as a device for 
pooling knowledge, governance remains important in terms of corporate success or 
failure.  The founding of an FSC would appear to require some entrepreneurial skill to 
find a possible opportunity for exploitation, and its continuation would appear to require 
a large amount of informed decision making.  Clearly an FSC is an excellent example of 
a new combination in the Schumpeterian sense.  This thesis will examine this in a 
qualitative manner and analyse key decisions and the structures employed to create such 
new combinations. 
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This thesis seeks to add to our existing knowledge of the topic first by bringing together 
the various threads of the existing diverse historiography with as yet undocumented 
material.  At present there is a gap between the writing of historians of Scotland on the 
subject and the writing of business historians.  Historians of Scotland generally have 
been interested in this topic to a certain degree, but tend to bundle the whole issue of 
foreign investment together, often seeing it as a damaging outflow of funds from the 
Scottish economy.
142
  They suggest that this outflow of funds (and perhaps 
entrepreneurial activity) in the late nineteenth century contributed to economic 
development in countries outside the UK instead of boosting Scotland’s economy 
which, they believe, lagged behind in the twentieth century.  Foreign investment is often 
also associated with emigration, yet it would appear that the flight of people and that of 
capital inhabit two different spheres even if there may be some link between the two.
143
  
At the same time, business historians such as Mira Wilkins and Ranald Michie point to 
the importance of FSCs in the development of both home and host economies. The 
FSCs helped to make the capital markets in home economies, and also the productive 
markets in host economies, more sophisticated.  According to business historians such 
as T. A. B. Corley, FSCs also helped domestic industry by providing cheap access to 
raw materials such as copper, tea, coffee, oil or rubber, not available readily in Scotland.  
Business historians have focused previously on UK-based FSCs as a general subject and 
partially upon Scottish FSCs but have generally not attempted to explore the subject in 
greater depth.  This thesis aims to explore this subject in detail and to investigate the 
enabling factors behind the formation of FSCs in addition to the motivation of investors 
and entrepreneurs in forming FSCs.  It is intended to achieve this without pursuing a 
nationalistic agenda and any overarching narrative that foreign investment somehow led 
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to industrial failure.  This thesis brings a fresh theoretical approach, aiming to see the 
Scottish economy as part of a wider world economy, and to evaluate the role of Free-
Standing Companies within it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
Chapter 3 – Free-Standing Companies: Purpose, 
Lifetime and Origins 1862 – 1885 
 
This chapter will analyse the results of the survey undertaken of some 116 Limited 
Liability Company registration files pertaining to companies that can be ascertained to 
be free-standing and whose records are held in the National Archives of Scotland in 
Edinburgh. 
 
 
This chapter creates for the first time a clear picture of the targeting of 
entrepreneurialism and investment into all Free-Standing Companies that were based in 
Scotland between 1862 and 1885, and which had already been dissolved by the time of 
the survey in 2006-7.  A systematic picture of the FSC-hosting industry as a whole is 
presented, with details on the FSC’s Standard Industrial Classification Category, which 
host countries were chosen, their lifetime and place of origin.  Creating such an overall 
picture is an important contribution to broadening our knowledge on the subject in 
Scotland, which did not previously extend far beyond a few well known cases, or of the 
group of FSCs that invested in the US.  By doing this we improve on previous work 
looking at Scotland’s contribution to the history of business and economic growth more 
widely, before the thesis moves on to discuss more company-specific examples. 
 
3.1 The Impact of Limited Liability 
 
 
The 116 files examined were kept by the Registrar of Companies in Scotland at 
Companies House in Edinburgh (the equivalent of the London Companies House 
Registrar) and were produced by all limited joint-stock companies that were registered 
in Scotland. The BT2 collection includes files of companies registered to operate 
domestically as well as those registered to operate abroad.  In fact, the first company to 
be registered under the Joint Stock Act of 1856 was the Daily Bulletin Company, which 
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was formed in late 1856 to publish newspapers.
144
  None of the companies examined in 
this chapter continue to survive today in their original form.
145
 
 
The initial response of Scottish business, whether domestic or international, to this new 
legislation was relatively slow. The first company registered to operate abroad, the 
Lisbon Royal Steam Navigation Company (Limited) of 1862,
146
 was only the 110
th
 
company to be registered; or at this stage an average of 18 per month.  This compares 
with 4,859 companies registered in London between 1856 and 1865.
147
 In the 1861 
census England’s population was around 6.5 times that of Scotland and consequently 
about 750 registrations might be expected.
148
 Institutional differences between Scotland 
and England may explain this discrepancy. As noted in section 1.3, Joint-Stock 
companies with unlimited liability had been formed in Scotland even before the 1856 
Act and they were on more solid legal ground than those in England whose formation 
had been heavily restricted by the Bubble Acts.
149
  Shareholders in such companies thus 
risked their own assets if the companies they bought shares in ran into difficulties.  In 
addition, there was very little regulation of practice, permitting only relatively low 
levels of trust in joint-stock companies.  In part this meant that private ownership by 
entrepreneurs remained the dominant form of organisation in Scottish business. Similar 
patterns of company ownership with low levels of registration persisted after 1856, 
however; just as in England, many larger domestically operating companies (for 
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 The last surviving FSC mentioned here was the New Zealand and Australian Land Company Ltd., 
which as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 was sold to the Anglo-Australian multinational Dalgety Ltd. in 
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 This is unclear, but it appears that there may have been some legal opinion that these acts were not 
applicable in Scotland.  See Campbell, "The Law and the Joint - Stock Company in Scotland."  
 70 
instance Charles Tennant’s chemical company)150 did not seek limited liability status.  
Some companies such as joint-stock banks, the Commercial Bank of Scotland and the 
ill fated City of Glasgow Bank, did not seek limited liability status after 1856 as it was 
seen to imply the possibility of failure.
151
  
 
Under the limited liability scheme that was put in place in 1862, registered companies 
were obliged to submit certain documents to the Registrar of Companies in Edinburgh.  
Upon registration, companies had to prepare a Memorandum of Association and a set of 
Articles of Association.  The Memorandum was important legally as companies had to 
list the purposes for which they were established to carry out business.  Many 
companies deliberately made their Memoranda as ambiguous as possible, with widely 
sweeping powers to cover for unforeseen eventualities as companies were strictly 
limited to the powers set out in their Memoranda.  The Memorandum also had to 
include a list of subscribers. Subscribers were the founding shareholders of a company 
(with witnessed signatures).  The Memorandum also set out clearly the level of nominal 
starting capital and number of shares that the company was offering.  The Articles of 
Association acted as a constitution for the company and set out exactly the rights of its 
directors and shareholders; for instance, making clear the voting rights of different 
classes of share and the powers of directors.  Theoretically directors could be sanctioned 
by shareholders if they went beyond the provisions in these articles.
152
  Often dividend 
rights and plans for sinking funds would even be specified in the Articles of 
Association.  In addition, companies were obliged to register themselves as being based 
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at a particular address, although, as in the better documented cases of London based 
FSCs, these addresses were often little more than cases of ‘brass plate capitalism’.153   
The final obligation was that companies had to return summaries of capital raised and 
details of their shareholders each year.
154
 
 
At this stage there was no obligation to report results of any kind. These obligations 
gradually increased, with lists of directors having to be submitted after 1901 and from 
1908 balance sheets having to be returned.  Initially the requirement to file capital 
returns was not rigidly enforced, but after 1880 any company not filing returns was 
vulnerable to investigation and potentially risked being struck off the register of 
companies.  What was crucial, however, is that some minimal level of regulation had 
been achieved and now companies could use their limited liability status to attract 
shareholders.  Further, there were clear legal procedures set out to deal with 
liquidations. If a company ran into difficulties then, the directors themselves could 
resolve to wind up the company and recover whatever funds it was possible to recover 
from any remaining assets.  Limited liability then allowed for a new, formalised 
framework for Joint-Stock companies which was ideally suited to the needs of 
companies that intended only to operate abroad as it provided a relatively transparent 
means of containing risk for shareholders. 
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3.2 Free-Standing Companies 1862-1885 
 
I have identified 116 Free-Standing Companies as having been registered in Scotland 
between 1862 and 1885.  As noted above, the first identifiable FSC to be registered was 
the Lisbon Royal Steam Navigation Company (Limited), in 1862.
155
  This company was 
founded by Louis Bunney, a merchant based in Lisbon, after acquiring a ten year 
concession to operate tug boats on the River Tagus in Portugal, at a cost of £1,700, for 
which Bunney was to be reimbursed from the company’s capital. Nominal capital was 
set at £70,000; although it seems unlikely that this happened as the company was 
voluntarily wound up very quickly, with liquidation completed in 1864.  Seven small 
investors, mostly from the West of Scotland with the exception of James Reid, a 
merchant based in Liverpool, were registered subscribers to the company.  The main 
apparent linkage into any related industry was that one of the subscribers (and later the 
liquidator) Graham Brymer was himself a steam boat owner.  This company may 
therefore have been an extension of the contemporary practice of ship owners 
establishing registered companies to spread the risks involved in shipping.
156
 
 
The Royal Lisbon Company was unsuccessful but it did establish a pattern of 
organisation which became commonplace – that of companies being set up to take over 
a particular concession or contract and even possibly to take over an already going 
concern.  The second Free-Standing Company to be registered, the West Pacific 
Company Ltd., was a very different type of concern.  The West Pacific was formed in 
Dundee in 1863 with seven local shareholders, and had the objective of establishing a 
sawmill on the island of Hokkaido in Japan.
157
  This was possibly an attempt to 
capitalise upon the perceived opening up of Japan in the wake of the American mission 
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of the 1850s. This company appears to have been a relatively modest enterprise with a 
nominal capital of £4400 which was fully subscribed by the shareholders and apparently 
rested entirely upon the management skills of a David Scott, described as a ‘master 
mariner’ and the company’s agent in the east.  The 1866 Annual Meeting reported a 
deficit of US$30,846.95 while the 1864 meeting had reported a deficit of only $20.18.  
It is clear that establishing any sort of competitive advantage in a remote country 
without any telegraph link to the UK had proved impossible and the voluntary winding 
up process was started in 1869, one year after the Meiji Restoration.
158
  Long distance 
liquidation proved a problem as the company experienced difficulty in trying to dispose 
of the land it had purchased in Japan. The company remained in liquidation until 1872 
when the hoped for price of £2200 was realised and the money could be returned to the 
shareholders. 
 
Table 3.1 Scottish FSCs established 1862-1885 
Years Frequency 
1862-65 8 
1866-70 7 
1871-75 26 
1876-80 23 
1881-85 52 
Total 116 
Source: Registration details collected from NAS BT2. 
 
 
 
These two early examples are fairly atypical of the pattern of FSC formation which 
started to become common after the 1860s.  In effect, many FSCs were constituted by a 
contract between the vendor of the assets to be taken over by the FSC, and the new 
company. For instance, this could be between the previous owner of the mine to be 
purchased and the new FSC setting up the sale conditions and often allowing the vendor 
a share in equity, sometimes deferred.  In some cases the vendor might also be engaged 
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 NAS BT2/110. 
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as a manager. Over time, as promotions became more accomplished, it was not unusual 
for the existence of the contract to feature prominently in the Memorandum of 
Association.  This is not to say, however, that the execution of such a contract would be 
the only power allowed by the Memorandum of Association – often companies would 
allow themselves a plethora of powers.  Such powers were often, but not always, related 
to the core activity of the company.  In the case of mining companies, for example, 
rights were often made non specific – so for instance, a company intended to mine 
copper, would allow itself rights to mine every mineral of value on its land.  
Manufacturing rights would often also be included as well as the rights to operate 
railways and other forms of transport.  Quite frequently, rights to hold land were also 
included, even for companies that were not intended to be ‘land’ companies – and for 
land companies rights to farm, mine and manufacture were often included to cover all 
eventualities, presumably in the event that tenants and purchasers could not be found.  
Another important power was geographical; some companies restricted themselves to 
particular countries; for instance a company aiming to operate in Spain might allow 
itself powers to operate anywhere in Spain even if it only intended to concentrate on one 
narrow site.  Others might be more liberal; for instance it was common for companies 
operating in the United States or Canada to allow themselves rights to operate anywhere 
in North America. In some cases companies even allowed themselves rights to operate 
worldwide even though this was extremely unlikely in the short term. 
 
It would be tempting to dismiss the powers given in the Memorandum of Association as 
legal niceties given their apparent exaggeration of the scope of the real activities of the 
companies they constituted.  However, there were cases when freedom of action was 
genuinely constrained by the Memoranda – such as in the case of the fourth Free-
 75 
Standing Company to be formed – the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company.159  The Irrawaddy 
was one of the better known FSCs being formed to take over shipping operations started 
by the government of British India on the Irrawaddy River in modern-day Myanmar.  
The Irrawaddy Company operated the flotilla from its effective privatisation in 1865 
until the nationalisation of riverboat operations by the then Burmese government in 
1948.  The company’s initial Memorandum simply gave rights to operate the contract 
negotiated with the government to convey all government passengers and cargo and in 
addition to run a public steamer service on the river.  This proved too restrictive as the 
company’s activities developed beyond shipping – this was still a developing territory 
with many unexploited opportunities.  A particular difficulty was that the company did 
not have the rights to build new docking facilities. In 1875 it was decided to wind up the 
existing company and transfer the assets to a new registration with a Memorandum 
expanded to allow for the building of structures such as docks and warehouses as well 
as allowing the power to act as general traders.
160
  Complete reconstitution like this was 
comparatively rare; usually powers were added if necessary – or in some cases perhaps 
another company might be registered to take on the powers not included in the original 
Memorandum. 
 
3.3 SIC Category of Companies 
 
 
After completing the collection of data for this part of the thesis, what became clear was 
the diversity of purposes for which companies were registered.  Table 3.2 below 
illustrates the purposes for which companies registered within the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) as far as could be clearly taken from the Memoranda, based on the 
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powers that companies allowed themselves.  Companies fitting twenty different two 
digit and thirty four different four digit SIC classifications were identified.
161
 
 
These have been taken from the first paragraph in the Memorandum of Association, but 
some companies may have had secondary purposes. For instance, it seems likely that 
many of the 17 companies classified within Beef Cattle intended to operate as land 
companies also, or saw their land as a crucial asset.
162
  Certainly some such as the 
Missouri Land and Live Stock Company moved visibly from the livestock industry into 
the land industry after the collapse in cattle prices of the late 1880s.
163
  Some land 
companies themselves had ambitions to move into agriculture or the financial industry; 
most notably the vast New Zealand and Australian Land Company Ltd which was 
formed in 1866 with general aims to purchase land in Australasia for all extractive 
activity and offer some financial services such as mortgaging.
164
 
   
Most of the Free-Standing Companies formed in this period were in the sectors we 
might expect. The mining and farming companies fitted broadly into the primary sector 
of the economy, with a few such as the telegraph and river shipping companies fitting 
into the tertiary sector.  Only a handful of manufacturing FSCs were set up in this 
period; of these the most successful group were the jute companies that were set up to 
spin jute in addition to growing it in India.  Possibly the most unusual manufacturing 
company, classified in Table 3.1 under ‘Brick and structural clay tile’ was the Huelva 
Brick and Tile Company Ltd.
165
 Huelva Brick and Tile was formed in 1882 to 
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manufacture bricks, tiles and pipes in the city of Huelva in southern Spain.  The 
Province of Huelva was a major centre of British investment (both English and Scottish 
based) in the pyrites industry and it seems likely that this FSC sought to exploit these 
linkages, probably by sourcing its raw materials from mining spoil.
166
  This company 
was not successful: in the long term being forced to wind up, due to debt incurred, in 
1886.   
 
Table 3.2 – Scottish Free-Standing Companies Registered 1862-1885 by two digit 
SIC Code 
SIC Code Class Name Frequency 
01 Agricultural Production – crops 10 
02 Agricultural Production, livestock and animal specialties 19 
08 Forestry 2 
10 Metal Mining 31 
12 Coal Mining 1 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 2 
14 Mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels 2 
20 Food and kindred products 2 
22 Textile mill products 5 
24 Lumber and wood products, except furniture 7 
32 Stone, clay, glass and concrete products 1 
40 Rail transportation 1 
44 Water transportation 3 
48 Communications 2 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 3 
51 Wholesale trade - nondurable goods 2 
61 Non-depositary credit institutions 1 
63 Insurance carriers 1 
65 Real estate 20 
89 Miscellaneous services 1 
 Total 116 
Source: The purpose given, usually in paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Association. 
 
 
Table 3.2 above shows the FSCs placed into SIC two digit classifications.  The 
dominance of metal mining among the promotions becomes clear when gold and silver 
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mining concerns are classified with the copper companies.  Class 02 here includes all 
agricultural companies whether in the livestock, tea, coffee, rubber or sugar sectors. 
Taking all the companies categorised within the two types of agricultural production, 
the various types of mining and oil, lumber and wood products together gives us 75 
companies that were registered mainly for primary sector purposes. Meanwhile, taking 
the rail, water transport, communications, electric and gas, wholesale, non-depositary 
credit, insurance and real estate companies together, 33 companies definitely fit into the 
tertiary sector.  The five textile companies could be considered to fit into the secondary 
sector, although they probably pursued some primary sector activity in terms of 
cultivation too. For certain the Camperdown Trading Company allowed itself the rights 
to cultivate jute, flax, hemp and cotton in addition to manufacturing. 
 
3.4 Geographical Location 
 
 
This section will detail which countries Scottish Free-Standing Companies were formed 
to operate in. The 116 Scottish FSCs aimed to invest in 19 separate countries in this 
period.
167
  This creates a methodological problem: as with powers granted in the 
Memoranda, companies may state their intention to begin operating in a certain country 
but not actually carry it out, but despite this it is still possible to create a picture of the 
intentions of entrepreneurs.  We might expect, for instance, entrepreneurs based in an 
English speaking country to prefer to invest in other English speaking countries as this 
can cut information asymmetries that can arise through linguistic misunderstanding.
168
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 The number of separate countries is complicated a little by the fact that three of these countries – 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma (Myanmar) and India, were all counted as part of British India in this period. 
Jurisdictions in Africa were also somewhat unclear, so in this study those two companies whose 
operations could not be attributed clearly to a single country were simply assigned to ‘Africa’.  Often the 
Articles of Association provided little specific information on where a company intended its operations to 
be – The Glasgow West African Company Limited, registered in 1866, simply registered its intention as 
‘General trading with the West Coast of Africa.’  NAS BT2/235. 
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 A.W.K. Harzing and A.J. Feely, "The Language Barrier and Its Implications for H.Q.-Subsidiary 
Relationships," Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal 15, no. 1 (2008)., suggest that 
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Similarly, common legal and institutional systems can prove attractive – for Scots 
entrepreneurs the existence of a parallel system of Roman law in many other European 
countries might have created some attraction compared to English speaking countries 
which tended to have Common law systems.  Such transaction cost issues could be a 
particular difficulty when dealing with local contractors, or even with the company’s 
own agents or with land ownership systems that were operated on different principles to 
those in Scotland.   
 
A further difficulty for some companies was the introduction of legislation in some 
jurisdictions against foreigners holding land or simply against large corporate land 
owners. For instance, the demand for such legislation in the US became very acute 
during the ranching boom in the 1880s.  In 1886 the Federal Government finally moved 
to introduce legislation to prevent aliens or foreign corporations from holding lands in 
the western territories.
169
  It has also been suggested that the political background of the 
period may have a role to play in companies deciding where to invest – and that such 
companies can themselves serve as engines of imperialism.
170
  In this study the findings 
have conformed to some of these expectations but less so to others.  Table 3.3 shows a 
simple breakdown of the countries in which companies aimed to invest in the earlier 
years of the period. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
language problems can seriously impede head office – subsidiary relationships in modern day 
Multinational Enterprises.  Principals and agents can easily misunderstand each other, and if either party 
is operating in a second language this can cause anxiety for the party doing so and cause the other party to 
lose respect, thus impeding the principal-agent relationship.  Clearly in a Free-Standing Company the lack 
of any such impeding factors in a relationship is important, as relationship between principal and agent 
essentially defines an FSC – the principal cannot make a profit without the agent. 
169
 Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 1873. p.109. 
170
 For an examination of the role of commerce in British Imperial expansion see Davis, Mammon and the 
Pursuit of Empire. 
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Table 3.3 Scottish FSC Host Countries, 1862 - 1885 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The country an FSC stated it intended to operate in in its Memorandum of Association. 
       
 
The most noticeable fact is that the USA was the most popular country for FSCs to 
target during this period, followed at a considerable distance by Canada.  This becomes 
most clear when examining Table 3.4 below which breaks FSCs down by host 
continent.  Mexico has been counted with South America as the barriers faced by 
entrepreneurs in Mexico in terms of language and institutional barriers would be similar 
to those in South America.  Perhaps a surprising result however is that the figure for 
Europe – meaning all of Continental Europe – almost matches that for Asia.   
 
 
 
 
Country Frequency 
USA 43 
Canada 15 
India 14 
Spain 8 
Italy 5 
New Zealand 4 
Portugal 4 
Burma 3 
Argentina 3 
Africa 2 
South Africa 2 
Australia 2 
Ceylon 2 
Algeria 1 
Austria 1 
France 1 
Japan 1 
Norway 1 
Peru 1 
Mexico 1 
British Guiana 1 
Persia 1 
  
Total 116 
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Table 3.4 Host Continent 
 
 
 
 
Source: See table 3.3. 
 
Within Europe, Spain, was the most popular country for formations with its large 
pyrites industry, mining promoters also targeted Italy and Portugal to a lesser extent.  
Within Asia, British India was by far the most important country, with nineteen 
companies registered to operate there.  Although Burma was not strictly considered a 
separate jurisdiction from India in this period, it has been shown separately to 
emphasise the importance of the activity of Scottish companies there, such as the 
Irrawaddy Company mentioned above.  The most surprising result here was that of 
South America, with only six companies registered, despite the large number of English 
FSCs and merchants operating there.
171
 This was equivalent to the number formed to 
operate in Australasia, which was perhaps also lower than might have been expected for 
FSCs, given its English speaking settler status, and the previous history of Scottish 
investment companies there.
172
  Finally Africa had five FSCs formed to operate in it: 
one mining company formed to operate in Algeria, and four companies operating in 
British territories – two of which would fall into modern South Africa, one in West 
Africa, and a fourth which appeared to have been formed to provide inland shipping 
based around the River Zambezi.
173
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 Miller, "British Free-Standing Companies on the West Coast of South America." In his general history 
of Argentina Colin Lewis notes the importance of UK foreign investment in late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Argentina, centred around the London money market.  C. Lewis, Argentina: A Short 
History (Oxford: 2002), pp. 40-46. 
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 Macmillan, "Scottish Enterprise in Australia, 1798-1879." 
173
 This was NAS BT2/833, the Livingstonia Central Africa Company, later the African Lakes Company, 
whose Memorandum of Association gave it powers to navigate the River Zambezi and set up trading 
posts and colonies.  The main area of activity was probably modern day Zambia. 
Continent Frequency 
North America 58 
Asia 21 
Europe 20 
Australasia 6 
South America 6 
Africa 5 
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Table 3.5 Empire v non-Empire 
 
 
Source: See table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.5 shows the proportion of companies formed to operate in the Empire 
compared to those formed to operate outside it.  Clearly, non-Empire countries 
represented a far larger proportion of investment than Empire countries, with 61.2% of 
promotions being targeted there.  Despite this, 43 out of the 71 companies registered to 
operate in non-Empire countries were registered to operate in the United States, so there 
remains a linguistic link even if there is no imperial link.  In addition, the relative ease 
of communication with the United States may have a role in this preference with the 
first reliable telegraph links being set up in 1866. This line went through Newfoundland 
and Canada so they were also linked to the UK at the same time by telegraph.
174
  This 
had a reverse effect, encouraging entrepreneurs and promoters in the US seeking inputs 
of foreign capital using the relatively convenient link with Scotland to seek potential 
promotion opportunities, as will be examined further in Chapters 6 and 7.  This link 
may be even more apparent in the case of Canada, where a large Scots settler population 
potentially helped to heighten awareness of the opportunities of the Scottish capital 
markets.
175
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 T. Standage, The Victorian Internet (London: 1998), pp. 81-85. 
175
 The 2001 Canadian Census registered 4,157,210 people as being in some way of Scottish descent. 
Empire (inc general Africa) 45 38.8% 
Non-Empire 71 61.2% 
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Table 3.6 New Paid-up Capital per country per annum (£’000s) 
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1862          1 
1863           
1864           
1865  175   30 51     
1866  10  12       
1867           
1868  934  20       
1869        30   
1870  243       80  
1871    4  20     
1872 16   2  46 98   3 
1873   55 96  59 250 19   
1874   2   9  3  2 
1875 218  76 74  41  16   
1876 21   75   7   1 
1877 32  295 5  10     
1878 22  40    3    
1879 2   48 26      
1880 164  103 2  35 2 6   
1881 268  175 152   8    
1882 991  175 43   29    
1883 744  161 36   72 9 1  
1884 554  8 98   45 8 1 8 
1885 317  9 51   11   3 
1886 210  2 32 131  7    
1887 102   58  100 5    
1888 228   12 125 200     
1889 179   11 264      
1890 132   143       
Total 4200 1361 1100 975 575 571 538 91 82 17 
% 43 14 11 10 6 6 6 1 1 0 
M 
 per firm 
95 340 73 65 192 190 60 18 41 4 
Note: Countries are arranged in order of total paid-up capital size, left to right. Table shows newly paid-
up capital.  Blank years mean no capital was paid-up.   
Source: Paid-up capital is extrapolated from annual returns given to Companies House. 
 
 
To further develop the analysis of location choice, the paid-up capital for each of the 
countries or regions (in the case of Africa) with two or more FSCs has been calculated.  
Table 3.6 shows the capital raised every year 1862-1890 by FSCs formed between 1862 
and 1885 aiming to operate in each host country which hosted three or more FSCs. The 
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final row shows the mean amount of paid-up capital that companies operating in each 
country had raised by 1890, and before any reductions.  This does not necessarily mean 
that this money was invested in operations in that host country but it does show the 
response of investors to opportunities presented by companies operating in each 
country.  The dominance of North America continued, with capital being sent to the 
USA every year after 1875, and Canada enjoyed a run of popularity in the mid 1870s 
and early 1880s.   
 
The mean figures for each country suggest that the typical size of FSC in some 
countries, particularly New Zealand and Burma, was larger than the average US size. 
This was particularly so in the case of New Zealand, in which a handful of land or 
pastoral companies, two of which are examined in detail in Chapter 4, were being 
formed with very large capitalisations in the later 1860s.  The figures for Burma also 
show disproportionate company sizes, because there was a large FSC operating in 
internal shipping.  Contrasted with this is Portugal where hosted companies called 
relatively little capital.  Portugal’s small figure is explained by the lack of success of the 
four companies registered to operate there; particularly the above mentioned Lisbon 
Royal Steam Navigation Company which appears to have failed to begin operations but 
which it is reasonable to assume would have gained a very large capitalisation had it 
been more successful.  Portugal’s other three companies were speculative mining 
ventures and so likely to be short lived, as will be examined in Section 3.5. 
 
Referring back to Table 3.3 a further important factor in choice of FSC location relates 
to the resource endowment of the particular country of interest.  This is naturally 
important when we are thinking about companies which are interested in extractive 
activities. The existence of the particular mineral required for a purpose is important 
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(such as the use of sulphur in the alkali based chemical industry) and the correct 
climatic conditions are needed to grow crops such as sugar or tea.  It might be thought 
then that location patterns would become clearer if company types are tied to the 
countries located in.   Appendix 2 shows the Standard Industrial Classification of 
companies by individual country, for those countries represented by three or more 
FSCs. 
 
The largest SIC four digit category in any one country was beef farming in the US, with 
15 companies. The importance of the real estate industry in the US and Canada is also 
clear, with 11 free-standing companies being formed to invest in land. This period 
coincides particularly well with the building of the transcontinental railways in the US 
opening up new areas to development.  Some of the cattle companies also sold their 
stock to concentrate on real estate, particularly after around 1886 when cattle prices 
declined to a level at which they became unprofitable for many large ranchers.
176
  In 
New Zealand, too, pastoral and land companies were important, and FSCs operating 
there also operated land under their ownership as livestock farms as well as trading as 
land companies. 
 
Tea farming in India or Ceylon represented a further grouping of five companies which 
clearly related to the region’s suitability to grow tea in addition to the availability of 
cheap land and labour – the same was true for jute.  An industry which appears on four 
different continents, meanwhile, is pyrites mining which suggests that investment in it 
may have been driven mainly by commodity pricing – although it remains concentrated 
to some level in North America and Spain.  This will be explored further in Chapter 5 
where the Arizona Copper Company will be examined in more detail. 
                                                 
176
 For instance NAS BT2/1101 The Missouri Land and Live Stock Company, which openly abandoned 
cattle ranching by 1902. 
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Nine FSCs represented the only attempt by promoters to enter a specific country in this 
timescale.  Some of these, such as the West Pacific Company with its sawmill in Japan, 
might be expected to be rare atypical outliers and others such as the utilities arguably 
constitute natural monopolies which presented barriers to entry. Even so, there still 
remain a lot of companies for which a clear motive relating to the wider economic 
environment is difficult to establish.  Some are likely to represent the sole Scottish 
example of larger investment trends which may have been important in London or 
elsewhere; while others, like the pyrites companies, were established as a result of 
commodity prices.  Others may simply represent attempts to exploit unusual 
opportunities which arose in particular areas, or even purely speculative attempts to 
enter markets by individuals or groups. 
 
3.5 Lifetime 
 
 
FSCs have been perceived to suffer from particularly short lifetimes with a very rapid 
entry and exit rate, particularly in the overseas mining industry.
177
  The mean lifetime of 
all 116 FSCs was found to be 13.7 years before the decision to wind up was taken or 
19.2 years including time in liquidation. This compares closely with the mean lifetime 
of 16.4 years calculated by Payne for all Scottish Limited companies registered 1856-
1895.
178
  In the figure of 19.2 years, the lifetime has been taken to be the point at which 
an FSC was deleted from the register either because its assets were successfully 
liquidated, transferred to a purchasing or new company or struck off the register due to 
inactivity.  This difficulty arises as the resolution to wind up a company was often taken 
                                                 
177
 Both  Harvey, "The City and International Mining, 1870 - 1914." and Schmitz, "The Nature and 
Dimensions of Scottish Foreign Investment." emphasised the importance of this. 
178
 See Payne, The Early Scottish Limited Companies, 1856 - 1895, p. 101.  Payne used the date of the 
winding up resolution or court order winding up a company as the end of its life.  This probably suited his 
purposes as he was also looking at companies trading mainly in the domestic market which could have 
been liquidated more rapidly than FSCs.  See Payne p. 5. 
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many years before the winding up was actually concluded.  In the case of Free-Standing 
Companies this period could often be protracted in situations where liquidators faced 
problems selling unattractive land and other assets abroad where businesses had failed 
completely.  One example of this protracted process was the Scottish Mortgage and 
Land Investment Company of New Mexico Ltd. whose directors passed a resolution to 
liquidate the company in 1906.
179
  Liquidation was not successfully completed until 
1944 due to difficulty encountered in finding a buyer for 225 shares held in the US 
registered Sabina Springs Land Company. 
 
Table 3.7 Mean Lifetime for most frequent two digit SIC Codes 
 
Two 
digit 
code 
Class Name Frequency Mean 
Lifetime 
1(a) 
Mean 
Lifetime 
2 (b) 
Mean Nominal 
Capital (£,000s) 
Mean 
Liq 
Period 
1 Agricultural 
Production – crops 
10 19.0 27.3 92.1 8.3 
2 Agricultural 
Production livestock 
and animal 
specialties 
19 24.2 26.9 431.1 2.7 
10 Metal Mining 31 7.6 13.9 180.2 6.3 
22 Textile mill products 5 20.7 31.1 114.3 10.4 
24 Lumber and wood 
products, except 
furniture 
7 5.6 14.6 252.8 9.0 
65 Real estate 19 14.1 23.9 162.5 9.8 
 Whole Sample Mean (91 
companies) 
15.2 22.9 205.5 7.7 
a) is the mean lifetime of companies until the decision to liquidate, merge with another company or 
re-register is taken.  This can be argued to represent the end of the effective life of a company as 
it usually meant normal trading activities were ceased although legal personality was not. 
b) is the mean lifetime of companies taking the date of the final winding up meeting held by 
directors as the end date or the date that the company was struck from the register due to 
inactivity.  This generally occurred if a company failed to submit its annual returns of paid-up 
capital and shareholders registers for a number of years successively. 
 
 
Table 3.7 above shows the mean lifetime of the 91 companies for which end dates 
could be found in the six most common two digit SIC classes together with the mean 
paid-up capital per annum per sector and mean nominal capital per sector overall.      
                                                 
179
 NAS BT2/1161, The Scottish Mortgage and Land Investment Company of New Mexico, Limited, 
registration file. 
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Nominal capital has been used here as an indicator of expected company size based on 
the premise that larger companies enjoy a lower risk of bankruptcy – although 
economies of scale should not be overstated as all companies are vulnerable to liquidity 
problems.  Companies possessing larger amounts of nominal capital can both call in 
more funding and deploy this capital to lower their risk of bankruptcy. The usual 
practice was not to call all the capital up straight away, but to start with an amount 
thought to be suitable to set up business – although this often left shareholders exposed 
to further calls. 
 
Table 3.7 suggests that companies in the metal mining sector had a very short life 
expectancy, while the manufacturing companies in the textile industry and the livestock 
companies survived the longest.   The brevity of the lives of companies in the mining 
sector reflects the single project nature of these companies which were usually formed 
with the intention of mining on a single property or group of properties rather than 
mining generally.  Five metal mining FSCs, four of which were set up to mine copper, 
failed to survive for longer than a year before deciding to liquidate. This suggests either 
operations were not commenced, or that reserves were found to be insufficient or 
unworkable.
180
  In a few cases newly promoted companies failed to register any public 
interest at all. For instance the Consolidated Copper Company of Canada
181
 was 
intensively promoted in the press in 1872.  Despite a high profile appeal for funds the 
company did not survive for long enough to submit a capital return.  In many cases it 
appears that promoters would move to liquidate as quickly as possible, to recover any 
invested funds before they could be lost subsidising unproductive operations. 
                                                 
180
 Registration files of metal mining companies failing to survive for longer than a year included 
BT2/435 The Consolidated Copper Company of Canada, Limited, BT2/443 The Utah Cottonwood 
Mining and Smelting Company, Limited, BT2/494 The Scottish Italian Copper and Lead Mining 
Company, Limited, BT2/550 The Mont Alegre Silver Mining Company, Limited, and BT2/1367 The 
Tuscan Copper Company, Limited. 
181
 NAS BT2/435 The Consolidated Copper Company of Canada, Limited; see also Times article 15
th
 July 
1872 and full page prospectus advertisement in The Economist 13
th
 July 1872. 
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This contrasts with the fortunes of agricultural crop and livestock companies which 
enjoyed much longer lifetimes; in the livestock industry, hosted in New Zealand, 
Australia and in the 1880s in the US West, companies attracted capitalisations more 
than four times the size of those in crop farming. Companies in arable farming appear 
able to have survived for long periods with relatively low capitalisations, despite the 
long gestation period these companies would have had to endure in waiting for their 
plantations to bear fruit. The land dependence of arable companies may support their 
relatively long liquidation delays although liquidation delays were longest in companies 
dealing mostly in real estate. This seems likely to be because of the difficulties often 
encountered in disposing of unattractive lands; a protracted process which often took 
many years for liquidators based in Scotland to complete. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Scatter Plot – effect of Nominal Capital on Company Lifetime 
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Note: Company lifetime until liquidation is company lifetime until the company enters liquidation.  This 
is based on Mean Lifetime 1 in Table 3.7.  Two outliers, the original New Zealand and Australian Land 
Company Ltd., and its successor company, have been removed as their nominal capitals, at £2million and 
£2.5million respectively, were much larger than those of the rest of the population. 
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Figure 3.1 above tests the hypothesis that a higher nominal capital should help a 
company enjoy a longer life.  No clear trend is discernable here – a number of 
companies with a nominal capital of less than £100,000 survived for relatively long 
periods, including two which survived for forty years.  Similarly a number of companies 
with nominal capital in excess of £200,000 failed to survive longer than ten years.  
Hence nominal capital cannot be assumed to be a determining factor in the life of a free-
standing company, no matter how much promoters might have tried to use a high 
nominal capital to enhance a new company’s prestige. 
 
Table 3.8 Reasons for dissolution – most frequent SIC codes 
 
Two 
digit 
code 
Class Name Host 
(a) 
Liabilities 
(b) 
Merged 
(c) 
Re-
reg’d 
(d) 
Struck 
Off (e) 
Voluntarily 
Wound Up 
(f) 
1 Agricultural Production – 
crops 
0 0 3 1 1 5 
2 Agricultural Production 
livestock and animal 
specialties 
1 2 3 4 0 9 
10 Metal Mining 0 5 3 3 2 18 
22 Textile mill products 3 0 0 1 0 1 
24 Lumber and wood 
products, except furniture 
0 2 0 0 1 4 
65 Real estate 0 1 2 1 4 11 
 Total sample (91 
companies) 
4 10 11 10 8 48 
a) Company moved its registration to its host country. 
b) Company was wound up as its liabilities were too great to continue trading. 
c) Company merged or sold to another company. 
d) Company wound up, then re-registered under a new name, usually to carry on the same firm. 
e) Company struck off the register, usually due to inactivity. 
f) Company wound up following Voluntary Winding Up Resolution of board meeting. 
 
 
Table 3.8 summarises the reasons given for the dissolution of companies.  While 
voluntary liquidation accounted for 50% of cases here, it should be noted that often the 
reason for winding up was not stated to the registrars, nor was it compulsory to state it.  
Thus it is possible that more cases from the voluntary category actually belong to the 
liabilities category; that of companies that were wound up due to their liabilities 
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becoming too great to continue.  As might be expected, this was a frequent occurrence 
in metal mining as the value of a mining company’s main asset, mineral rights, 
depended on the actual presence of workable mineral reserves there; this value would 
have to be reduced if such minerals were not present or accessible.  In some cases 
voluntary winding up occurred when a company was felt to have fulfilled its original 
purpose.  This appears to be common in the case of real estate companies which often 
sold off their entire stock of land gradually returning the proceeds to their shareholders 
by reducing their authorised capital as in the case of the Scottish American Land Co 
Limited which resolved to wind up to return the proceeds to its shareholders in 1892.
182
 
 
A further area of ambiguity is that surrounding take-overs and mergers.  Some of the 
companies which are listed here as having merged may in fact belong in the ‘host’ 
category of companies in Table 3.8 which became registered in their host country.  
Mira Wilkins suggested that British owned FSCs operating in the US frequently 
changed their registration to local jurisdictions once the company had become well 
established, notably citing the example of Eastman Kodak which moved its registration 
to gain US tax advantages and improve managerial efficiency.
183
  This does not seem to 
have been such a frequent phenomenon as Wilkins suggested, at least for the Scottish 
FSCs of this period.  However, two of the FSCs which naturalised their registrations 
were long-established jute companies operating in India; the India Jute Company (Ltd.) 
which moved its registration to India in 1917
184
 and the Champdany Jute Company 
Limited
185
 which transferred its operations to an Indian registered company from 1921.  
These two companies are also distinct in that they were manufacturing companies as 
well as extractive companies and may have had more of an incentive to move control to 
                                                 
182
 NAS BT2/957, The Scottish American Land Company, Limited, registration file. 
183
 Wilkins, "The Free-Standing Company, 1870 - 1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct 
Investment," p. 277.,  
184
 NAS BT2/232, The India Jute Company (Limited), registration file. 
185
 NAS BT2/496 The Champdany Jute Company, Limited, registration file. 
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India to focus further on developing competitive advantage. The Camperdown Trading 
and Pressing Co. Limited has also been included in the ‘host’ category as it was sold in 
1882 to a company known as the Camperdown Pressing Company which did not appear 
in the Scottish registers, and presumably was registered in India and may have had 
similar shareholders.
186
   The fourth company which moved into local registration – The 
Swan Land and Cattle Company, did so in order to have a US based board manage the 
sale of its lands after entering liquidation in 1925.
187
   
 
One further category of dissolution includes the eight companies, most of which were in 
the mining or land sectors, which were struck off the register due to inactivity.  This 
usually meant that a company had neither outstanding liabilities to be paid nor assets to 
dispose of, but some exceptions did occur. In some cases it may have meant that the 
number of directors or shareholders had dropped below the required level set out in the 
Articles of Association, such as when the Glasgow West African Company was 
dissolved in 1880 after dropping below the minimum seven shareholders.
188
  Another 
situation was that of the Consolidated Copper Company of Canada promotion in 1872 
when promoters simply found a lack of interest from investors following hostile reports 
in the newspapers.
189
 This meant that some companies were simply abandoned without 
a formal liquidation process, particularly if the liquidation was likely to cost more than 
any assets to be recovered.  In some cases such as that of the Gibbas Mining Company 
Limited (which itself was a re-registration of an earlier company formed to work the 
same property in Italy) a reasonable amount of capital had been raised (in this case 
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 NAS BT2/694 The Camperdown Trading and Pressing Company, Limited, registration file. 
187
 NAS BT2/1225 The Swan Land and Cattle Company, Limited, registration file. 
188
 NAS BT2/235 The Glasgow West African Company Limited, registration file. 
189
 The Consolidated Copper Company of Canada promotion of 1872 sought to raise £400,000 to 
purchase two copper mining complexes in Canada.  Unusually for a Scottish FSC, the shares were very 
widely promoted, with a prospectus advertisement appearing in The Economist of 13
th
 July 1872, and The 
Times of 15
th
 July mocked the company’s promise of a 40% return for shareholders. The company was 
very quickly wound up without even submitting a shareholder’s register.  NAS BT2/435, The 
Consolidated Copper Company of Canada (Limited). 
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£14000 over three years) before activity gradually ebbed away in the mid 1880s.
190
    
Regulation was lax enough to allow such company registrations to continue for a 
surprising period – the mean lifetime for the ten struck off companies in the whole study 
was 13.7 years. 
 
3. 6 Profit or Loss? 
 
 
This section will take a brief look at the success levels of Free-Standing Companies 
based in Scotland and formed before 1885, based on the available data, which in the 
majority of cases is scant.  Those companies still surviving after the introduction of 
compulsory balance sheet filing in 1908 allow us to gain some idea of the likely 
previous profitability of FSCs closer to their formation and some idea of their worth in 
the long term.   A further difficulty is that it is unclear if profits that are reported are 
gross or net, for instance of Home Office charges. Only two mining FSCs formed 
between 1862 and 1885 were still surviving in operation in this period; the already 
mentioned Seville Copper and Sulphur Company sponsored by Irvine based chemical 
manufacturer William Henderson, and the second incarnation of the Arizona Copper 
Company, the early life of which is examined in detail in Chapter 5.
191
  The Seville 
Company continued to operate in Scottish hands until the late 1920s when it was 
purchased by the Esperanza Sulphur and Copper Company, a London based company 
formed in 1906.
192
  The book value of this company in 1908 had reached £225,741 15s 
7d showing a gain of £105,741 15s 7d over the paid-up capital of £120,000.  Much of 
this was due to large cash reserves; Seville’s mining properties were valued at only 
                                                 
190
 NAS BT2/984 The Gibbas Mining Company, Limited, registration file. 
191
 NAS BT2/507. Initially Henderson held 39,994 shares out of a total of 50,000 and the vendor, William 
Percival Partington was awarded 9,680. 
192
 See the prospectus advertisement in The Times, Tuesday February 20
th
 1906, p. 2.  An article in The 
Times, Wednesday June 5
th
 1929, p. 20, suggests that the Seville name was going to be kept and 
Esperanza’s own Spanish properties to be transferred to it – Esperanza also owned some properties in 
Cyprus.  See NAS BT2/776 regarding the sale of Seville to Esperanza. 
 94 
£71,319 1s 10d and net profit recorded as only £19,825 18s 3d although this soon fell 
away – by 1913 profits had dropped to only £10 17s 5d and book value to £187,544 15s 
8d.  The 1908 figure suggests an impressive approximate return on paid-up capital of 
16.52% per annum although this was clearly susceptible to operating conditions.
193
 
 
Among the SIC category 01 (Agriculture – Crops) companies, some of the Indian 
hosted tea companies survived for long enough to file balance sheets.  The Glasgow 
based Agricultural Company of Ceylon was registered in 1883 to act as a landowner but 
also with rights to pursue agricultural activities directly.
194
  A £545 10s 5d debenture 
holding in the Argentine Great Western Railway was also reported.  Agricultural 
activities gained precedence by 1909 when a book value of £19,590 6s 3d was reported 
with gross profit reported at £1,551 18s 6d from income of £5,257 9s 5d gained from 
tea sales on the London market.  This represented a return on paid-up capital of almost 
5% which appears reasonably favourable given the longer lives of companies operating 
in the arable sector generally.  Even more favourable was the 42% return on paid-up 
capital offered by the Taprobane Tea Company in 1907; this Edinburgh registered 
company operating in India had a paid-up capital of only £4,970 but reported a profit of 
£2,068 16s 3d.
195
  Book value remained at only £7,366 19s 1d, suggesting that much of 
the profit was paid out in dividends rather than reinvested in the company, particularly 
as cash holdings remained minimal.  Such large returns appear to have been common 
among the more successful companies in arable farming; the sector has one of the lower 
average paid-up capital figures in the study,  at only £25,057; among tea companies in 
particular this seems to have been even lower with the exception of the twin North and 
                                                 
193
 NAS BT2/776 Balance Sheets, 1908-13.  Return on capital calculated using a simplified Return on 
Capital Employed formula: 
Capital up-Paid
Account  sProfit/Los of Balance Capitalon Return   
194
 NAS BT2/1238, Agricultural Company of Ceylon Ltd., registration file. 
195
 NAS BT2/1447, Taprobane Tea Company Limited, registration file.  Again Return on Paid-up Capital 
was calculated using a simplified Return on Capital Employed formula: 
Capital up-Paid
Account  sProfit/Los of Balance Capitalon Return   
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South Sylhet Tea Companies which boasted paid-up capital amounts of £426,570 each 
upon their merger into Consolidated Tea and Lands in 1902.
196
 
 
For companies involved in livestock farming, results were initially favourable; in the 
early 1880s companies such as the Texas Land and Cattle Company paid some generous 
dividends (12.5% in 1883 and 1884) to attempt to emphasise to their shareholders that 
they would generate returns.
197
  After 1885 returns from the cattle industry dried up; the 
Texas Company reduced its paid-up capital in 1893 after paying no dividends for eight 
years, although some smaller dividends in the region of 6% were achieved by this 
company in the early twentieth century as competitors scaled back production or exited 
the industry.  In cattle the lack of experience of promoters in the field appears to have 
been a problem; because of the large amounts invested in paid-up capital (the mean 
fully paid-up capital in the sector was £72,542) the pressure to pay dividends was very 
high even if this meant only that investors were being handed back their own money.  
Possibly the most extreme case was that of the first cattle company to enter the market, 
the Prairie Cattle Company, which after being formed in 1880 paid a 10% dividend in 
1881.
198
  Shares were reported to have reached a premium of £18 by 1882 and, to take 
advantage of this, nominal capital was increased to £500,000 with new issues of shares.  
By 1884 paid-up capital had reached £250,000 and a 20% dividend was claimed.   Such 
exuberance appears to have reflected a lack of realisation that in a cyclical commodity 
industry building up some cash reserves was useful as a buffer in the event of a year of 
low production or the onset of low market prices caused by overproduction or 
exogenous shocks.  By contrast, the case of the Seville Sulphur and Copper Company 
noted above shows that it was possible to build up cash holdings against difficult market 
                                                 
196
 See registration files NAS BT2/1157 and BT2/1158 – these two companies were registered on the 
same day with the same capitalisation and directors.  This registration appears to reflect a desire to spread 
risk between two diverse land holdings. 
197
 NAS BT2/1075, Texas Land and Cattle Company Limited, registration file. 
198
 NAS BT2/1003, Prairie Cattle Company Limited, registration file. 
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conditions – although in the case of the Seville Company this was made possible by the 
shares being concentrated in the hands of William Henderson and his successors, thus 
removing the pressure for returns from a wide body of shareholders. 
 
Also in Spain was the single surviving utility company: the Huelva Gas and Electricity 
Company Ltd. which was formed in Glasgow in 1888.
199
  This company appears to 
have originally intended to have taken advantage of the region’s pyrites industry and the 
strong British influence in the area as it also stated a purpose to manufacture sulphuric 
acid and sulphate of ammonia.  The Huelva Gas and Electricity Company represented a 
little noted facet of British activity there – it is not mentioned in the company studies of 
Checkland and Harvey or even in Avery’s book about Rio Tinto, which looks more at 
the socio-political aspects of the Rio Tinto operation.
200
  Its main base was the 
concession purchased to supply Huelva town, the main port used by both the large Rio 
Tinto and Tharsis companies, with gas in 1878.  Electricity rights were added in 1896.   
Acting as the main local utility was the company’s core activity; by 1908 it reported a 
book value of £57,708 1s 8d and a profit of £3,769 8s 4d, representing a return on paid-
up capital plus debenture stock of around 7%.  This level of success continued although 
returns diminished with the last dividends being paid on ordinary stock in 1911.  The 
electric and gas plants were closed in 1917 and their remains sold in May 1919, with the 
company being wound up soon afterwards.
201
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 NAS BT2/849, Huelva Gas and Electricity Company, registration file. 
200
 D. Avery, Not on Queen Victoria's Birthday: The Story of the Rio Tinto Mines (London: 1974), 
Checkland, The Mines of Tharsis: Roman, French and British Expertise in Spain, Harvey, The Rio Tinto 
Company; an Economic History of a Leading International Mining Concern, 1873 - 1954. 
201
 Stock Exchange Official Yearbook entries for ‘Huelva Gas and Electricity Company Ltd.’, 1918 and 
1919. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
The experience of Scottish Free-Standing Companies formed during the period 1862-
1885 was clearly very varied.  The well known sectors of mining and farming, both 
arable and pastoral, have been found to be of paramount importance in this chapter, but 
a multitude of other unusual schemes have also come to light. Some of these were 
failures, either over a short career or even almost instantly, such as Bunney’s Royal 
Lisbon Company, or the West Pacific Company’s ill fated Japanese sawmill 
development, and they represented a waste of productive resources for both home and 
host country.  Others, such as the Huelva Gas and Electricity Company, or the River 
Plate Telegraph Company, proved very successful and generated profits for their 
shareholders for many years as well as doubtless contributing to economic development 
in their host countries.  Among the companies in the more familiar mining, farming and 
real estate sectors, experience was equally varied, suggesting that choice of market to 
enter, or the offer of an apparently good opportunity abroad from a promoter could not 
alone guarantee success.  This chapter has usefully highlighted this diversity which was 
not altogether clear from previous work on the subject; much of the investment in 
mining, particularly in copper and sulphur, by Scottish companies has effectively been 
ignored by historians who have tended to focus on the agricultural side of things. 
 
Similarly, in explaining the parts of the world in which FSCs were established, previous 
literature has tended to focus on the targeting of specific countries by certain industries.  
Inevitably, in terms of livestock farming and real estate investment, activity in the US 
has been the focus of writers such as Jackson and Kerr.  This chapter has shown that in 
terms of paid-up capital, Australia and New Zealand were at least as important as the 
US, and the next chapter will go on to look at these companies in more detail.  Australia 
and New Zealand arguably presented more opportunities for FSCs in this industry 
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because they could integrate or cluster down the value chain as their domestic markets 
were not as developed in this industry as those of the US.
202
 This led to the appearance 
of one free-standing company in the Sausage and Other Meat Products SIC category, 
which was the New Zealand Meat Preserving Company.  In arable farming, and also in 
the related field of textiles, historians of jute have rightly drawn attention to the role of 
Scottish investment in India, but less so that in Ceylon or South Africa.  A further 
important contribution as far as destinations for investment go has been to draw 
attention to the twenty one FSCs targeting mainland Europe, stressing that while the 
main tide of British foreign investment was switching generally away from Europe, 
some entrepreneurs remained interested in opportunities.  A common assumption that 
has also been dealt a blow here is that regarding South America – in this type of 
investment the Scots were showing little enthusiasm for this region. 
 
This chapter has also shed light on the approach to investments in fields such as metal 
mining.  By investigating the way in which companies were wound up, it makes a new 
contribution to thinking about the approach of promoters to these companies.  By far the 
most popular category of winding up among the 92 companies looked at among the 
main sectors was voluntary dissolution – suggesting that if a company looked likely to 
fail, capitalists were happy to cut their losses at that point.  This would appear 
particularly to be the case in metal mining where companies did not take a portfolio 
approach to mining properties, instead being formed for a single project which could 
                                                 
202
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easily be abandoned if it proved unworkable and that part of the capital not already 
invested returned to shareholders, if indeed any capital had been called.  The fact that 
this speculative approach to investment existed in Scotland has not been discussed 
much in previous literature on the subject – writers such as Jackson, Kerr and Payne 
tend to work on the premise that companies were expected to succeed.
203
  Instead, as 
noted above, some companies such as the Seville Copper and Sulphur Company or the 
Dundee based jute companies were established as Free-Standing by already successful 
entrepreneurs who did not want to risk the success of their existing business by bringing 
their risky vertical investments inside the boundaries of their present firms.  Other FSCs 
had no obvious link to any domestic industry but were established as Free-Standing to 
raise capital for schemes too risky for an already successful investment trust (see 
Chapter 6 for two in-depth examples of this).  Seen in the context of a wider portfolio, 
where risk was spread between ventures, the fact that a lot of FSCs failed is perhaps not 
surprising. In most cases their promoters and probably their investors would have 
expected them to fail, but bought shares because there was a chance that an FSC might 
make a profit, allowing them to collect large dividends before selling the shares at a 
premium. 
 
On the contrary Scots from the country’s larger cities were prepared to take risk at 
different times. Glaswegians showed a consistent appetite for risk, particularly as 
Glasgow was home to a number of the speculative mining FSCs.  Edinburgh was also 
home to speculations, such as the Arizona Copper Company, which as will be seen in 
Chapter 6 was treated essentially as a speculation by its Edinburgh board of directors.  
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Part of the reason for this was that such directors were usually treating such mining 
companies as side projects at best and had less of an incentive to invest in a controlling 
structure suitable to manage such businesses.   
 
The following chapters move on to examine FSCs inside the box to look at the 
management structures that FSCs put in place more closely, and examine how 
effectively FSCs functioned as businesses.  Chapters 4 and 5 examine the history of the 
Canterbury and Otago Association and the New Zealand and Australian Land Company 
Ltd., examining how they created effective business organisations.  This they achieved 
despite operating on a different side of the world to their head offices.  This will be 
followed in Chapters 6 and 7 which examines the attempts of Scottish Free-standing 
companies investing in the US to create organisations that could work on a trans-
Atlantic basis.   
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Chapter 4 - Ownership and Control – Free-
Standing Companies in Australasia 
 
This Chapter examines the structure and management style of the Canterbury and 
Otago Association and the New Zealand and Australian Land Company between 1866 
and 1877 to investigate how they operated as Free-Standing Companies.  It looks at the 
extent to which these companies were managed from Scotland and offers new 
conclusions about the potential for knowledge transfer in Free-Standing Companies. 
 
4.1 Scottish FSCs in Australia and New Zealand 
 
This chapter is the first of five qualitative chapters focusing on the ‘inside the box’ 
structure and management style of Scottish Free-Standing Companies.  So far this thesis 
has examined Scottish Free-Standing Companies from a distance, describing the 
direction of FSC formation and its extent.  This chapter examines two FSCs which were 
very important yet have been under-researched examples of the type based in Scotland 
and operating in New Zealand.  One of these companies, the New Zealand and 
Australian Land Company Ltd. (NZALC), had the largest capitalisation of any company 
mentioned in Chapter 3 and was also one of the more successful companies, surviving 
until 1968 when it was absorbed by the Dalgety Group.
204
  The other, the Canterbury 
and Otago Association Ltd. (C&O), was a similar company with a smaller capitalisation 
but a more geographically focused business model than the NZALC until it merged into 
the latter in 1877.  By the First World War, the NZALC claimed to be the largest 
pastoral company in the world. 
 
These two companies are interesting because their experience can inform several 
debates on Free-Standing Companies in terms of their structure and their ownership - 
the two companies had a typically interlocking set of directors and even shared a 
General Manager and Head Office based in Glasgow. At times both relied on the same 
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managing agencies in New Zealand and naturally, there were many shareholders with 
holdings in both companies.  The two companies occupied the same industrial sector – 
livestock farming – and within this concentrated on sheep and the wool trade.  
However, these companies were not merely interlocking investment societies delegating 
their strategy to managers based in the host economies. The Glasgow board meetings of 
both companies took active decisions right down to specific investments in machinery 
or irrigation improvement on particular farms, even though these farms were many 
thousands of miles away.  Further, some interest was taken in vertical integration into 
distribution, and associated companies such as the New Zealand Meat Processing 
Company
205
 and New Zealand Refrigeration Company
206
 came into existence to 
purchase the products of both companies.   
 
More widely, both companies are thought to have had a considerable impact on the 
early development of both host countries – and particularly so in New Zealand where 
both companies invested in the newly developing provinces of Otago and Southland at a 
crucial time for their wider economic development.  In the longer run, after the 1877 
merger the New Zealand and Australian company continues to be credited today with 
helping to establish New Zealand as an important exporter of agricultural produce to the 
UK from the 1880s – particularly in dairy production and frozen meat.207  In addition, 
investment in animal husbandry proved fruitful, with new breeds of sheep being 
developed whose wool and meat were of equally high value.
208
  These fortunes contrast 
heavily with the fortunes of the sixteen cattle based Scottish FSCs in the United States, 
only a few of which survived into the twentieth century, and the last of which (the 
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Matador Land Cattle Company Ltd.) lasted only until 1951 and then was not sold as a 
going concern.
209
  None of the US companies appear to have invested substantially in 
improving the quality of their livestock or in its distribution, nor were they as 
managerially adept as the two Australasian companies came to be. 
 
4.2 Previous Companies and other links 
 
The Canterbury & Otago Association (C&O) and the New Zealand and Australian Land 
Company (NZALC) were not the first link between Scotland and Australasia.  Various 
studies have already examined the influence of Scots settlers upon the economy and 
social structure of both countries,
210
 and this extends into the area of expatriate 
enterprise.  Although larger landowners and corporate landowners had an important role 
in farming in both countries, smaller farmers were initially dominant and later retained 
an important role.
211
  This was a particular problem where property rights were not well 
defined as yet and mapping of claims was not accurate. As early as 1866 the C&O was 
forced to invest in fencing, not to keep its stock from escaping, but to stop small settlers 
from encroaching upon its land.
212
  This was a particular problem in both countries 
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which were still very much ‘frontier’ colonies in this period, with settlers attempting to 
settle whatever land they could occupy (or squat on) along with livestock.  Both 
companies had particular problems with this on runs (the term used in Australia and 
New Zealand for large farming estates) which were leased from the colonial 
government. Governments, being influenced by the need to accommodate smallholders, 
leased small parcels of land in the middle of runs to independent settlers.  In both 
countries a substantial proportion of these small settlers originated from Scotland: one 
set of estimates for Australian pastoral regions in the 1840s suggests that the proportion 
of Scottish squatters in New England (New South Wales) was 34% of the total, while in 
the neighbouring Darling Downs (Queensland) Scots accounted for 33% of the total.
213
  
Meanwhile in Moreton Bay (Queensland) Scots were claimed to account for 46% of the 
total
214
 and, most dramatically, two-thirds of the pioneer settlers in Western Victoria 
were claimed to be Scottish.
215
  Although settlers from other national groups entered 
these areas of Australia, notably from other parts of the UK and even from Germany, a 
considerable Scots influence appears to have persisted for much of the nineteenth 
century.
216
 
 
Across the Tasman Sea Scottish settlers were very influential in the early development 
of the Otago region based around its capital, Dunedin, which was an important 
establishment of the Free Church of Scotland.  This scheme had been promoted in 
Edinburgh in the 1840s with the aim of establishing an almost exclusively Scottish 
settlement – a study by Maxwell revealed that as many as 80% of immigrants to Otago 
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between 1848 and 1860 were Scots.
217
  Scots smallholders in Otago became influential 
in mixed and sheep farming in open country districts – it has been suggested, although 
not entirely conclusively, that, as many of these farmers originated from areas where the 
existing land was relatively poor such as the Highlands, they were able to transfer their 
experience to these rougher parts of New Zealand without great difficulty.
218
  Scots 
settlers acting independently in Otago have also been credited with innovations such as 
the adoption of a more scientific approach to farming to increase outputs.
219
  Further, 
Scots in Dunedin itself became involved in the trading and financial industry 
establishing the city as a pre-eminent trading centre in New Zealand during the Maori 
wars which raged on the later more influential North Island between 1860 and 1872, 
disrupting settlement and commerce.
220
  The relative importance of these developments 
for both the C&O and the NZALC will be discussed further below.     
 
There were also earlier trading and investment company operations which predated the 
modern FSC, particularly on the Australian side where large scale European settlement 
started around thirty years in advance of that in New Zealand.  Some of these 
organisations, in the form of joint holdings by individuals termed associations, such as 
the Glasgow Association, London Association and Holmes Association, were absorbed 
by the NZALC on its formation in 1866.
221
 Other agricultural companies, such as the 
Clyde Company, established in October 1836, were already in liquidation by the late 
1850s.  The Clyde Company had its origins in Glasgow as it was sponsored by 
merchants from that city, raising a paid capital of £8,400 but this link appears to have 
been merely nominal.
222
  There seems to have been little interest in supervising 
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management from Glasgow and most authority was vested in two Scottish émigré half 
brothers, George and Philip Russell.  Little is known about the finances of this company 
but it appears that George Russell, the longer lived of the brothers, effectively ran the 
company from the Golf Hill run in Victoria, eventually buying out the interests of the 
Glasgow promoters in 1857.
223
  On the basis of paid capital, the Clyde Company 
appears to have represented a very small investment compared to the later companies: if 
UK GDP growth is used as an indicator of monetary value, then £8,400 in 1836 was 
worth only £15,802 9s 9d thirty years later when the NZALC initially issued £409,000 
worth of stock.
224
 
 
Other similar enterprises survived longer, although they were more focused upon 
finance for farmers rather than operating farms on their own account.  One of the more 
successful early companies was the Aberdeen based Scottish Australian Investment 
Company which was established in 1840 with a capital of £100,000.  This company 
sought contributions from small shareholders around Scotland and dispatched a 
manager, R. A. Morehead, to Sydney to manage its operations directly although it 
appears to have concentrated upon the mortgage industry and later upon investment in 
mining.
225
  In addition in Aberdeen a year earlier the North British Australasian 
Company had also begun operations in Sydney with ambitions to operate directly as a 
pastoral and agricultural company.  It had raised capital of £50,000 but unfortunately 
failed to value accurately its first estate at Lochinvar, New South Wales, and ended up 
in debt for several years.
226
  Despite this the company continued to survive, later 
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expanding into Queensland.
227
  However, these precursor companies were not as 
innovative in the longer term as the New Zealand & Australian Land Company, failing 
to develop their business models beyond acting as mere investment vehicles.  
 
4.3 The City of Glasgow Bank 
 
 
In the Scottish sphere the C&O and NZALC are interesting, for two reasons. They were 
more successful and longer lived than many of their contemporary peers, and they were 
closely tied to the infamous City of Glasgow Bank which collapsed in 1878.  Much of 
the borrowing of both companies had relied upon unsecured loans from the bank, partly 
because of Lewis Potter’s interlocking directorship in the bank and in both 
companies.
228
  The bank itself was also heavily involved in lending to private 
speculators in Australia and New Zealand while disregarding the value of actual 
deposits with the bank.  Further, James Morton, General Manager in Glasgow of both 
the C&O and NZALC since inception, had been allowed to borrow almost without 
restriction from the bank for personal speculation while using his company stock as 
security.  Morton had substantial personal or joint holdings in both companies, holding 
46.28% of the C&O shares, and 39.54% of NZALC shares personally, with a further 
12.38% joint holding with other directors, effectively giving him 51.92% of the 
NZALC.  After the bank collapse Morton’s stock in the merged NZALC was held by 
the creditors of the bank who formed the Assets Company Ltd in 1882 to manage these 
holdings as well as land speculations in New Zealand and Australia that had been 
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surrendered to the creditors.
229
 This also made the NZALC’s extremely large 
capitalisation and book value at this time something of interest to the financial press, as 
the bank’s chief liquidator, George Auldjo Jamieson, found that a lot of the realizable 
value of the bank’s assets relied on those of the NZALC.230  Speculation grew that the 
NZALC’s assets were fictional like those of many other FSCs of the period, but they 
were not - after re-valuation in 1879 it was arguably these assets which helped the 
victims of the bank crash to recover.
231
  This chapter will now move on to consider how 
these assets came into existence and how they were organised. 
 
4.4 The Canterbury and Otago Association: Structure and 
Organisation, 1865-1877 
 
 
This chapter will first examine the Canterbury and Otago Association before moving on 
to the NZALC, as the C&O was established first and was arguably more successful 
before its absorption by the NZALC. The Canterbury and Otago Association was 
initially registered on 28
th
 April 1865 as having its head office at 16 Carlton Place, 
Glasgow.
232
  The principal registered purpose, aside from the usual very general 
powers, was to ‘purchase land of any tenure in New Zealand and improve the 
land/establish working farms to be resold later’.  In addition a London office was 
announced at 16 Great St. Helens and indeed the initial board meeting was held at 34 
Great St. Helens.
233
  This company was only the fourth FSC to be formed in Scotland 
and at £500,000 had the largest nominal capital of any FSC yet registered, being five 
times the nominal capital of the previous largest company, the Irrawaddy Flotilla and 
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Burmese Steam Navigation Company.
234
  A total of £207,000 worth of paid capital was 
subscribed with which three pastoral runs were purchased near the town of Timaru in 
Canterbury province on the South Island  – Pareora for £31,000, the Acton Run for 
£50,000 and the Rhodes Stations for £40,000.
235
  This accounted for £121,000 worth of 
investment in total.  
 
In addition 13,000 sheep at Pareora and 20,000 lambs on the Rhodes Stations were 
purchased costing an additional £30,000. The total initial outlay had been £151,000, 
leaving the remainder of the capital for investment in equipment if required.  Like many 
Free-Standing Companies, the Canterbury & Otago Association had progressed as far as 
the purchase of property in a British colony.  In this case the land purchased was more 
than 18,000 kilometres (11,000 miles) away from Head Office, and around ninety days 
sailing time.  All correspondence would have to be by post as the telegraph network did 
not reach New Zealand as yet (indeed it was only in 1872 that an intercontinental 
telegraph link reached Darwin, although internal routes had certainly been established in 
Australia by this point).
236
 
 
Communication was likely to be especially challenging as the General Manager, James 
Morton, was to be based at the Glasgow office.  Helpfully, at this stage Morton already 
had some experience with the operation of agricultural FSCs in New Zealand as he had 
previously been London based General Manager of a London based company, The New 
Zealand and Otago Agricultural and Land Investment Association Limited.
237
  This 
company had been established in 1862 and appeared to have been Morton’s 
                                                 
234
 NAS BT2/188. 
235
 NAS GD435/2 minute of meeting, 19
th
 May 1865. 
236
 A. Briggs and P. Burke, A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet (Cambridge: 
2002), pp. 134-135. 
237
 See NAS GD435/1 which contains the minutes of the directors’ meetings for the entire life of this 
company. 
 110 
incorporation of a private venture in which he had sent £30,000 to New Zealand 
independently.  Morton was repaid for this out of the starting capital of the company.
238
  
This company appears to have operated as a sort of landowning investment trust, 
purchasing relatively small freeholds on the North Island initially before moving into 
farming on its own account at the Hakataramea station in south Canterbury province.
239
  
This run was composed of 115,000 acres of leasehold land although not all of it was 
viable, a large proportion being mountainous and snow covered in winter although the 
lower land contained good pasture.
240
 
 
To manage affairs in New Zealand, managing agents were appointed there: in this case 
Douglas Alderson & Co., a Dunedin based company.
241
 Alderson’s appear to have 
enjoyed a good relationship with Morton initially, despite their reporting of a ‘backward 
state of accounts’ in 1866, as Morton also appointed them to manage the New Zealand 
affairs of the Canterbury and Otago Association.
242
 The New Zealand and Otago 
Agricultural and Land Investment Association Limited appears not to have been a 
success generally: it seems to have generated only £5,000 worth of income from wool in 
its entire lifetime and survived only by raising further share capital and mortgaging.
243
  
Part of the problem appears to have been the time it took to communicate orders to 
Alderson & Co. and it seems also that the board was prone to procrastination. For 
instance, it took the board two years simply to decide whether investing in fencing the 
run was necessary.
244
 The board resolved in 1865 to meet on the first Friday after the 
mail had been received from New Zealand, although Alderson & Co. appeared to send 
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them scant information about the state of operations in New Zealand.  The location of 
Hakataramea in a remote mountain valley 190km distant from Dunedin was a further 
drawback and it is unclear if anyone from Alderson & Co. had even visited the property.   
In 1865 the board also considered a merger with the C&O. In 1868 it was decided to 
merge into the C&O, effectively meaning that the C&O had gained a new property in 
New Zealand for £80,000 worth of shares and £66,666 13s 4d worth of debentures in 
itself.
245
  Morton’s first attempt at FSC management had been mostly unsuccessful, 
although perhaps the New Zealand and Otago Agricultural and Land Investment 
Association Ltd. had been managed in a minimalist speculative manner with little 
attempt at property improvement. 
 
Meanwhile in his capacity at the Canturbury & Otago Association Morton was starting 
to establish more competent procedures.  In 1865 a dispute arose over funding with 
Alderson & Co and led to their replacement.  On 16
th
 March Alderson’s partner 
Matthew Holmes had written to the directors in Glasgow complaining at the lack of 
credit and promised remuneration that his firm were given for overseeing the C&O’s 
expansion in New Zealand.
246
  Holmes had been sent £150,000 to purchase the 
company properties in New Zealand.  This responsibility included negotiating terms on 
these properties either with the government (to whom most of the land in New Zealand 
still belonged) or with their existing owners – in one case he claimed he had purchased 
the ‘Rhodes land’ from its owner Mr Rhodes with great difficulty as Rhodes left it only 
reluctantly.
247
  This may have been an exaggeration, however, as according to a history 
of the Rhodes family the run, known as ‘The Levels’, was sold following the sudden 
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death of George Rhodes, the original claimant of the land.
248
  Holmes was also 
responsible for securing the later much liked Pareora run from the government, and he 
had had to carry out favours such as placing credit notes with the Bank of Otago 
without charge.
249
 
 
Alderson’s had received 1.5% commission for investing these funds, and were entitled 
to receive 5% of profits, and to draw 2.66% or £4,000 in fees for their first year’s 
services in general.
250
  However, Holmes believed this was not sufficient for the work 
undertaken in travelling around to inspect these properties and negotiating for them – he 
complained that the Alderson firm was putting a large proportion of its resources into 
this work for little reward.  Further, Holmes insisted in his communication that he 
‘never made a mistake or error of judgment’251 – this claim would retrospectively 
appear to have had some truth as the estates selected by him, particularly Pareora, were 
later among the more successful in company ownership, especially according to the 
later General Manager William Soltau Davidson in his autobiography.
252
  The early role 
of Holmes and of Alderson & Co. was never acknowledged by William Soltau 
Davidson: according to him the C&O’s first agents at Dunedin were George Gray 
Russell & Co (later known as Russell, Ritchie & Co.).
253
 
 
Relations with George Gray Russell & Co. appear to have been far more harmonious.  
Under this arrangement both partners, George Russell and Matthew Ritchie, had Powers 
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Holmes to purchase – the Rhodes’ family’s lawyers were in agreement that they had to sell. 
249
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of Attorney to act for the company.
254
  Their role was concentrated upon overseeing the 
staff on the existing runs (who were employed directly by the company) and 
representing the C&O to the government and other parties, particularly in terms of 
purchasing land and stock, and also in selling products such as wool and meat in New 
Zealand.   Staff members on the runs were paid directly by the C&O and included from 
the start a hierarchy of managers, overseers, shepherds and labourers – a large number 
of shepherds and labourers were required as the runs were extremely extensive. The 
Hakataramea run, for example, consisted of 115,000 acres or 465 km² (179 square 
miles)
255
 making it larger than Midlothian.  Numbers are unclear but, because the area 
was one of recent settlement by Europeans, recruitment appears to have been difficult 
and so possible emigrants were recruited from Scotland to work for the company, even 
as shepherds.  This was the experience of William Soltau Davidson who started as a 
shepherd for the C&O on their ‘Levels’ estate before progressing through the ranks. 
Davidson was recruited directly in Scotland by Morton for this purpose.
256
   
 
The shepherds employed appear mostly to have been young single men who were 
expected to take up residence on the farms and whose wages were kept relatively low, 
partly because they were paid in rations of mutton and lamb.  Davidson even 
remembered a labour dispute arising when farm hands insisted that they would rather be 
given hot chops for breakfast instead of cold mutton.
257
   Management enjoyed much 
better remuneration. In addition to being accommodated on the runs they were given a 
reasonable salary. There is no data for the C&O as to what total value these salaries had.  
However in 1866 the board approved a rise of £100 in salary for Messrs Hassel and 
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Smith, the managers of the Levels and Pareora stations, in recognition of the level of 
their responsibilities and value to the company.
258
 
 
By 1868 a clearer hierarchy of control had emerged within the company. As will be 
explored below, the NZALC took much longer to settle into such a hierarchy.  An 
established communication chain was fixed between Morton in Glasgow and George 
Gray Russell & Co. in Dunedin, and further it was Morton’s role to report to the board 
regarding what was happening in New Zealand.  Most major decisions, such as those 
relating to new land or stock purchases had to be passed back by mail to Glasgow, and 
often entailed a delay of between four and six months in decision making.
259
  This could 
be problematic but there was no other feasible system which could be used at this stage 
as investment in operations in New Zealand relied almost entirely upon City of Glasgow 
or Union Bank of Scotland credits being sent out as funding.  A particular difficulty (but 
one which would plague both the C&O and NZALC throughout their lifetimes) was the 
competition for land with small settlers that the company faced.  This was a particular 
problem as noted above for the C&O as the land laws of Canterbury province allowed 
for small settlers to purchase freehold lands where the company only had leasehold 
rights.
260
  This often necessitated rapid action to prevent the purchase of the most useful 
land on the runs, but the delay in sending the necessary funds to secure freehold rights 
where possible often meant that the C&O lost useful parcels of land.  This problem may 
have been further compounded for the C&O by the fact that Russell’s office was still 
somewhat distant from the majority of the C&O’s land in Canterbury province. The 
only C&O property in Otago was the somewhat mountainous and rocky Deep Dell run 
inherited from The New Zealand and Otago Agricultural and Land Investment 
Association in 1868. Another difficulty which originally appeared to be an advantage in 
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terms of market access was that the Levels and Pareora stations were close to the 
rapidly expanding port of Timaru and the main north-south railway line.  This proved a 
double edged sword as it also made the area particularly attractive for settlement.  In 
1868 the C&O appointed Mr A.J. Anderson to be inspector of the colonial books, 
meaning that he was to audit the books of the company produced in New Zealand 
before they were returned to Scotland.
261
 He also fulfilled this function for the NZALC 
and the New Zealand and Otago company, apparently partly in order to reduce the 
workload of Russell & Co.
262
  However, moving into the 1870s the C&O company 
would soon prove to be relatively more successful than its NZALC counterpart – this 
will be explored further in section 4.5 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 below shows the organisational structure of the Canterbury and Otago 
Association between 1865 and 1877.  At the top of the diagram, the first box, marked 
‘Scotland’, shows the parts of the company that were based in Scotland, and floating at 
the side is the London office.  Below this the box delineated with a solid line shows the 
parts of the company that were actually operating within New Zealand.  Key here is that 
the C&O had some managerial capacity within Scotland, meaning that decision making 
capability remained there.  The New Zealand agents, George Gray Russell & Co., were 
responsible for implementation rather than for decision making. The Superintendent of 
Properties was assisted by the Inspector of Colonial Accounts, who had no managerial 
capacity within the hierarchy, operating as an internal auditor.  Below this each farm 
had its own hierarchy of management and foremen, down to the level of the individual 
shepherd. 
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Figure 4.1 Canterbury and Otago Association Company Structure, c. 1865-1877 
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Source: This chart is based mainly on the minutes of meetings of the Board of the C&O (which the 
General Manager also attended).  These can be consulted in NAS GD435/1 and 2.  In addition the 
autobiography of William Soltau Davidson, who was recruited in Scotland and spent the early part of his 
career with the C&O working in New Zealand, was invaluable in filling in the gaps.
263
  Note that each 
farm had its own hierarchy of foremen and shepherds – this is not shown for simplicity. 
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4.5 The New Zealand and Australian Land Company: Structure and 
Organisation, 1866-1877 
 
 
The New Zealand and Australian Land Company was registered on 8
th
 March 1866, 
initially to bring together a disparate set of about thirty-eight different property holdings 
in both Australia and New Zealand.
264
 This company had the largest nominal capital of 
any Scottish Free-Standing Company in this period at £2,500,000 and in addition the 
highest paid capital at £1,250,000 eventually reaching £1,500,000 although a 
considerable proportion of this was represented in the stock allocated to the various 
associations that the new company brought together.
265
  The main motivation for this 
appears to have been to seek Limited Liability for these holdings, particularly with the 
difficult backdrop of the Overend – Gurney crisis.266  In addition, this allowed for some 
economies in scope of management between the properties and relieved the previous 
owners of the need to manage, or arrange the management of the properties themselves. 
In many cases the ownership of these holdings overlapped between different investors 
including both Lewis Potter and James Morton.  The formation of the company would 
often make it possible for these properties to be invested in and operated intensively in 
order to produce returns other than those gained through property resale at a later time.   
 
The NZALC shared its Glasgow office, 16 Carlton Place, with the C&O from the start 
in addition to sharing its General Manager, James Morton – this will be examined 
further below.
267
  In addition a London office was opened at 34 Great St. Helens. An 
early concern was that it might not be possible for a Scottish based company to be 
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recognised as a corporate body in New Zealand and Australia. Instead it might be 
necessary to incorporate in the colonies also, or lands might have to be held in a trustee 
agreement as used by FSCs operating in some other jurisdictions, most notably the 
US.
268
  Arguably this would not have created any operational difficulty but simply have 
meant that the lands were held in the names of the directors rather than of the company.  
A further feature of this transaction was that the syndicate owners of the lands 
purchased were bound to guarantee the company’s profitability against an independent 
valuation of the properties until 1872.
269
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Of the forty-four groups of property inherited by the NZALC, seven were in Australia, 
and of those four were in New South Wales, a further two in Queensland, and one in 
Victoria.
270
  In New Zealand there were a further thirty sections of rural land, in 
addition to seven town sections, all in the Otago and Southland provinces on South 
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Island.
271
  Like the properties that the C&O acquired, these runs were often 
underdeveloped and lacking in management structure - it would take the NZALC some 
years of experiment (and numerous failures) before they were able to implement a 
successful progressive strategy for the whole company.  This was made more 
challenging by the fact that the regions were ones of only recent settlement, particularly 
in New Zealand which had only joined the British Empire in 1840, and that there was 
relatively little knowledge of the climatic character of the regions.
272
  New challenges 
presented themselves which made livestock rearing difficult – being in the southern 
hemisphere, firstly, the seasons were at the opposite time of year from those in 
Scotland.  Secondly, the lands that the company owned were very diverse in terms of 
climate – the winters in Southland and Otago were extremely cold and wet, while by 
contrast Queensland was extremely arid and subject to periodic drought, often 
endangering livestock.
273
  Only after exposure to these conditions and a relative lack of 
success on some farms in the 1860s and 1870s was the NZALC able to change its 
territorial emphasis to suit the best conditions for the livestock farming which became 
its specialism.  A further benefit of this in the longer term was the ability to enter the 
real estate market both through the sale of land which was not considered appropriate 
for corporate farming to smaller farmers, and through the sale of land which had 
become more valuable for urban land use. 
 
Like the C&O, the NZALC at first worked through mercantile agents.  George Gray 
Russell & Co. were agents for the New Zealand side of the business, while Holmes & 
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Co. of Melbourne (despite being distant from the company holdings in New South 
Wales and Queensland) were Australian agents.  In addition a strong local management 
structure was established. For example, in Queensland where the company had a 
concentration of properties on the Darling Downs, Mr A B Buchannan was appointed 
regional manager with a responsibility for Queensland roughly equal to that of the 
managing agents in New Zealand and New South Wales.
274
  Below this was a structure 
of regional inspectors who toured the properties looking for problems, and below them 
a system of farm managers or foremen who had responsibility for the shepherds and 
other farm employees.
275
  An agricultural inspector was also employed in a central 
consulting role. Although it appears that this system was settled in relatively early by 
Morton and the managing agents, the first few years of the company’s existence were 
noticeable for their agency disputes and spending overruns. 
 
Agency problems frequently emerged as a result of management having other interests 
in mind apart from those of the NZALC.  This was a period in which individuals could 
still split themselves between different employers or pursue personal interests at the 
same time as holding office. At the NZALC management contracts started to stipulate 
that employees could only work for the NZALC and that they could not pursue any 
outside interests.
276
 As with the C&O, an important part of the farm manager’s 
compensation package was that they were entitled to accommodation on the farm.  A 
flaw with this was that managers were delegated the responsibility to arrange the design 
and construction of these houses, and inevitably some managers were somewhat freely 
using company funds to commission new houses that were excessively luxurious.  A 
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company limit of £1,300 was set towards house building initially, but this was not 
enough for Mr McAulay, manager at the Totara property in northern Otago, who was 
told in December 1867 by the board that he personally must pay the excess £790 
towards the estimate accepted for a new dwelling house.  This incident led to a 
tightening of budgets for house building: on the Ardgowan run, also in northern Otago, 
the manager Mr Hunter was told to spend only £600 on a new house and to design it on 
a plan to allow future extension.
277
    Later, in 1870, another station manager, Mr 
Brydon, was advised by the board of the company’s disapproval of his potential interest 
as a partner in a flax making concern.  In response the board announced that they would 
happily offer a ‘liberal rate of interest’ on its officers’ savings instead of risking their 
distraction into private lines of business.
278
   
 
It appears that many settlers in both Australia and New Zealand at this time were keen 
to set up either as farmers or as businessmen on their own account and that many saw 
paid employment only as a way of saving capital to do this.  Indeed many of the farm 
managers of both the C&O and NZALC companies later took the opportunity to 
purchase parts of the runs they had managed, to operate in their own name rather than 
make a career with the company.  Probably the biggest agency dispute of all arose when 
a John Douglas was appointed in 1867 to act as a senior manager for all the farms in 
New Zealand with the usual restriction that he could not act for any other company or 
person or transact any business on his own account.
279
   For this he was paid £2,000 a 
year with additional travelling and office expenses,
280
 but when reminded of this 
obligation in April 1868 he attempted to dispute the obligation to the extent that the 
board were forced to ask him to come to Glasgow to discuss his contractual issues with 
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them.
281
 Douglas became increasingly alienated from the board and from Russell & Co., 
to the extent that Mr Hunter of Russell & Co. was communicating with the board 
without consulting Douglas first.  Eventually Hunter was promoted to replace Douglas 
after he allegedly cashed in £8,000 worth of company credits for his own uses.
282
 
 
Cost control became a matter of serious concern to the board and to Morton, particularly 
in the more experimental early years of the company.  In his autobiography William 
Soltau Davidson would later write about what he perceived as extravagance in the early 
years of NZALC.  He gave the example of one farm manager who went to visit a 
company agent, talked about non-business subjects and then only at the end of the 
conversation introduced his need for £1,000.  He was then able to simply ask the agent 
to make it £2,000 instead.
283
  This is likely to be only a story although the early minutes 
of the directors’ meetings in Glasgow are littered with cases of overspending.  This 
difficulty appears to have arisen because the company dived into ‘improving’ its lands 
and flocks without any real knowledge of which investments were likely to bring 
returns.  As early as November 1866 £4,000 was spent ordering steam ploughs and 
‘various other articles and implements’ to be sent to the colonies.284 Part of the 
difficulty in this was that Australasia had as yet only minimal indigenous manufacturing 
industry. This meant that equipment such as steam ploughs had to be acquired by the 
Head Office from manufacturers in Scotland and then shipped to Australasia. In 
addition grass seeds,
285
 pedigree sheep for breeding purposes,
286
 thoroughbred horses,
287
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and later even stoats and weasels to control the rabbit population were shipped to 
Australasia.
288
  To some extent the natural resources available there were ignored by the 
NZALC which arguably attempted to transform its properties into a larger version of the 
Scottish environment. 
 
At the end of 1867 it was reported that a deficiency of £37,000 was feared at the end of 
the financial year.
289
  A committee had been appointed to examine management in New 
Zealand and it reported that expenditure on improving the freehold lands there should 
be restricted to £3,750 a month and that this should later be reduced further.
290
  A month 
later Alexander F. Anderson was appointed to be inspector of colonial books and 
accounts and dispatched to New Zealand to carry out this role, although it appears he 
did not visit Australia.
291
  By January 1868 arrangements were made for accounts to be 
sent back to Glasgow on a monthly basis, although problems continued with 
unauthorised land purchases and unauthorised spending on fencing of land.  While 
fencing was useful for enforcing property rights and for stock control, it involved a 
large sunk expenditure, requiring many miles of wiring and numerous wooden posts.  
By the late 1860s expenditure was directed towards the improvements considered most 
necessary, which in particular involved the replacement of the indigenous vegetation 
with English grass seed, considered more beneficial for sheep grazing.  In addition 
fertilizers such as guano and nitrate of soda were purchased and sent to New Zealand.
292
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The results of the NZALC’s land improvement programme are best described as mixed. 
In Southland in particular, the introduction of English grass on a large scale brought few 
results.  In the later 1860s the company devoted vast resources to the giant run at 
Edendale where it held 124,666 acres of freehold, though this in itself had represented a 
waste of capital according to Davidson.  The climate and terrain of this run posed vast 
problems – only 30,000 acres were suitable for grazing, the remainder being rocky and 
mountainous, and the local climate was particularly cold and wet.  Attempts were made 
to plant the English grass in the better soil: of 33,000 acres planted with English grass, 
the species was able to maintain itself in only 17,000 acres, and within a few seasons 
the other 16,000 acres had returned to their native state.  This meant that by 1878 as 
much as £219,000 had been spent on cultivation and English grass at this property 
alone, but with very disappointing results.  With an additional £57,500 spent on 
buildings and fencing on the run, it was calculated that improvement had cost £8 2s per 
acre. This figure compared unfavourably with the C&O’s Levels estate in Canterbury 
where a similar improvement had cost only £2 1s per acre over 28,703 acres of 
cultivated land, with the desired results - by 1878 the Levels could support 113,400 
sheep.
293
  A further waste of resources at Edendale was that because of the size of the 
estate many of the steam engines purchased in Scotland were allocated there for 
working ploughs and harrows. These proved too heavy for the boggy ground and ended 
up being kept in a warehouse for many years until they could be sold as engines for 
sawmills.
294
  Infrastructure costs were also high with the construction of roads and 
bridges over deep creeks.
295
 Davidson was later critical of the NZALC for pursuing 
these investments in what appeared to him to be a reckless manner, though the mistakes 
seem to have been part of a longer term learning process for the board and management. 
Certainly at the bottom line few of the company’s New Zealand estates had seen an 
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improvement in profitability by the late 1870s, particularly when the sums invested in 
cultivation were deducted from the gross profit attributed to each estate. 
 
The NZALC enjoyed more success in improving its core product, sheep, in the longer 
run, with the heavy investment in Leicester and Lincoln rams which were exported to 
Australasia to cross-breed with the merino sheep brought out by earlier colonists.
296
  
The merinos were not so hardy when exposed to either the extreme heat of Queensland 
conditions or the damp conditions in New Zealand.  The company also kept a few 
hundred cattle through the 1860s and 1870s, but would move into this area further in the 
1880s by exporting Angus cattle to cross-breed with the breeds already in 
Australasia.
297
  In this way animals were bred which required relatively little attention 
and were thus suited to the very large farm sizes compared to those back in Scotland.
298
  
Techniques from Scotland were also used in dealing with pests on the runs, although 
ironically these were often pests that had been imported by previous colonists, such as 
rabbits which created competition for grass.
299
  Rabbits and weeds were a severe 
problem on many of the Southland and Otago runs, although the use of phosphorus to 
control them met with some success - at Kourow in Otago half a million rabbits were 
poisoned annually at a cost of £600.
300
  The New Zealand government made some effort 
to help with this by importing stoats and weasels to maintain a balance between the 
numbers of different pests, and later (from 1888) the NZALC itself imported stoats and 
weasels on a wider scale after experiments with frozen pigeons as food for the animals 
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on the voyage proved successful.
301
  Eventually it was realised that rabbits could be 
turned into an asset as they could be shipped to the UK as a frozen food product along 
with exports of frozen lamb and beef.
302
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Figure 4.2 New Zealand and Australian Land Company Structure, c. 1866-1877 
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Source: This chart is based mainly on the minutes of meetings of the Board of the NZALC (which the 
General Manager also attended).  These can be consulted in NAS GD435/6 and 7.  In addition the 
autobiography of William Soltau Davidson was useful in filling in the gaps.
303
   
Notes: Each farm had its own hierarchy of foremen and shepherds – for simplicity, this is not shown.  
Holmes, Wright & Co. were responsible for Yawong Springs, Bundure, and Humula stations, those 
falling within New South Wales and Victoria, though worked closely with the Queensland Manager.  The 
position of Colonial Manager appears not to have been consistently filled, and is referred to in the late 
1860s only – NAS GD435/6 meeting 17th July 1867 re the appointment of a Colonial Manager, and 
GD435/6 meeting 11
th
 August 1868 when the Colonial Manager was told to reduce expenditure on 
stations.  After this point regional managements would have corresponded directly with Glasgow. 
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4.6 Were these companies separate firms? 
 
 
The C&O and NZALC shared many institutions before they merged formally together 
in 1877.  The Head Office of both companies in Glasgow remained at the same address 
throughout the period between 1865 and 1877.  Indeed, the joint head office of both 
companies occupied four different addresses during this period - firstly 16 Carlton 
Place, then 7 Carlton Place in 1867, followed by 180 West George Street in 1872 and 
finally moving to 204 West George Street in 1876.
304
  This was not unusual for FSCs in 
this period, particularly as the size of Head Office required was usually fairly minimal 
and it was often not worth investing in a large corporately owned headquarters. 
Additionally, it was usually prudent to register the headquarters at the address of the 
legal practice or home managing agent responsible for the company.  This practice of 
‘brass plate capitalism’ would later become far more common in Scotland, particularly 
in Edinburgh where Sir George Warrender had as many as eight different companies 
registered at his address of 123 George Street through the late 1870s and 1880s, some of 
which will be mentioned in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
305
  In London where there 
were many thousands of FSCs this practice was even more ubiquitous.  It should be 
noted, of course, that this practice is not unique to the FSC world - many subsidiary 
companies that have separate registrations from their parent companies share a head 
office, for example, and in some cases sister companies which share head offices under 
the same ownership exist among companies operating in only one economy.
306
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In the case of the C&O and NZALC the various premises in question belonged to James 
Morton, the general manager of both companies in Scotland.  Morton was in effect a 
management contractor to both companies, and to earlier the London based New 
Zealand and Otago Company. He was not forced by his contracts from either company 
to concentrate on only one, as most of those working for either company in New 
Zealand or Australia were.  Morton was expected to supply a complete managerial 
service to the companies; when his contract was renegotiated by the C&O in 1872 his 
annual remuneration was fixed at £1,250 but he was responsible for paying his own 
clerk’s salaries and other office expenses, such as utility bills and accommodation costs, 
out of this amount.
307
  Obviously, a further incentive for Morton was his 46% and 39% 
personal holdings in the C&O and NZALC respectively.
308
  It was further agreed in the 
renegotiation that: 
 
It is known to the Committee that Mr Morton is the manager of the New Zealand and 
Australian Land Co Limited and is also engaged in other undertakings with the prosecution 
of which it is not intended that this appointment if accepted by him shall interfere. 
 
Thus the directors of the C&O, some of whom were also directors of the NZALC, 
approved of Morton’s dual role and, indeed, his private responsibilities away from 
either company.  It should not be thought that this arrangement meant that either 
company should be considered to be less entrepreneurial or professional or indeed a 
more speculative enterprise by pursuing these arrangements.  Instead, the reality was 
that managing either company from Glasgow was not yet a full time role, particularly 
before Australia was linked by telegraph in 1872.
309
  This would make it possible for 
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Glasgow management to have a greater role in the running of the company although 
even after 1872 relatively few telegrams were used.  Morton’s role could not be to 
supervise the day to day running of either company’s runs in New Zealand or Australia 
as there remained a delay of two months in communication to either colony until 
telegraph links were established with Australia. Instead, his role as it evolved was much 
more strategic - his job essentially was to receive the monthly correspondence of the 
various managers and agents in New Zealand and Australia and make strategic 
recommendations to the two Boards based upon this information.  Further, he sought 
approval from the board for his strategic responses to this information flow which he 
then relayed back to Australasia where it was the job of the regional and farm managers 
to put these actions into practice. 
 
Morton’s consultancy role in management, then, allowed both companies to gain some 
economy in management affairs as it meant they did not have to waste capital acquiring 
a base in Glasgow themselves. This capital could be more usefully employed in 
Australasia with returns at a time when property values in Glasgow were sharply 
increasing during a building boom in the late 1860s and through the 1870s until the City 
of Glasgow Bank collapse.
310
  Similarly, one set of clerical staff under Morton carrying 
out any necessary administration for both companies led to savings overall for both 
companies.  Expertise in this area could also be shared, given the obvious similarity in 
business interests between the two companies.  The only difficulty that would appear to 
arise here was that the initial contract between Morton and the NZALC, referred to in 
the Articles of Association, set up a principal-agent problem. It fixed his remuneration 
at 1% per annum of the price of the properties purchased from any association.
311
  
Therefore Morton was presented with an incentive to purchase as many properties as 
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possible, using the company’s funds to capture these rents for himself, and this 
incentive seems likely to have contributed to some of the more overpriced property 
purchases that the NZALC made. 
 
Economies of scale were also possible in lobbying – in March 1871 Morton along with 
NZALC directors Stewart Buchannan and James Melvin met the New Zealand 
government minister and future Prime Minister Julius Vogel in London.
312
  The purpose 
of this meeting was to discuss the building of a railway to connect Southland and Otago, 
which the New Zealand government developed in sections throughout the 1870s, with 
Christchurch, Dunedin and Invercargill being linked by 1879.  This railway benefited 
both NZALC and C&O – the line passed through important estates of both companies 
including the C&O’s Acton and Pareora, and the NZALC’s Totara and Edendale, while 
the C&O’s Levels estate received a branch line along its northern boundary.313  No 
minute of this meeting is known to exist, but it appears that Morton, Buchannan and 
Melvin may have managed to influence the government’s choice of route with a view to 
enhancing the value of the properties of both companies as well as improving 
distribution. 
 
Another institution shared between the two companies was the post of inspector of the 
colonial books, whose £1,000 per annum salary was jointly paid by both companies 
(and initially was split three ways with the New Zealand and Otago Company).
314
  
Again this was a cost saving measure for the companies as it allowed for the same level 
of work to be done by the appointee, Mr A. J. Anderson, for both companies while each 
paid him only £500 per annum rather than £1,000.  The C&O and NZALC also shared a 
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chairman, Robert Stewart, a merchant from Glasgow who continued to hold the position 
after the 1877 merger, until his death in 1909.   
 
Similarly, savings were achieved for most of the period through sharing the Dunedin 
based agency company of George Russell & Co., later Russell Ritchie & Co., although 
the NZALC moved towards employing its own management structure to oversee the 
day to day operation of its farms in New Zealand.  However, Russell Ritchie & Co. 
continued to represent the NZALC in many outside dealings such as those with the 
government or in organizing land sales.  Again there was a saving in not investing in a 
Dunedin office which would have used much needed capital and resources, and even 
when a Dunedin office was eventually set up after the merger its staff was kept small.
315
   
In many of these dealings Russell Ritchie & Co.’s freedom of action was restricted and 
they had to refer back to the board of the company that they were acting for before 
taking any major decisions.  In this they appear to have been more conservative than 
some of the managers employed by the two companies, particularly the NZALC where 
cost overrun problems caused by mismanagement in New Zealand developed in the late 
1860s. 
 
There was a further linkage with an additional company to cater for both the C&O and 
NZALC. This was the New Zealand Meat Preserving Co Ltd which became a rare 
manufacturing Scottish FSC in 1872, registered in Glasgow, after an initial period as a 
New Zealand registered company.
316
  This company was established by James 
Wotherspoon in 1868 to preserve meat and also to boil down carcasses to produce 
extracts.
317
  It is unclear how much of a Chapman/Wilkins style cluster with the C&O 
and NZALC this company represented, as it is not known if any links existed in terms 
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of shareholding, directorships or management. The New Zealand Meat Preserving Co 
Ltd. came into being to fulfil a very precise need: finding a market for the surpluses in 
production being generated by both companies.  It was possible to ship wool back to 
London, but the level of meat being produced was usually in excess of demand in 
Australasia. The logistics of controlling, feeding and watering large animals on board 
ship on an 80-90 day voyage that crossed the equator made it almost impossible to ship 
live sheep or cattle back to the UK for sale in a healthy condition.
318
    William Soltau 
Davidson even claimed that the C&O went as far as keeping sheep alive for the wool as 
long as possible before herding them off cliffs as a waste product.
319
  This led to the 
association with the New Zealand Meat Preserving Co. with which contracts were made 
by the C&O in 1869 to sell sheep at an agreed rate of between 2d and 2½d.
320
  The 
NZALC also made an ongoing contract with the New Zealand Meat Preserving Co. in 
1869. This appears not to have been consistently remunerative as the Glasgow board 
could not agree whether to renew the contract in the Southern hemisphere in autumn 
1874.
321
  This procrastination also highlighted one of the disadvantages of the slow 
communication with New Zealand in particular at this time.  Few figures survive on 
these transactions but Soltau Davidson maintains that this activity was unprofitable and 
forced him to move the post-merger New Zealand and Australian Land Co. into the 
downstream vertical integration which will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
In July 1876 it was first proposed to merge the C&O and NZALC into a single 
company, and a joint committee was appointed for the purpose of investigating the 
synergies to be gained.  It has been suggested that this merger was the brainchild of 
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James Morton who wished to combine the (more profitable per acre) C&O with the 
NZALC.
322
  Certainly the NZALC held in the main vastly less attractive land - by 1877 
its Queensland leaseholds were valued at just 11d per acre; those in New Zealand were 
valued at 3s 1d per acre compared to 5s 7d for the C&O.
323
  On the other hand, the 
NZALC continued to hold 198,070 acres of freehold in New Zealand valued at £5 3s 9d 
per acre which compared favourably with the C&O’s 103,349 acres valued at £4 17s 0d 
per acre.
324
  Table 4.1 below summarizes the land holdings of both company prior to 
merger. 
 
Table 4.1 New Zealand and Australian Land Company and Canterbury and Otago 
Association Land Holdings, 1877 
 
 Freehold   Leasehold   
Region Acres Cost and 
Fencing (£) 
(a) 
Cost per 
acre (£) 
(b) 
Acres Cost and 
Fencing (£) 
(a) 
Cost per 
acre (£) 
(b) 
Victoria and 
NSW 
31,431 42,038 1.34 582,000 169,625 0.29 
Queensland 347 400 1.16 1,756,453 78,194 0.04 
New Zealand 
(NZALC) 
198,070 1,027,695 5.19 162,537 25,012 0.15 
NZALC Total 229,848 1,070,134 4.66 2,500,990 272,832 0.11 
Canterbury & 
Otago Assoc. (c) 
103,349 501,376 4.85 348,912 98,579 0.28 
Source: NAS GD435/2 minute of meeting 08
th
 January 1877.  Reproduced from report to the NZALC 
and C&O boards into the feasibility of the merger, produced by a joint committee of the boards of both 
companies.   
Notes: 
a) These figures were derived from the original cost of acquiring the land plus the cost of improvements 
carried out such as sowing English grass, creating access to water for livestock and adding fencing. 
b) Decimalized for clarity.   
c) All holdings were in New Zealand. 
 
As noted above, some of the NZALC lands such as Edendale had also absorbed large 
sums in improvements with not entirely satisfactory results. Meanwhile some land 
remained fallow, giving no return on investment at all.  Both companies were 
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additionally suffering from the loss of their leasehold land rights. This was a particular 
problem for the NZALC in Australia where it was reported that the Chinchilla run in 
Queensland had been almost totally lost.
325
 Nonetheless the accounts of the NZALC 
would suggest that, although the company was not as profitable per acre or as 
productive as the C&O, it was essentially a profitable business despite the high level of 
debt against it. The committee investigating the amalgamation stated that both 
companies were attaining returns on capital employed of around 6% and, as Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 below show, both companies were reporting profits before the merger.
326
  The 
committee suggested that a merger would also yield synergies between the two 
companies in terms of undivided management in New Zealand which could end 
conflicting interests, although there is no evidence for the committee’s claim that the 
two companies were simply engaged in buying and selling land to each other. Perhaps 
for the Glasgow interests the opportunity to introduce preference shares which the 
committee also mentioned was the most powerful incentive to merge these two 
companies. 
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Table 4.2 New Zealand and Australian Land Company Operating Profit Summary 
1873-6 
 
Year £'000s 
1873 
£'000s 
1874 
£'000s 
1875 
£'000s 
1876 
£'000s 4 
year 
avg 
% of 
turn-
over 
Returns from Wool 104 102 100 90 99 65.2% 
Returns from Sheep(a) 32 56 31 29 37 24.5% 
Returns from Cattle 7 11 10 15 11 7.2% 
Returns from Horses and Sundries 3 8 3 6 5 3.2% 
Gross Colonial Returns 146 176 143 141 152 100.0% 
Less Colonial working expenses and 
Depreciation of Implements 
46 50 52 61 52 34.4% 
Net colonial Profit (b) 100 126 91 80 99 65.6% 
Interest 17 19 22 24 20 13.4% 
Home Charges (c) 4 4 4 4 4 2.6% 
Total Interest and Home Charges 20 23 26 28 24 16.0% 
Net Divisible Profit 80 103 65 52 75 49.6% 
Source: NAS GD435/2 minute of meeting 8
th
 January 1877.  Reproduced from report to the NZALC and 
C&O boards, into the feasibility of the proposed merger produced by a joint committee drawn from the 
boards of both companies. 
a) Probably returns from sales of live sheep for slaughter or as carcasses for meat and tallow production. 
b) Profit earned in the colonies before being returned to the UK. 
c) Charges deducted for administration etc. in Glasgow by James Morton & Co. 
 
 
Tables 4.2 above and 4.3 below give short summaries of the financial results that both 
companies reported in the mid-1870s. The dependence of both companies on revenue 
from wool is clear, while returns from the few cattle kept remained low, with only a 
local outlet for milk and beef.  Maintaining a head office in Scotland, meanwhile, did 
not represent a substantial drain on the finances of either company, with James Morton 
& Co. administering both firms at a combined cost of around £7,000 a year.   
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Table 4.3 Canterbury and Otago Association Operating Profit Summary 1873-6 
Year £'000s 
1873 
£'000s 
1874 
£'000s 
1875 
£'000s 
1876 
£'000s 4 
year avg 
% of 
turn-
over 
Returns from Wool 69 77 69 54 67 75.6% 
Returns from Sheep (a) 20 20 15 22 19 21.6% 
Returns from Cattle (b) 1 0 0 0 0 0.4% 
Returns from Horses and Sundries 3 2 2 1 2 2.3% 
Gross Colonial Returns 93 100 86 77 89 100.0% 
Working Expenses and Depreciation of 
Buildings, fences and Implements 
28 31 31 31 30 34.2% 
Written off Right of Tenure 5 10 3 2 5 5.6% 
Exceptional Colonial Charges 1 1 1 1 1 0.9% 
Less Colonial working expenses and 
Depreciation of Implements 
34 42 35 34 36 40.7% 
Net colonial Profit (c) 59 58 51 43 53 59.3% 
Interest 16 16 17 16 16 18.4% 
Home Charges 3 4 3 3 3 3.3% 
Total Interest and Home Charges (d) 19 20 20 19 19 21.8% 
Net Divisible Profit 40 38 31 25 33 37.5% 
Source: NAS GD435/2 minute of meeting 8
th
 January 1877.  Reproduced from report to the NZALC and 
C&O boards into the feasibility of the merger, produced by a joint committee of the boards of both 
companies.  Some mathematical errors apparent in the original have been corrected. 
a) Probably returns from sales of live sheep for slaughter or as carcasses for meat and tallow production. 
b) Less than £500 in the years 1874-6. 
c) Profit earned in the colonies before being returned to the UK. 
d) Charges deducted for administration etc. in Glasgow by James Morton & Co. 
 
The merged New Zealand and Australian Land Company Ltd. initially had the largest 
paid capital at £2,500,000 of any Scottish FSC in this period, and this was also larger 
than the English Rio Tinto Company, at £2,250,000 probably the largest English FSC at 
this time.
327
  This was not a realistic value for the new NZALC, being based on a 
combination of the capital of the C&O and old NZALC plus 25% to allow for the 
possible proceeds of subdivision of lands and it had to be reduced throughout the 1880s 
to reflect the real value of the company.  The year 1879 marked a big change in 
management as James Morton resigned his position as General Manager of the merged 
company. This was claimed to be due to his involvement in the City of Glasgow Bank 
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collapse, following his vast personal borrowing from the bank while using his NZALC 
stock as security, although Chapter 5 examines these events in more detail.  This had 
been allowed to continue to the level at which the liquidators of the bank discovered 
that a large proportion of the bank’s value depended upon the assets of the NZALC; 
hence the former shareholders of the bank became shareholders in the merged NZALC 
after 1879.
328
  This collapse did not directly affect the financial position of the NZALC 
but it did bring a lot of scrutiny upon the company, particularly in those quarters where 
investments in overseas companies and assets were already regarded with suspicion - 
letters to newspapers alleged that the NZALC’s assets in Australasia existed only on 
paper.
329
 
 
William Soltau Davidson was promoted to replace James Morton in January 1879 as 
General Manager of the merged company, moving back to Glasgow from New Zealand.  
His career path had been entirely with the C&O, and he notes in his autobiography that 
he felt the merger had been dominated by the NZALC to the disadvantage of 
shareholders interested only in the C&O, such as himself.
330
  Davidson’s tenure saw the 
role of General Manager become fully internalised to the company, dispensing with the 
agency problems existing under Morton; it also appears that Davidson had no other 
external commitments.  The Davidson era is examined in more detail in Chapter 5; it 
appears that he completed the development of the NZALC into a modern corporation 
with the full internalisation of the agency functions in New Zealand and in Australia.  
Gradually he invested in the three Chandlerian prongs of production, management and 
distribution.
331
 Efforts to improve the quality of stock and the runs themselves 
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continued with the decision to reduce the less remunerative holdings in New Zealand, 
particularly in Southland, and to concentrate more fully on Queensland and New South 
Wales.  Management structures were formalised, based upon those that already existed, 
while Davidson himself frequently travelled to Australia and New Zealand to oversee 
operations despite the long sea voyages required.   
 
Distribution was radically improved under Davidson; previously both companies had 
relied upon sales of wool in London and of meat and dairy products in New Zealand.  
Davidson was able to take advantage of the new technology of refrigeration to freeze 
sheep carcasses in New Zealand, erecting plants to do this before shipping the frozen 
carcasses to London where salesmen based at the Smithfield meat market would oversee 
distribution to butchers in the London area.
332
  The economies of scale required by a 
company that had been keeping many hundreds of thousands of sheep were realised in 
this venture: 4,460 sheep carcasses and 449 lamb carcasses were sent in the first 
shipment in 1881, by 1900 50,000 carcasses annually were shipped, and by 1916 the 
trade had grown to 150,000 carcasses.
333
   
 
Economies of scope were also discovered in refrigeration – later Davidson also oversaw 
the extension of the NZALC into the dairy industry with downstream integration into 
the construction of dairies and creameries.  To do this Davidson visited Ingersoll’s dairy 
factory in Canada and imported the technology to New Zealand, and a butter making 
expert from Denmark was also recruited.  The factory was constructed on the Edendale 
estate, and the NZALC continued to manufacture there even after the estate itself was 
sold to smaller farmers.  Even rabbits were turned from pests into a revenue stream as 
their carcasses could also be frozen and shipped back to the UK.  The Edendale name 
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was used as a brand to market the products through the rather atomistic food retailing 
industry existing in Britain at this time, although it was not felt necessary to integrate 
further downstream into retailing as other companies such as Lever did.  Davidson did, 
however, become a founder director of Nelson Brothers Ltd., which operated cold stores 
in London that could store 200,000 carcasses at a time.
334
  This did not represent an 
outside interest for Davidson – his director’s fee was paid to the NZALC.335 
 
Through this further development of the NZALC into a vertically integrated company, 
Davidson was able to draw on the earlier work of Morton and the farm managers of the 
two earlier companies to move the merged company forward to become what he 
claimed was the largest pastoral company in the world by the First World War.
336
  
Technology was a partial solution to the problems of both companies on the fresh 
produce side, particularly those of the NZALC.  Davidson’s bringing the two companies 
together helped to realise economies of scale that had not been possible previously – 
despite the close links between the NZALC and the C&O prior to the merger it can be 
argued that they were distinct companies.  There is less evidence about the C&O but the 
surviving material suggests that this company succeeded in becoming more tightly 
managed in New Zealand and more profitable because it was more sharply focused on 
one group of farms which were located close to each other. 
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This company was also better at concentrating on its core business of sheep farming 
without wasteful attempts to move into arable farming or to cultivate infertile land.  
Therefore those managers who worked only for the C&O seem to have been more 
successful within it, and James Morton himself (and the chairman and other interlocking 
directors) appeared to have a far more conservative approach when dealing with this 
company than with the NZALC.  By contrast the NZALC was highly expansionist and 
established a cost control system only when it became clear that spending was running 
out of hand.  It was also prevented from operating as freely as it might have done by its 
obligations to its vendor associations which the C&O did not have.  This was 
particularly constraining when the company sought to sell off unproductive land, for 
example.  Thus while the same group of individuals dominated both companies on the 
Scottish side, on the colonial side these they represented distinct businesses governed 
with separate managerial approaches from the same management.  Arguably this 
demonstrated the effectiveness of limited liability combined with the free-standing form 
in containing risk. 
 
4.7 Conclusion: To what extent were these two companies managed 
from Scotland? 
 
 
So far this chapter has demonstrated that both the Canterbury and Otago Association 
and the New Zealand and Australian Land Company were reasonably successful within 
their aims of operating as pastoral farmers in Australia and New Zealand.  Although the 
management of the two companies was related, they represented two separate 
organisations.  Both companies were more successful in terms of longevity and value 
created than the better known US hosted ranching FSCs of the 1880s which did not deal 
with the development of management structures nor invest in production.  This final 
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section will examine the role of Scottish management in these companies and whether 
this of itself was important. 
 
Writers on the history both of Scottish emigration to Australia and New Zealand and on 
the pastoral history of the region acknowledge that these colonies were in their 
formative periods as economies and therefore were in need of external capital.
337
  Inputs 
such as management experience and actual farming knowledge were also in short 
supply.  Most early settlement by pioneer ‘squatters’, particularly in Australia, where 
Davidson would later concentrate the NZALC’s mass grazing activities, was purely 
speculative with sheep being herded to where they would best survive.  Most settlers 
were self supporting subsistence farmers, but corporate farming worked better, 
particularly in Australia, as the wide open plains would support scale economies. These 
were to be gained from having larger herds than were possible in Europe while allowing 
a relatively low density of only around two sheep an acre.  Buying this land was not a 
huge difficulty (the governments were willing to sell, at least on leasehold), but there 
were problems with the low quality of the livestock in the colonies as well as the lack of 
irrigation and the unsuitable terrain in some parts of certain runs.  Both the NZALC and 
C&O were useful in bringing investment into the colonies – in this case to the value of 
nearly £2million.  In some cases this investment would have a lasting role in promoting 
long run agricultural and economic development outside of the company where 
improved land was sold on to small farmers.  These two companies also helped to 
establish larger industries in food products that gave these emerging economies their 
staple export products.  But it was not essential for the colonies that this money came 
from Scotland; it could have been raised in London or elsewhere in the UK, or for that 
matter in any other capital market globally. 
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It was also important for the investors in these companies back in Scotland that they 
chose to send their funds to Australasia.  Australasian agriculture offered a more 
sustainable use for funds than mining in Europe or the Americas, for example. This 
appears to have occurred partly because some knowledge transfer occurred from 
Scottish farming to Australasia.  This is not usually associated with the FSC model - 
Wilkins has tended to argue that FSCs generally do not transfer knowledge because 
with a minimal Head Office it is difficult for them to develop the institutional 
capabilities to do this.
338
  In this scenario Wilkins tends to assume that the employees of 
an FSC will operate within the institutional framework of the host country, with a heavy 
reliance on intermediaries and outside contractors - in the case of the NZALC and 
C&O, operations were being conducted in the framework of the home country.  This 
came about because the workforce and colonial management of both companies tended 
to be Scottish born themselves, and in the case of the NZALC the emigration of workers 
to these farms had been sponsored by the owners of some of the predecessor 
associations to the company.  A B Buchanan, owner of the Chinchilla run in 
Queensland, imported shepherds from the Highlands of Scotland to tend his flocks in 
1863 – these shepherds are unlikely to have spoken much English and even brought 
their own collie sheepdogs with them, for instance.
339
  Both companies were also helped 
by the Scottish background of many immigrants to the South Island of New Zealand, 
with Otago province having originally been formed as a Free Church of Scotland 
colony.
340
  It is estimated that as many as a third of the population in some parts of 
Australia were of Scots origin in this period.  While neither C&O nor the NZALC 
caused these institutional phenomena, they did take advantage of them. 
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Later both companies attempted to operate with the familiar rather than the unfamiliar. 
The NZALC’s attempts to import farm machinery and the improvement of land through 
the importation of grass and new pests to try to control naturally the levels of pests 
existing were all attempts to use Scottish knowledge to solve problems in farming in the 
colonies.  Further, in the Scottish Highlands sheep farming had moved beyond the small 
scale hill farming common in England. From the mid 18
th
 century large estates 
abandoned their tradition of leasing to small subsistence farmers and increasingly 
operated by leasing their land to farmers in large sheep runs.
341
  By the early 1800s 
some runs in the far north were measuring 100,000 acres and already creating a mass 
trade in wool and mutton.
342
 It does not seem unlikely, then, that the directors of the 
NZALC took some inspiration for the direction of this farming from the new direction 
followed by Highland landowners in this period, and the transfer of labour from the 
Highlands also allowed both companies to profit from experienced labour.  
Additionally, the NZALC director James Melvin gave his profession as farmer, and 
frequently reported to the board about agricultural and managerial matters.
343
 
 
We have seen therefore that the C&O and NZALC were intensively managed 
companies from the start rather than hands off speculation or investment clubs, and that 
the decision making process followed a chain of command stretching up to the Glasgow 
Head Office of both companies.  It is not necessarily the case that the style of 
management was always in the best interests of either company; sub optimal decisions 
were often made.  The NZALC was a particular victim of this in addition to having 
purchased many of its lands from more speculative investment based groups, but over a 
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twenty year period the company was able to correct these problems through the 
imposition of a strong Scottish based management style which could take advantage of 
the large population of Scottish migrant labour available in both colonies.  The Glasgow 
Head Office within both companies had a central role in transferring not just control but 
knowledge, personnel and resources to the host countries. This is what made the C&O 
and NZALC successful organisations and examples of the Free-Standing form. 
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Chapter 5 - Managing a Free-Standing Company 
in the long term: The New Zealand and 
Australian Land Company 1877-1914 
 
This Chapter will examine the management structure put in place by the New Zealand 
and Australian Land Company after 1877 as it became an increasingly sophisticated 
enterprise and continued to internalise information to develop itself as a trading system. 
 
5.1 The NZALC as a Case Study 
 
 
This chapter of the thesis continues with the case of Australasia after the merger of the 
original New Zealand and Australian Land Company (NZALC) with the Canterbury 
and Otago Association (C&O).  This chapter will examine the long term consequences 
of this merger and the much larger firm thus created, which started with a nominal 
capital of some £2.5 million.
344
  From the start, this made the new NZALC the largest 
single Scottish FSC in terms of paid capital, and one of the larger based in the UK. The 
merged firm found itself in charge of a miscellany of farmed estates in Australasia – 
thirteen on New Zealand’s South Island and eight in the Australian states of Queensland 
and New South Wales.  In total this new company had rights, whether freehold or 
leasehold, to around 3 million acres of land and in 1878 the company’s estates carried a 
total of 576,521 sheep and 4,197 cattle, in addition to an unspecified amount of arable 
crops.
345
   
 
This collection of concerns was still managed by James Morton & Co. from Glasgow in 
1877, although the company would soon be forced to leave behind its managerial 
arrangement with Morton because of his involvement with the City of Glasgow Bank 
collapse.  This would be the first of many challenges that the NZALC would face before 
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the First World War, of which most the company successfully overcame to reinforce its 
dominant position in pastoral farming in Australasia.  Competitive pressure in this 
period was coming increasingly not from other pastoral companies but from smaller, 
more flexible independent farmers who were favoured both in New Zealand and the in 
Australian states by government policies which often advocated the breaking up of large 
estates to replace them with smallholders.  In time the NZALC was able to turn this 
change to its advantage, particularly in New Zealand where the company would 
gradually dispose of its holdings to smaller farmers at a profit. 
 
The NZALC almost completely left the farming industry in New Zealand by 1910 to 
concentrate on Australia where land was not such a precious commodity and economies 
of scale in livestock farming were greater.   Further, the NZALC had to rise to the 
challenge of finding a market for the company’s produce, now that Australasia had 
established that its terrain and climate were well suited to livestock farming.  Both the 
NZALC and the C&O had been reliant on sales of wool back in the UK market, but in 
the early 1880s the merged company would successfully pioneer the export of frozen 
meat from New Zealand to the UK, thus allowing it to use its resources to full 
advantage.  In the longer run, however, this would arguably end up benefiting the 
smaller farmers more, as purpose built independent freezing works, some of them 
sponsored by government or farmers’ co-operatives, gradually displaced the NZALC’s 
initial venture which was on a relatively small scale. Meanwhile, the strategies of 
managerial hierarchy started under the original NZALC and the C&O were continued 
and reinforced, with management remaining strongly in Scottish control despite the 
colonies’ increasing political independence (which appears to have had curiously little 
effect on the company). The NZALC would evolve then, reacting to the constraints of 
the market outside the company and the regulatory environment in general through this 
 149 
period, briefly flirting with becoming a vertically integrated food company but choosing 
not to follow this route in the longer term.  Instead the company would choose to 
concentrate on managing its most important commodity, not mutton, beef, milk, butter 
or wool, but land in the longer run – this would deliver the highest returns, and this was 
perhaps best suited to the FSC format of the company. 
 
This chapter will go on to examine how the NZALC’s structure and strategy developed 
to rise to these challenges and will examine the role of the personalities involved in 
overcoming these problems.  Of particular interest here is the role of the NZALC 
General Manager, William Soltau Davidson, who was General Manager based mainly 
in Scotland from 1878 until his retirement in 1915.
346
  Davidson is widely credited as 
being the entrepreneurial force behind the company in this period and is best known in 
New Zealand for pioneering the export of frozen meat and refrigerated dairy products 
and thus helping the country to find a national competitive advantage.
347
  The original 
shipment of frozen mutton from Port Chalmers near Dunedin to London on the SS 
Dunedin in 1882 has almost passed into national legend in New Zealand. Today the 
farmstead and former slaughterhouse of the Totara estate from which the first shipment 
was taken belong to the New Zealand Historic Places Trust and operate as a tourist 
attraction – such is the perceived importance of this export to New Zealand’s 
economy.
348
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While it is undoubtedly the case that the pastoral produce industry has been of great 
importance to the development of New Zealand’s economy, the fact that the NZALC 
itself did not stay directly involved in the refrigeration part of the industry beyond the 
late 1880s suggests that there may be a more complex story here than that told by New 
Zealand based historians.  Additionally, Davidson and his New Zealand superintendent 
Thomas Brydone were operating with the resources behind them of a large company 
which had been established for some years, and were merely adopting the technology 
already tried by meat shippers in Argentina and Australia to New Zealand’s 
circumstances.
349
  Indeed, the NZALC on the Australian side remained removed from 
direct entry into the frozen meat and produce industry for reasons that are not entirely 
clear – but may include the fact that the early entrepreneurs who entered the frozen meat 
industry there were relatively unsuccessful.  Therefore this chapter will seek to re-assess 
the contribution of Davidson and the frozen meat trade to the NZALC more generally – 
evaluating how far Davidson as a personality was essential to the continued survival of 
the company, and how far the frozen meat trade was also crucial in this context.  More 
generally, just as the New Zealand and Australian economies were becoming more 
narrowly reliant on the UK’s because of these exports, it will evaluate how far the 
Scottish based element of the NZALC continued to affect its development and fortunes. 
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5.2 The Impact of the Failure of the City of Glasgow Bank 
 
 
Before externalities in New Zealand could play any role in the fortunes of the merged 
NZALC, the stoppage and subsequent liquidation of the City of Glasgow Bank 
interfered in late 1878.  After having organised the merger of the old NZALC with the 
C&O, apparently to use the C&O’s comparative advantages to reinforce the NZALC’s 
position, James Morton seemed to be in a secure and commanding position.  He and his 
merchant house, James Morton & Co., had inherited the management of the joint 
company which continued to be headquartered at his Glasgow offices in West George 
Street.  Morton also dominated the new company in terms of shareholding, effectively 
having control of 50.25% of the shares via an assortment of joint holdings with other 
directors and trust holdings.
350
   
 
The merger was completed in November 1877, but Morton resigned the office of 
General Manager in January 1878 for reasons which remain unclear, although he 
continued as interim manager until a replacement could be found.
351
   At least publicly, 
his resignation was not caused by the collapse of the bank.  There was no public 
knowledge of difficulties at the City of Glasgow Bank at this point – rumours started to 
emerge only in the early autumn of 1878.
352
  Morton’s successor, William Soltau 
Davidson, wrote in his autobiography that he had been offered the position following 
Morton’s resignation in disgrace over the bank failure, although there is no clear 
evidence that this was actually the case.
353
  Nonetheless, it seems likely that Morton 
may have known something was about to happen with the bank – his firm was in debt to 
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it to the tune of £2,173,000, or about one sixth of its total liabilities, which amounted to 
over £12 million.
354
  Most of this loan was placed by Morton into estates in Australia 
and New Zealand – most notably in Queensland - which were bought on his own 
account and never integrated into the NZALC or the C&O, and an undetectable amount 
appears to have been lent to the NZALC by Morton.  He used his stock in the NZALC 
as security against his borrowing from the bank, which meant that after the collapse the 
value of the remaining assets was very closely tied to that of the NZALC, placing the 
company under immense suspicion in the press. 
 
When the City of Glasgow Bank actually closed its doors on October 1
st
 1878 Morton 
was forced to resign as interim manager as his firm collapsed with the bank (Davidson 
had in fact already been chosen as his replacement).  Directors Lewis Potter and John 
Stewart, who had interlocking directorships with the City of Glasgow Bank, were also 
forced to resign as they were arrested, tried and subsequently imprisoned for their role 
in the bank’s failure.  This put pressure upon the remaining board members to find 
suitable and suitably reputable replacements, particularly as the NZALC’s public 
reputation was now somewhat damaged.  The Free-Standing nature of the NZALC did 
not help in this regard – there was much public anger in Glasgow following the bank’s 
collapse as its shareholders and depositors had also been concentrated there.  Following 
Morton’s exposure of the firm’s securities, large blocks of preference and ordinary 
stocks in the NZALC were at the bank liquidator’s disposal, although the sale of large 
blocks of shares in such a discredited company would be difficult to achieve at a 
reasonable value.  This made repayment out of these holdings unlikely for the 
depositors (but it was achieved by making a call of £2,750 per share on each £100 
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share)
355
 and the geographical location of the NZALC’s assets, out of sight in 
Australasia, made critics wonder whether the company actually owned these estates at 
all.
356
 
 
The closure of the bank caused other more immediate difficulties.  Merchant houses 
selling produce on behalf of the NZALC ran into difficulty. This included the loss of 
£4,000 worth of income from the wheat crop when Messers Matthew and Theilmann, 
selling on a prompt of three months, found themselves unable to pay the proceeds on to 
the NZALC as the money was stuck in the bank.
357
  Around £70,000 worth of bills that 
were in the possession of the bank at the time of the failure were also lost, and the 
NZALC was forced to seek a temporary loan from the Bank of Scotland and the Union 
Bank of Scotland to cover its dividend payments.
358
  The company also found itself in a 
legal dispute with the liquidators of the bank over an apparent attempt to swap a 
mortgage on some estates in Queensland for NZALC stock, which had left the bank 
liquidators in possession of the runs – the ownership of these reverted to the NZALC by 
agreement in early 1879.
359
  The bankruptcy of Morton’s firm also meant that the 
company could no longer use his premises as its registered Head Office, and efforts 
were made very quickly to find new premises.  Indeed, from this point onwards the 
company internalised its Head Office function entirely, having a staff of clerks who 
were on the company’s books answer to Davidson and the company secretary rather 
than using a contractor to do this.  The Head Office was also moved to Edinburgh for 
reasons which are unclear, but which may have been intended to distance the company 
as far as possible from the City of Glasgow Bank failure.   
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Gradually the liquidators, led by George Auldjo Jamieson, moved towards a resolution 
of the crisis, probably helped by the fact that he and Davidson were personal friends.  
The bank’s depositors were repaid in full but the shareholders lost huge amounts of 
money – of 1,819 shareholders only 254 remained solvent.360  In 1882 the remaining 
unsold assets, including Morton’s shares in the NZALC and some sheep runs bought 
privately by Morton in New South Wales as well as some assorted properties in 
Lanarkshire and other miscellaneous items, were combined into a new company. This 
was the Assets Company Ltd., intended to manage the estates with the aim of providing 
some relief to the remaining creditors.
361
  This company was wound up in 1890, after 
selling its Piallaway and Wallhallow estates in New South Wales to the NZALC in the 
late 1880s.
362
  Despite its majority shareholding in the NZALC, the Assets Company 
Ltd. appears to have allowed Davidson a free hand in managing the NZALC, as will be 
explored below.  Although to a large extent an exogenous event, the City of Glasgow 
Bank collapse was one that had important effects for the NZALC and helped to bring 
the company by necessity into a new era, one which might have had more continuities 
with the pre-merger era had the collapse not occurred. 
 
5.3 Post Merger Structure 
 
The collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank and James Morton’s resignation came at 
what was already a watershed as the two original companies were adjusting to life as a 
single company.  This adaptation came relatively easily as the common institutions of 
the Head Office and Dunedin agents between the two companies were already in place – 
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this meant that there was less of an issue of seeking synergies after the merger as both 
companies were already enjoying economies of scope in management.  What remained 
different, of course, were the properties of the two companies.  Clearly it was difficult to 
find synergies between these operations as they remained physically separate places 
although livestock could be moved expensively where suitable transport links existed.  
A new economy of scale was found in shipping wool to the UK market, particularly as 
only one set of sales now had to be conducted on behalf of the merged company, and 
only one set of agents employed to do this.  What is clear is that the former C&O runs, 
particularly those in Canterbury province such as Acton, the Levels, Pareora, 
Hakateramea and Deep Dell, remained the more productive runs and were cheaper to 
improve per acre than the NZALC’s troubled properties in Southern Otago and 
Southland.  Some critics have pointed to the defensive nature of this merger, although in 
the longer run there is little evidence of cross-subsidisation.
363
  Certainly there were as 
yet no competition authorities either in Australasia or in the UK to take an interest in the 
merger, which was even granted official sanction via a private Act of Parliament.
364
 
 
It is unclear if numerous candidates were considered for the post of General Manager 
after the departure of James Morton.  The first mention of his resignation in the Board 
minutes, at the meeting of 15
th
 January 1878, is also the first mention that a committee 
had previously been appointed to examine the issue of management.
365
  This committee 
had reached the conclusion that Davidson should be offered the post of General 
Manager on the basis that he had performed well as manager of the C&O in New 
Zealand.  The committee explained its rationale for choosing Davidson thus: 
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The Committee have very anxiously considered the question of the future management of 
the company, which has emerged on consequence of the resignation of Mr Morton, and 
have had several meetings on the subject.  They are of opinion that, as they are about to 
lose the wholly exceptional services of Mr Morton, in the capacity of manager, it is very 
desirable looking to the extent and nature of the interests at stake, that they should obtain 
as Manager, some gentleman who has practical experience of, and in the colonies, and who 
will be able in coming to this country to give his entire time to the duties of the office.
366
 
 
Clearly, colonial experience was seen as a benefit by the directors, who were looking 
for someone whose general skills were supplemented by an awareness of the challenges 
of farming in New Zealand.  Further, Davidson was also time served with the C&O – he 
had effectively started his career with the company as a cadet after being recruited in 
Scotland by Morton.
367
 The institutional effectiveness of the organisation of the C&O is 
demonstrated by the fact that it was capable of training and nurturing internally 
someone with a combination of farming and business skills (and who apparently had no 
previous experience of either) and was then capable of recognising him as a rising star 
for rapid promotion, despite his relative youth.  This may be one of the earliest cases of 
an internationally operating firm promoting one of its own recruits to a top management 
position back at its home office, in a pattern that would later become common in UK 
based FSCs and multinationals.  Davidson was offered a contract at the pleasure of the 
board with remuneration of £2,000 per annum, and he was to have sole management of 
the affairs of the company subject to the direction of the board. Perhaps most crucially 
he was expected to work full time as manager.
368
 This demonstrates that it was expected 
that there would be enough work at the Head Office to fill Davidson’s time – as does 
the fact that he was expected to concentrate only on the affairs of the company and not 
any distracting outside interests as his predecessor had done.  He was also expected to 
                                                 
366
 Ibid. 
367
 Davidson, William Soltau Davidson, 1846 - 1924, p. 7. 
368
 NAS GD435/11 Minute of meeting, of NZALC Board of Directors 15
th
 January 1878.  
 157 
devote time to be ready to visit Australia or New Zealand at any notice – despite the 
inconvenience of doing this.  During his thirty-seven year tenure Davidson travelled to 
Australasia at least ten times to personally supervise operations there.  This is all the 
more remarkable because the travel time to Australia was still around two months by 
sea – but Davidson appears to have taken such a hands on approach that cable 
communication was not sufficient. 
 
Davidson was not expected to move straight back to headquarters, but to first carry out 
an inspection of all the NZALC’s properties, both in New Zealand and Australia.  This 
seems to have been useful to Davidson as it is unlikely that he had any previous 
experience of operations in Australia, with its more arid conditions, at this time.  Hence 
it was not until a year after his official appointment that he arrived to take up the 
position of General Manager in January 1879, when he also presented to the board the 
results of his inspection of the estates.
369
  Davidson made his mark rapidly, beginning 
by selling off Australian estates that had fallen below their book value.
370
  The Bundure 
and Till Till freeholds in New South Wales were retained on account of their superior 
fertility.  Despite his dislike of the NZALC properties in southern New Zealand, 
Davidson made little effort to sell them en masse following a bad harvest which seems 
to have started an economic downturn in the colony in 1879.
371
  Instead, Davidson 
appears to have decided to use the growth of smallholding in New Zealand to the 
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company’s advantage and gradually sell small portions of land.  This aspect of his 
strategy will be examined in more detail in section 6.3. 
 
Below Davidson, the previously existing managerial network in both New Zealand and 
Australia was retained and strengthened.  In New Zealand the agency house of George 
Grey Russell & Co., by the late 1870s trading as Russell Ritchie & Co., in Dunedin 
were retained throughout the period. The Edinburgh Head Office issued all Powers of 
Attorney for the company in New Zealand, principally to the partners of this firm, 
usually George Gray Russell and John MacFarlane Ritchie.
372
 The retention of an 
external agency is surprising because all permanent employees below agency level were 
employed directly by the NZALC.  This included the New Zealand Superintendent of 
properties, Thomas Brydone, who was moved by Davidson from being the pre-merger 
colonial manager of the NZALC in both New Zealand and Australia to a more 
concentrated role.  The capacity of the agency house in this relationship appears to have 
been representative and advisory rather than managerial – Russell Ritchie & Co. acted 
as representatives of the company particularly to the New Zealand government Ministry 
of Land in carrying out the necessary administration to buy and sell land holdings.   
 
This expertise was key to the retention of an otherwise external agent within the 
NZALC, although the company itself had at least a registered address in Bond Street, in 
central Dunedin, where official documents could be served.  A secretary was employed 
at Bond Street, and it presumably also functioned as Brydone’s office as well as 
receiving enquiries from the public about land leasing and sales.
373
  The house was 
responsible for regular reports to the Head Office in Scotland not only regarding 
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company affairs, but also in terms of advising on the prevailing economic conditions 
and regulatory environment.  Often such advice was used to advise the Edinburgh Head 
Office on sales of land which required board level permission, most notably in April 
1879 when Russell’s cabled to warn Head Office of the poor harvest that year, and that 
land prices had crashed as a result and they should not continue with planned land 
sales.
374
 
 
A similar role continued to be carried out in Australia by Messers Holmes White & Co. 
after 1877, although this house was based in Melbourne, distant from most of the 
NZALC’s Australian runs which were concentrated in New South Wales and 
Queensland.  The agency function was taken over gradually from 1879 by Messrs 
Alford & Co., who were dedicated stock and station agents rather than general 
mercantile agents.
375
  Alford & Co. appear to have acted on a freelance basis for the 
company before being officially appointed as agents in 1883 with the senior partner Mr 
J. C. Alford being officially appointed attorney for the company in Australia.
376
  Alford 
& Co. were also given a fixed remuneration from 1883 of £1,000 per annum, which is 
not only unusual for an agency house but perhaps reflects the importance of the function 
of the agents in Australia.
377
  Previous evidence suggests that agents had been paid a 
percentage of the value of monetary sums handled.
378
 
 
In Australia the regulatory environment for runholders was more complex than that in 
New Zealand, particularly in terms of dealing with the different jurisdictions which 
were operated as colonies totally separate from each other until Australia’s federation in 
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1901, when the federal government was established.  Given this, it is curious that an 
agency based in Melbourne was chosen again, although the merged company owned 
only one run in Victoria, Yawong Springs.  This was gradually disposed of, following 
Davidson’s 1879 report on the properties of the company in which he found that a 
property originally comprising some 78,000 acres of leasehold at the time of purchase 
had been reduced to just 1,280 acres of freehold and a few patches of remaining 
leasehold between settlers’ runs.379  This was due to Victoria’s laws on landholdings 
which were designed to prevent squatters, or large companies, from establishing large 
estates as had occurred in other parts of Australasia.  Individuals were permitted to lease 
parcels of land of up to 320 acres from the government at 2 shillings per acre per annum 
for three years, although the land had to be improved in value by at least 20 shillings per 
parcel during the lease period.
380
  Under these laws the NZALC could lose the land they 
were leasing from the government when it was released to these settlers, or ‘selectors’. 
Inevitably the settlers selected the most attractive parts of the run, leaving the company 
with infertile or inaccessible areas such as ridge tops and sandy areas.  Alford & Co. 
were instructed to close the workings of Yawong Springs, along with the also inefficient 
Cardbeign station in Queensland in December 1880, leaving the company with 
properties only in New South Wales and Queensland.
381
 
 
Alford & Co. were given a more active managerial role in Australia in addition to the 
representative role which was carried out by Russell Ritchie & Co. in New Zealand, as 
no superintendent equivalent  to Thomas Brydone was appointed in Australia.  Instead 
the managers of the individual stations were given more power – after the merger the 
three main Australian runs remaining were Bundure and Till Till, both in New South 
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Wales, and Wellshot in Queensland, whose attempted sale had fallen through due to the 
City of Glasgow Bank collapse.  This structure appears to have been adopted because 
the number of Australian properties was lower than the number of New Zealand 
properties, although this was compensated for by their immense size: as illustrated in 
table 6.1, which displays the known acreage of properties in both colonies in 1879.  
Bundure at this point encompassed about 120,000 acres, much of which was freehold, 
and Till Till contained over 380,000 acres of leasehold which was not considered 
attractive to selectors due to its very arid climate.  No figures are specified for Wellshot 
but it was given its own inspector, a Mr Turnbull, alongside its manager to oversee 
affairs, although Turnbull was also engaged as a manager for a nearby independent 
farmer, George Fairbairn, suggesting that this was not intended to be a full time post.
382
  
Management in Australia was then carried on by Alford & Co. with occasional input 
from Davidson, on inspection visits from Scotland, although this situation was 
constantly under review.   
 
On his 1881 tour of the colonies Davidson was asked to consider the appointment of a 
superintendent for the properties in Australia, although this came to nothing.
383
  On his 
1884 tour Davidson was asked to review the possibility of finding an agent in Brisbane 
to oversee Wellshot and to collect information about and lobby the Queensland 
government regarding land laws, although again Davidson appears to have thought 
better of this idea.
384
  William Drysdale, a director of the company, made an inspection 
tour of both New Zealand and Australia in 1883.
385
  Later, in 1886, Drysdale was 
appointed inspector of estates in New South Wales, while remaining a director, but one 
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with special responsibility for Australia. At around the same time the Board sent orders 
to Drysdale and Alford in Australia to find someone cheaper to replace Turnbull, with a 
salary not exceeding £400 per annum.
386
  In 1891 Drysdale decided to move to 
Australia permanently, where he continued as a director with a fee of £200 annually 
plus an additional 50 guineas for each inspection of the Wellshot estate, until his death 
in 1903.  Still, despite these changes, it would appear that the role of the agents 
remained more a managerial one in Australia than in New Zealand. 
 
Below agency level the previous system of salaried career management was retained, in 
both New Zealand and Australia, for those parts of the company estates that were not 
sold or leased out.  The cadet system which was started under the NZALC and C&O 
was retained and strengthened, having the additional benefit of providing some farm 
labour.  Potential cadets applied or were recommended to the NZALC Head Office in 
Edinburgh by their fathers, where the board could approve their appointment, and 
subsequently place them on a property.
387
 The NZALC were successful in inspiring 
their managers to be loyal company men over the longer period. By 1900 those with 
long service were rewarded with generous severance payments or even pensions on 
retirement, despite the company maintaining no specific pension fund.
388
  Grants of land 
were sometimes made to retiring managers, and when the company sold many of the 
earlier properties in New Zealand in the early 1900s, some of the sales were to 
managers.  The policy of providing all the estate managers with a house at the centre of 
the estate was continued, to ensure that managers continued to live on the estate, and the 
company continued to furnish these houses.  When the former manager of the Levels 
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estate in Canterbury province purchased the final 810 remaining acres of the estate in 
1904, the furniture in the Levels house and cottage was gifted to him in recognition of 
his work as manager there (of course it might well have cost the company more to 
recover this furniture than its actual sale value).
389
   
 
As time moved on, the expectations of the Home Office regarding the quality of 
management continued to rise, and in general they seem to have been met, although 
there was concern at the Home Office that the quality of management required some 
standardisation.  There was particular concern that the agricultural plans for each year, 
which were devised by Thomas Brydone and sent to Edinburgh for approval, to 
optimize production according to the prevailing market prices were not always being 
followed.
390
   In 1887 Davidson wrote to the managers of the New Zealand estates with 
specific instructions as to how they were to report their results back to head office.
391
  
Reports were to be produced four times a year, at the end of June, September, December 
and March.  To make these reports comparable, Davidson made his instructions to 
station managers, very precise laying out a standard format for the reports under some 
twenty-five different headings, discussing every possible facet of estate management.  
This included the supervision of tenants, accounting for land improvements and their 
quality, accounting for implements, monitoring the weather, accounting for livestock, 
problems encountered with vermin, the regulatory environment, the management of 
cultivation, the areas ploughed, the use of cropping contractors and the inclusion of any 
other general remarks thought relevant.  Central to this was the idea that all managers 
should be keeping a diary of the day to day activities on the run so that the reports 
would simply consist of an abstract of these diaries. A further concern of Davidson’s 
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was that some managers were more interested in animal welfare than in profits, as 
management did not have the same risk of bankruptcy threatening them that an 
independent farmer would.   
 
Managers were told that, particularly with depressed prices for produce prevailing, ‘the 
first consideration must always be will the proposed undertaking pay?’.392  Hence it was 
intended that, as actual accounting statements were now requested, management would 
be more aware of the need to allocate the resources under their control more efficiently, 
and that managers would work closely with Brydone in coming to efficient 
arrangements. In terms of incentivisation the most strikingly important sentence in the 
whole document was: 
 
In dealing with the whole question, place yourselves in the position of proprietors, and 
make every effort to work the places as economically and as profitably as if they were your 
own.
393
 
 
Davidson’s intention here appears to have been to convey the expendability of the 
managers as employees – just as an independent farmer could go bankrupt (and many 
did so in New Zealand at this point),
394
 corporate farmers could not rely indefinitely on 
the subsidy of the wider company.  On the other hand, there is no evidence that any 
manager was ever actually removed from his position for mismanagement, at least 
openly so it appears that management had security of tenure unless the Edinburgh board 
decided entirely to dispose of the estate that they were responsible for managing.  
Managers seem to have been very secure in their positions and were even frequently 
given salary increases and bonuses, although some of these were tied to specific 
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achievements, such as the bonus to the manager and clerk of Totara station for the extra 
work carried out in slaughtering sheep belonging to the other stations so that the 
carcasses could be frozen.
395
 
 
At lower levels tenure was generally not as secure as it was in management.  Although 
each station had a wide variety of jobs carried out both by labourers and by more skilled 
employees such as sheep shearers, each station employed most of its staff only 
seasonally.  As might be expected, there was a high degree of reliance on casual labour, 
and both countries had a high population of itinerant male immigrants who relied on 
this casual labour as they were not able to obtain land of their own.  Records of the 
exact numbers employed were probably not kept, and certainly do not seem to have 
been sent back to Edinburgh. Instead, it was left to station managers, or more likely 
their foremen, themselves to decide how many men to employ.  Although his source is 
unclear, Williscroft claims that in the 1880s the 15,000 acre Totara estate in Otago 
province was employing twenty men permanently, increasing to around fifty in the 
autumn with harvesting and sheep shearing.
396
  This is likely to be a high figure 
compared to the other New Zealand estates. The farmstead at Totara hosted the central 
slaughterhouse for all the company properties in the area when the company started 
frozen meat exports in the 1880s and needed to employ more people for this purpose.   
 
According to Williscroft the main incentive for itinerant labourers was that the company 
would accommodate and feed them for the duration of their employment, although as 
mentioned in Chapter 4 the conditions of such employment could still encourage a 
difficult relationship between employer and employee.
397
  Such itinerants could also 
cause trouble if they turned up looking for work but were not given any, or if they were 
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dismissed. To combat this and to prevent violence or reprisal attacks on property, the 
NZALC had a policy of giving a meal to all itinerants that visited its farms looking for 
work.
398
  In less populated areas, such as in Southland or on the remoter Australian 
properties, lack of suitable labour could be more of a problem.  This remained a 
particular problem on the Edendale estate, where Davidson claimed that the company 
was typically paying more for less reliable labourers, those of a higher calibre 
apparently having been attracted to the better climate of the north.
399
 More realistically, 
migrants were more likely to be attracted to areas with higher levels of economic 
activity. 
 
In addition to the direct employment of labourers on a casual basis, contracting was 
becoming increasingly important to the company, particularly as arable crops outside 
the NZALC’s area of expertise became more important.  Further, as more land became 
available to smallholders throughout the 1880s and 1890s the number of itinerants was 
falling.  Cropping contractors, often smallholders elsewhere in their own right, were 
typically contracted for a year to turn over native scrubland that was to be re-sown with 
English grass the following year.
400
  As the company properties became more 
developed, it became necessary instead to renew old areas of English grass that were 
exhausted from grazing, but where the English grass had survived. Typically turnips 
were sown in these lands in spring, and were used by the NZALC to feed livestock; then 
the land would again be broken up to be sown with wheat in the more temperate climate 
of Canterbury or North Otago, or further south to be sown with oats.  Wheat was 
particularly advantageous as it could be used as a cash crop for outside sale, sometimes 
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being exported to the UK, while oats again could be used as animal feed.  This practice 
meant that soil fertility could be boosted for the new grass and clover coming in, while 
allowing some revenue opportunity from wheat production.  Contractors with specific 
expertise were also used to deal with the continuing problem with rabbits, which were 
often worse at certain times of the year and so again it was not always beneficial to have 
a permanent staff attached to this.  In the autumn Edendale employed five rabbit hunters 
who produced 25,000 rabbit skins, which were also saleable.
401
  This contracting system 
allowed the company to maintain land values while keeping risk at a relatively low 
level, as the managerial responsibility for these activities was passed on to the 
contractors even if the company remained responsible for the eventual sale of their 
products.  Further, with an indirect contracting arrangement there was less of an issue 
with the long term employment of staff as this became the problem of the contractors. 
 
After the merger of the New Zealand and Australian Land Company and the Canterbury 
and Otago Association the structure of the new company continued to build on that of 
the old companies.  The two separate colonial structures were merged, particularly in 
New Zealand under Thomas Brydone as Colonial Manager there, and were further 
rationalised in Australia, although the issue of management in Queensland was never 
quite resolved.   Entrepreneurial involvement from Head Office was strengthened 
further, and evidence suggests that this level of control did not diminish even after 
Australia’s federation and granting of self-rule in 1901 and New Zealand’s in 1907, 
with both countries continuing to be referred to as ‘the colonies’ in the minutes even 
after effectively being granted independence.  Further, the role of William Soltau 
Davidson as entrepreneur was crucial for the development of the company, taking a 
direct part in arranging new ventures for the company both in the UK and in both host 
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countries, and frequently visiting both host countries to oversee developments taking 
place there in his absence as well as to instigate new developments.  The directors also 
took a more entrepreneurial role in this period, not only continuing to take a direct 
interest in the financial situation of the firm but also scrutinising more closely its affairs 
in the host countries and even in some cases visiting these to see the state of company 
operations for themselves.  For instance, during the 1888-9 southern hemisphere 
summer, the Chairman, Robert Stewart, whose role was mostly a supervisory non-
executive one, accompanied Davidson on a visit to the colonies.
402
   Through this 
structure, then, contrary to the host nation orientation that might be expected, the 
NZALC reinforced its ‘Scottishness’ in this period rather than becoming more 
antipodean.  This chapter will now go on to examine the strategies followed by the 
company in both host countries and to investigate how far the Head Office determined 
those strategies. 
 
5.4 Vertical Integration and Strategy in New Zealand 
 
This section will examine the strategy of the New Zealand and Australian Land 
Company specifically in New Zealand after 1878.  In this period important themes 
included the gradual movement away from a concentration on the direct operation of all 
company owned estates (although by no means its total abandonment), a brief period of 
involvement in the livestock carcass freezing industry and a longer period of vertical 
integration into dairy products, and the gradual sale of the company estates to 
smallholders hastened by an unfavourable regulatory environment.  This section will 
argue that, even though some of these policies involved retreat from New Zealand, this 
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exit decision remained an entrepreneurially motivated one driven from Edinburgh rather 
than a speculative failure. 
 
The involvement of the NZALC in organizing the first frozen meat exports from New 
Zealand has already been well documented by a number of authors, although its 
subsequent failure to remain in this part of the industry for a longer period has not.  
Even Davidson himself does not admit this in his autobiography, despite his keenness to 
point out that refrigerated exports provided an outlet that was not previously available 
for sheep carcasses.  On 2nd February 1880 the directors showed interest in the 
successful shipment of frozen beef and mutton by a Queensland syndicate on the 
Strathleven which had arrived in London on that same day, using the Bell-Coleman 
refrigeration process.  Subsequently Davidson was deputised to consult Mr Bell from 
the Bell-Coleman Mechanical Refrigeration Co.,
403
 a small Glasgow based partnership, 
about the possibility of adopting this process for the NZALC’s needs, and also with to 
discuss shipping agents the possibility of using this process on board ship.
404
  The Bell 
brothers had been inspired to work on refrigeration techniques after acting as the 
Glasgow agents of T. C. Eastman’s New York based dressed beef shipping business, 
but noting the inefficiency of the technique used by Eastman as it required 25% of the 
available storage space to be filled with natural ice.  The Bell brothers proposed that 
refrigeration using cold dry air would be a feasible alternative and approached Professor 
Sir William Thompson, later Lord Kelvin, of Glasgow University for advice.  
Thompson introduced the brothers to a Mr J. J. Coleman, with whom the partnership 
was formed and patents taken out in 1877.
405
  Again the Scottish head office of the 
NZALC proved particularly useful in making such connections possible, and this is one 
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of the best examples of technology transfer from home country to host country in a 
Free-Standing Company.   
 
It is also a rare example of a Free-Standing Company investing in Research and 
Development, of sorts at least, although this process was partly externalized.  In 
Edinburgh in April 1881 Davidson and James Melvin were authorised to make an 
expenditure of £1,000 which was used to purchase and adapt a Bell-Coleman machine 
to work with a dedicated steam engine on the Dunedin, a sailing ship belonging to the 
Shaw Savill and Albion Line, another Glasgow based firm.
406
  A specially chartered 
voyage by sailing ship was chosen in preference to the alternative of renting space on a 
steamship, simply because of the lack of direct steamship sailings from New Zealand to 
Britain at this time, most journeys requiring a stop in Australia.
407
  A further benefit was 
that more room would be available on the specially chartered ship for carcasses.  
Coleman appears to have been the main architect of the scheme in technical terms, 
supervising the outfitting of the Dunedin with the new plant and lining walls necessary, 
and working to suit the commercial needs of his clients.
408
  In doing this he designed the 
plant so that carcasses could be frozen on board ship rather than on shore, removing the 
need for an expensive investment in fixed assets in setting up freezing plants – early 
Australian freezing plants set up after the voyage of the Strathleven  had not met with 
initial commercial success.
409
   
 
A further benefit of the dry air system indentified by Coleman was that when frozen 
solid the carcasses could be packed as closely together as possible without crushing 
each other, maximizing the numbers that could be conveyed – the original target was 
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around 7,500.
410
  In the event only 5,000 were carried, possibly due to problems in 
finding enough sheep ready for slaughter. Davidson had written to Brydone to instruct 
him to organise the construction of a slaughterhouse at the Totara farmstead as late as 
April 1881 – the voyage left in December.411  Around this time Brydone visited the 
Melbourne freezing works of The Australian Frozen Meat Exports Company, built in 
1880 in preparation for loading the Protos, which undertook an experimental shipment 
for Victorian and New South Wales farmers.
412
 The low importance of the meat trade to 
the NZALC, and indeed to the meat industry in New Zealand generally, is shown by the 
fact that the company had to build a slaughterhouse: no suitable facility existed, at least 
on the South Island.  
 
The internalisation of the slaughtering part of the process itself is interesting, especially 
as it had not been done previously for the sale of stock to the New Zealand Meat 
Preservation Company. In terms of exporting, the choice of the Totara estate as the 
location for the slaughterhouse makes sense, given its proximity to the port of Oamaru 
and its being on the main railway line from the south, which also passed directly 
through the Edendale estate and close to Clydevale.  At this point Davidson hoped that 
Oamaru would grow to become as influential a port as Dunedin was, perhaps to the 
extent of swallowing up parts of the Totara estate itself, so in terms of attracting 
business from farmers from outside the NZALC this could have been regarded as a 
shrewd future investment.
413
  Either way, as mentioned above, the intention was to 
freeze carcasses on board ship even though this process would mean leasing the ship for 
an additional month – during this loading and freezing process the refrigerating plant 
broke down, resulting in the loss of about 300 carcasses and the sale of the 300 
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successfully frozen carcasses in Dunedin.
414
  The fault was repaired by Bell-Coleman’s 
engineer and the voyage was eventually completed, despite a few mishaps on the way, 
in London on May 24
th
 1882.
415
  The slowness of this journey was illustrated by the fact 
that Davidson had been able to return to the UK by steamship and meet the Dunedin on 
its arrival in London.  Davidson then played a key role in distributing this first cargo of 
frozen mutton in London, although 400 sheep carcasses were also dispatched to 
Glasgow.
416
  According to a statement of accounts published in Critchell and 
Raymond’s A History of the Frozen Meat Trade, apparently given to them by Davidson, 
this initial shipment had cost nearly £3,800 but made a profit of just over £4,000.
417
 
 
The NZALC had completed the first shipment of frozen mutton from New Zealand but 
as early as April 1882, even before the Dunedin had actually reached London, new 
firms were starting to enter the market. In that month The New Zealand Shipping 
Company offered the Dunedin agents of the NZALC room on a vessel called Mataura, 
which had been fitted out with refrigeration equipment.
418
  The board ordered Davidson 
to telegraph back to the Dunedin agents not to ship any meat on this vessel, choosing to 
continue the NZALC’s exclusive use of the Albion Line.  The Dunedin made a second 
voyage in late 1882, and in 1883 a contract was made with the Albion Line to expand to 
the Marlborough, sister ship of the Dunedin, after Brydone had cabled home that 
another ship could easily be loaded after the Dunedin in May 1883.
419
  At the same time 
Davidson was asked by the board to enquire into the erection of a refrigerating store in 
New Zealand
420
 – no evidence of his report to the board on this survives, but the 
company certainly did not decide to build a fixed freezing works on land.  Instead, the 
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freezing of carcasses on board ship was continued, possibly because the fixed costs 
involved in setting up a factory appeared too high for the company, or possibly because 
the New Zealand Refrigerating Co., in which Thomas Brydone took a small 
shareholding, was formed as early as 1881 to build works at Burnside, near Dunedin.
421
  
The strategy followed in the 1880s by the NZALC seems strange in this regard – 
vertical integration into production on board ship and marketing in London partly via 
agency and partly via direct representation continued until 1889 when both the Dunedin 
and Marlborough were lost at sea.
422
   
 
In the same period the initiative on the processing side was lost to a number of new 
entrants, including the Canterbury Frozen Meat Company near Christchurch, and the 
Gear Meat Company on the North Island.
423
 This may have been a deliberate decision to 
some degree in around 1887 as the entry of Nelson Brothers Ltd., a bi-national trading 
firm, was partly sponsored by Davidson who was a founding board member.  This was 
not just a networking directorship, but one undertaken to benefit NZALC – Davidson’s 
fee for this was paid directly to the company.
424
  Nelson Brothers operated freezing 
works in New Zealand to process the carcasses and opened cold stores in London 
capable of storing 200,000 carcasses for distribution, thus vertically integrating the 
manufacturing and distribution parts of the chain.  Davidson also became a director of 
the Colonial Consignment and Distributing Company, an agency company intended to 
represent owners and shippers in London independent of speculation.
425
  After the loss 
of the Dunedin and Marlborough the NZALC sold its stock to firms such as Nelson 
Brothers and the New Zealand Refrigerating Co. for freezing and onward distribution - 
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another aspect of the gradual move away from the original emphasis of the NZALC on 
agricultural operations. However, the failure to move into processing could be 
considered a failure in the Chandlerian sense as the NZALC’s competitive advantage of 
being a large company based in Edinburgh with the potential to develop manufacturing 
and distribution on its own terms was forfeited to smaller farmers who could now gain 
access to the British market through the new freezing and distribution intermediaries. 
 
Vertical integration into manufacturing was pursued much further on the dairy products 
side of the business, although to some degree this represented entrepreneurship from the 
host side.  Traditionally far fewer cattle than sheep had been kept by the NZALC: in 
1880 the company had just 9,800 cattle in New Zealand compared to 446,000 sheep 
although it was realised that refrigeration also allowed some potential in the dairy 
products industry.
426
  Dairying on the New Zealand properties was the brainchild of 
Thomas Brydone, who saw the potential of the NZALC’s southern properties in New 
Zealand, particularly Edendale, for dairying rather than raising sheep.  As early as May 
1881 Brydone had written to Edinburgh to seek permission to carry out his ‘dairying 
scheme’ – permission was tentatively given, though he was asked ‘to do as little as 
possible’ until Davidson reported to him on his visit to the Ingersoll Dairy Factory in 
Canada, which was already producing for the mass market, and which Davidson was 
able to visit on his way to Australasia for an inspection tour.
427
   On this visit Davidson 
was given sufficient access to the factory to enable him to directly model the dairy 
factory built by Brydone on the Edendale estate on the Ingersoll establishment.
428
  By 
1889 the factory was turning out around 200 tonnes of cheese annually, and had earlier 
recouped £500 of its £1,200 building cost by winning a government bonus for the first 
export of New Zealand cheese, a total of 25 tonnes.  This turned round the fortunes of 
                                                 
426
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the Edendale estate which had previously been something of a problem for the NZALC, 
having proved difficult to make into useful pastoral land on a large scale.  Now the 
dairy factory was used as a selling point for land on Edendale to small farmers, who 
could purchase or rent land there in the knowledge that they had a guaranteed customer 
for the milk from their cows.
429
 
 
Further expertise was secured for the Edendale factory in 1890 when Davidson was sent 
by the board to Denmark to recruit an expert on butter manufacture, Denmark at this 
stage being the leading exporter of butter to the UK market.
430
  This move was another 
which perhaps ended up benefiting the New Zealand protein industry generally more 
than the company itself. The Danish expert was then poached by the New Zealand 
government in 1891 to act as an instructor and lecturer for new butter manufacturers.
431
  
The company continued to operate the factory long after much of the Edendale estate 
had been sold to dairy farmers, although low cheese prices in the mid-1890s made the 
factory difficult to operate profitably.  The board decided to tolerate the loss on cheese 
manufacture somewhat charitably to prevent the company’s land purchasers and tenants 
on Edendale from defaulting as a result of lower milk prices.
432
  A second factory was 
also set up at Mataura, close to Edendale, as a joint venture in 1887.
433
  Davidson again 
worked closely with dairy merchants based in London’s Tooley Street, to find a market 
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for the NZALC’s produce, which was marketed under the brand name ‘Edendale’.434  
The remaining parts of the Edendale estate and factory were eventually sold as a 
package in 1903 for £200,000 as part of Davidson’s wider plans to move the NZALC’s 
focus across to Australia.
435
 
 
The most important strategic move for the NZALC in New Zealand after the merger 
was the gradual move towards acting as more of a property company rather than a 
farming company.  Davidson sensed that there was more scope for corporate farming in 
the open and arid expanses of Australia than in the increasingly competitive land market 
of New Zealand as early as his tour of the properties undertaken in 1878 before taking 
on the post of General Manager.
436
  Davidson suggested that a value of £10-15 per acre 
could be realised, and that with increasing pressure for land in the colony the 
government might legislate to force the subdivision of large estates.
437
  1878 had also 
seen the introduction of property tax in New Zealand as the government was forced to 
increase taxation to service the debt created by the extensive public works programmes 
of the 1870s.  Hence realising the value tied up in the land owned by the company 
would have its benefits – although, as noted above, it is not as though regulation in 
Australia was any more benign. In addition there were various small parcels of land that 
the old NZALC under Morton had simply held, having inherited them from the former 
associations but not utilized in any way, including a miscellany of town sections in 
Dunedin, Invercargill, Port Chalmers, Tokomairiro, Oamaru and Kakanui.  Although 
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Tokomairiro and Kakanui both represented holdings of low potential, being in towns 
which failed to grow, those in Dunedin and Invercargill were barely being exploited.
438
  
In addition there was a holding of 55 acres on the Bluff Harbour peninsula which was 
not being utilized, and a further holding of 105 acres north of Invercargill which again 
was not being worked.
439
  These sections could be disposed of quickly, and in the longer 
run a series of small offcuts and exclaves related to the more established properties 
could also be disposed of without affecting the NZALC’s ongoing agricultural 
programmes.  Holding these properties without making use of them for some years had 
represented poor entrepreneurship. 
 
The task of selling off parts of the larger estates was to prove more complex – the 
process of gradual disposal took over thirty years to complete and had to be integrated 
with the ongoing agricultural usage of the sections yet to be brought to the market.  The 
approach taken by Davidson and the board was to offer a choice to settlers of opting to 
purchase land with a mortgage, most likely provided by the National Mortgage and 
Agency Company of New Zealand,
440
 or leasing for a twelve year term with the option 
of purchase.  The leasing and purchasing contracts used were designed to ensure that the 
new settlers remained good neighbours with the company, and in the case of leasing the 
company effectively dictated what the land could be used for.  For instance, the 
arrangement used on Edendale in 1889 restricted tenants to growing only two grain 
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crops in six years, and only turnips and grass for the remaining four years.
441
  Although 
this arrangement meant that farmers would have little entrepreneurial control over their 
own activities, it also meant that they were spared the problem of having to decide how 
the land might be utilized most efficiently.  In addition the tenants were expected to 
maintain, to company standards, whatever buildings they inherited from the company 
and to have any new buildings authorised by the company.  The tenant was responsible 
for insuring these buildings, and for building new fences wherever necessary and 
keeping rabbits and other pests under control.  These safeguards ensured that the value 
of the property was maintained for later resale if necessary, or should the company have 
to resume farming the land at the end of the lease term, which was relatively short at 
twelve years.  In addition the agreements ensured that any tenants were good neighbours 
for the company’s ongoing farming operations on the land as yet to be leased or sold, 
particularly with regard to the level of pests and in terms of livestock being prevented 
from straying.  Through this arrangement the company was still able to gain an income 
from each property but at a reduced level of risk, while turning the existing competition 
for land with small farmers to its own advantage.  The previously mentioned problems 
of sharing either leasehold or freehold properties with small farmers could also easily be 
overcome through these contracts. 
 
In terms of marketing these small landholdings, the NZALC appears to have followed a 
strategy of targeting both those seeking farming land in New Zealand and those seeking 
a path of emigration from Scotland.  The role of the NZALC in promoting emigration 
has been undersold by existing writers on the subject such as Brooking.
442
  While there 
is no clear indication of the numbers that the company encouraged to emigrate because 
no records are known to exist of where the land purchasers come from, it is clear than 
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an attempt was made to bring settlers from Scotland. Guidebooks to the lands for 
potential purchasers survive from 1880, 1882 and 1889, edited, and with parts written 
personally by Thomas Brydone which included information about the company, the 
lands available and more general information about New Zealand geography and 
agriculture.
443
  In Scotland existing farmers were targeted by advertisements in an 
agricultural journal, The North British Agriculturalist,
444
 and a Mr J A Hoofz, an 
emigration agent, was engaged to find potential emigrants to purchase company 
lands.
445
     A relatively wide spread of income groups were targeted as all the 
company’s lands were made available despite their accessibility – the highest annual 
rent per acre in 1889 was set at 12s 6d for the most developed land - land on The Levels 
and Pareora estates where English grass had successfully taken root and near railway 
stations, with a frontage along a main road and where other facilities such as local 
schools had been set up.
446
  Farther from facilities, and particularly where land was 
unimproved or particularly remote, a lesser sum would be accepted despite the 
increased risk factor that the tenant might run into financial difficulty.   
 
If a smallholder was willing to commit to a property for a longer term, then purchasing 
under the scheme could potentially represent better value for money as the payments 
were flexibly spread over a seven year period: 30% in cash straight away, a further 20% 
was due after two years and the remaining 50% due within seven years.
447
  Interest was 
fixed at 6%, or 5% in Southland where it was recognised that making a profit was more 
challenging.  Again this time frame was relatively short and meant a potential buyer 
could even re-sell quite quickly.  These land holdings were sold by agents acting at the 
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Dunedin office, and also via the offices of the National Mortgage and Agency Co. Ltd 
in New Zealand among other agencies.
448
  In addition intending purchasers could 
arrange to call at the properties in question and have the estate manager point them out.  
For many years the importance of purchasing in comparison to leasing appears to be 
secondary, although an attempt at a complete audit of all the company’s land sales as in 
Table 5.2 has highlighted a number of issues about the role of Head Office control in 
this process.  Firstly Table 5.1 lists all landholdings in 1879 and 1889, when clear 
audits are available. 
 
Table 5.1 – NZALC aggregate freehold land holdings 1879 and 1889. 
Property Acreage1879(a) Acreage 1889 
(b) 
Acton 20430 16215 
Ardgowan 6444 4480 
Aparima 7041 0 
Clydevale 37254 36498 
Levels 74002 57579 
Merrie Creek 2771 0 
Moeraki 8621 6666 
Pareora 22505 13999 
Totara 15113 10796 
Bluff Harbour 55 0 
Kaikorai 745 0 
Waitepeka 3145 0 
Invercargill Hundreds 105 0 
Edendale (c)
449
 125860 46239 
Hakateramea                         0 23379 
Kurow 609 646 
Deep Dell 640 0 
Total Acreage 325340 216497 
a) These values are taken from NAS GD435/611/2, W.S. Davidson’s report on his visit to the colonies of 
1878, p. 125.  Roods and perches have been eliminated for simplicity.  This table does not include town 
sections or property leased from the New Zealand government. 
b) These values are taken from the publicity booklet NAS GD435/611/4, ‘Notes on the New Zealand 
Properties of the New Zealand and Australian Land Company Ltd., Nov 1889.’, p. 125. 
c) Edendale includes the sub-properties Matuara Plains, Waimumu, Forest Hill, Lindhurst, Edendale, 
Seaward Downs, Hunter’s Bush, Otermika, Waihopai Downs, Morton Mains, Flemington, Woodlands, 
Mabel, Halfway Bush, Lothian, Thornton’s Land, Spurhead, and Spar Bush, also taken from NAS 
GD435/611/4, p. 125. 
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Table 5.2 NZALC Sales of Freehold Land reported to Head Office, 1879-1906. 
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1879 417 4420 9542 3406   1507  19292 
1880       296 8 304 
1881  22 1056 20   100 14 1212 
1882 1541 137       1678 
1883 112 7 303    744 28 1194 
1884 574 183 2855  555    4167 
1885 7181  3345      10526 
1886 93       19 112 
1887   672     14 686 
1888 408       3 411 
1889 1477    300    1777 
1890   18  284    302 
1891 2217 193   294  372 3 3079 
1892 566    1293  4  1863 
1893 315    56  26  397 
1894 231  219  448 46   944 
1895 77    8    85 
1896 1102  434  102   22 1660 
1897 1239 273  40 651   20 2223 
1898 801     1508   2309 
1899 1819  217      2036 
1900 761    499  570  1830 
1901         0 
1902 10    371    381 
1903 2  45730      45732 
1904 39403        39403 
1905    658   1200  1858 
1906    14048  35011 0  49059 
Total 60346 5235 64391 18172 4861 36565 4819 131 194520 
Source: Acreages sold per year and which required the permission of the board extrapolated from NAS 
GD435/11, 12 and 13 with 1879 numbers from GD435/611/5.  Roods and perches removed for 
simplicity.  Does not include land swaps where acreages were swapped with other landowners.  Years 
where no known land sales took place left blank. 
a) Edendale includes the sub-properties Matuara Plains, Waimumu, Forest Hill, Lindhurst, Edendale, 
Seaward Downs, Hunter’s Bush, Otermika, Waihopai Downs, Morton Mains, Flemington, Woodlands, 
Mabel, Halfway Bush, Lothian, Thornton’s Land, Spurhead, and Spar Bush, taken from NAS 
GD435/611/4, p. 125. 
b) Includes smaller properties with less than 5,000 acres total land sales in period – Moreaki, Waitepeka, 
Ardgowan, Hakateramea, and four acres from an unspecified run. 
c) Includes all acreages sold or gifted to national or local government for road or school building 
purposes, acreages sold for railways and acreages gifted to Churches. 
 
 
Table 5.2 suggests that the NZALC was mostly successful in carrying out its long term 
policy of disposing of its land holdings, particularly with the large sales undertaken by 
Davidson initially on entering office in 1878-9, and with those of most of the remaining 
parts of the estates to the government in 1904-1906.  Interestingly, there remains a 
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discrepancy of 22,000 acres unsold by 1906 based on these figures, although the 
Hakatermea estate continued to be held along with a few other small properties after the 
company had sold most of its prestigious estates.  These numbers have been collected 
from land conveyances which were reported back to Edinburgh by the Dunedin agents 
and approved by Board meetings, so it is possible that some conveyances may have 
occurred without being reported back to Edinburgh.  Despite this, it appears that the 
intention was to report all conveyances, as even very small transactions such as a single 
acre for road building and sometimes transfers of less than a single acre were recorded 
in the minute books.   
 
Maps of the properties were kept in Edinburgh, although there is no surviving evidence 
that these were periodically updated as sections were sold, or that maps of sales were 
sent back from New Zealand.   Despite the increasing political pressure for land, the 
firm was mostly unsuccessful in offloading any significant proportion of its holdings to 
the private sector between about 1880 and 1900, managing to sell only a mean of 1,847 
acres per annum, based on the figures in Table 5.2. 
 
Few reliable financial records of the NZALC have survived from this period and it is 
difficult to assess the opportunity cost question of selling these land holdings against the 
potential profits of exploiting them.  What is clear is that the NZALC would have faced 
a much longer period of land disposal had the government not intervened in the late 
1890s and early 1900s, and even when the government first started making offers to buy 
the land back the valuations given were very disappointing compared to those for 1879.  
The government’s first approach in 1898 for the better Canterbury estates priced 
Parerora at £8 15s per acre (although instructions were sent back to try to hold out for 
£9), and the Levels at a very disappointing £6 10s per acre, although this was the 
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property most heavily demanded by private buyers.
450
  The salutation was little more 
than half the value of £12 12s offered almost twenty years previously, and rejected 
instantly by the Edinburgh board, although five years later the board accepted £6 10s 
per acre from the government in the absence of a better offer.
451
  There has been much 
debate between New Zealand historians over whether the 1880s and early 1890s were 
depression years, with revisionists arguing that the apparent depression was caused by 
falls in public spending.
452
  What is striking is that, despite the new opportunities 
granted by the opening up of the protein export industry, agricultural land values did not 
rise in the 1880s, and may even have fallen.
453
  Further, in the case of the NZALC it 
seems to have been difficult to obtain good prices despite direct action to improve land 
with fencing, the planting of grass and the system of cropping mentioned above, and 
although the company even built roads on its own account to make properties more 
accessible.  The NZALC also had problems with the ability of its tenants and purchasers 
under the instalments scheme to pay their rent or interest, with the Edinburgh office 
becoming involved in disputes with purchasers who defaulted.
454
   
 
Edendale, despite its dairy factory, was a focus for such difficulties with purchasers 
falling behind on payments from as early as 1884,
455
 and in 1886 directly petitioning 
Edinburgh for a renegotiation of the terms under which they bought land.  On his visit 
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that year Davidson met personally with all the land holders on that estate, although the 
board did not agree to reduce the terms on which land had been bought.
456
  However, 
the fact that these purchasers were having difficulty in paying their interest does not 
necessarily suggest that there was a recession – instead, they may have paid beyond 
their means for the land, or have been inefficient users of it, despite the attempts by the 
NZALC mentioned above to ensure that the use of the land continued as when it was 
under company ownership, although it is unclear that there was any real incentive for 
the purchasers to keep to these contracts.   What is clear for the NZALC is that 
significant values were realised, even if not at a long term profit, which were then 
reinvested in Australian land which could be obtained on very favourable terms even as 
late as 1905.  It is also likely that being a company ultimately based at a distance, in 
Edinburgh, and not in Wellington or Dunedin, made dispassionate comparison between 
the two countries of operation easier as this decision could be based purely on the sale 
value of the land versus the long term potential of the new land, and made the exit 
decision from most of New Zealand easier for the NZALC despite that country having 
been its operational heartland. 
 
5.5 Vertical Integration and Strategy in Australia 
 
Across the Tasman Sea the operations of the NZALC took on a very different character.  
The company’s role in Australia has been less well documented because it was not as 
influential in shaping the livestock industry there as it had been in New Zealand.  Its 
holdings in Australia in 1879 were larger in aggregate than those in New Zealand, but 
they were concentrated into fewer estates in a much larger country, and so the company 
has not been as noticeable to historians of Australia as it has to their New Zealand 
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counterparts.  Nonetheless, this lack of relative influence did not stop the company 
becoming commercially successful there, and if anything it may have been 
institutionally stronger in Australia than in New Zealand in the long run.  Technology 
and livestock breeding remained important in Australia although the climate was not 
favourable to the plantation of English grass seed, and the company avoided becoming 
directly involved in the freezing or dairy industries.  Instead, the emphasis was very 
much on overcoming the often harsh natural environment, where droughts could be 
frequent and where sources of water could be few. 
 
As noted in Section 5.3, soon after taking control of NZALC, Davidson disposed of the 
less efficient leasehold estates such as Yawong Springs in Victoria, where competition 
for land with small-scale settlers had made farming continuous stretches of land 
difficult.  Typically, the only freeholds available to the company were further from the 
coast and in areas of low land value, such as at Bundure in New South Wales which 
constituted 97,500 acres of freehold and 24,031 acres of leasehold in 1879, the freehold 
being valued at £1 12s 1d per acre.
457
  Leaseholds which could be retained were also 
typically in areas that were undesirable to settlers (often known as ‘selectors’, because 
they selected land according to government legislation)
458
 interested in livestock 
farming, such as the Till Till estate, also in New South Wales.   
 
Till Till was in an area so infertile that the 330 acres of freehold held by the NZALC 
there were valued at only 17s 4d per acre in 1879; the estate was mostly composed of 
the 383,670 acres of leasehold held – in total this made the estate about the size of 
Hertfordshire in England.
459
  Despite covering 600 square miles, the estate lacked any 
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access to a permanent supply of fresh water and had an unpredictable climate, which 
had ruined squatters who previously attempted to farm the area.  The main advantage of 
the estate was the salt bushes which grew over much of it, which could survive drought 
and whose leaves were nutritious to sheep.
460
  A further benefit was that pine trees were 
available locally which could be divided into fence posts cheaply, reducing fencing 
costs to £40 per mile.
461
  As with many of the Australian properties acquired later, the 
main way to source water was to bore deep wells.  By 1878 Till Till included 8 wells 
sunk at a cost of £750 each, which did not include the boring of trial shafts required; 
finding sites had been a particular problem as water generally seemed to be found only 
in the northern part of the property.
462
  Actually raising the water from the wells 
presented a further engineering problem – the wells were too remote from the railway to 
contemplate the use of steam power, so three horses were used to turn the mechanism 
with a driver working long shifts to keep the horses moving.  The requirement for 
constant labour at the wells presented another problem – the water brought up from the 
wells was considered to contain too much magnesium for human consumption, and 
what little rainwater there was had to be captured in tanks specifically for the drivers – 
although these tanks were designed to hold a supply to last for two years.
463
   
 
The boring of artesian wells was an important aspect of company policy in Australia, 
and really allowed the NZALC to reinforce its competitive advantage there.  Water 
improvements were again carried out on Till Till in 1880 and 1883 under strictly 
approved expenditures.  In 1880 expenditure was restricted to £5,000 following 
suggestions by the estate manager Mr Crombie that certain improvements be carried 
out.  In 1883 expenditure was restricted to £1,000, suggesting that even the boring of a 
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single well had to be referred to the top level of the company.
464
  Despite Till Till’s arid 
environment, rabbits were competing with the sheep for access to the salt bushes to the 
extent that complete disposal of the estate was considered by the Edinburgh board in 
1882 following a report on the subject by Mr Crombie, as 100 miles of rabbit netting 
would otherwise have been required to control the pests.
465
  Even at Bundure, a 
relatively more fertile location, water shortages were a difficulty – a sheep wash 
purchased there at a cost of £1000 in the early days of the NZALC was reported by 
Davidson to have lain idle for four years as there had not been enough water to use it.
466
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The freehold Wellshot estate in central Queensland, retrieved from sale in 1878, was 
also in a very arid location undesirable to selectors and could be added to frequently and 
cheaply. This run was gradually expanded over a number of years, with the company 
taking advantage of cheap real estate prices to secure freeholds when the government 
allowed it to.  One example of this came in 1890 when the government sanctioned the 
purchase of 10,000 acres at just 10s per acre; later, in 1893, 300,000 acres were 
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purchased at just 6s 8d per acre.
467
  Under Queensland law, however, the government 
was able to ‘resume’ ownership of these lands for sub-division, despite the apparent 
lack of viability for smallholders there.  At its greatest extent, around 1900, the run had 
expanded to an immense 1,178,480 acres, although this was pegged back by the 
government by 1914 to a still vast 800,000 acres, capable of carrying 400,000 sheep or 
lambs. Water was an especially troublesome issue on Wellshot, however, and some of 
the money saved by purchasing the land cheaply had to be reinvested in drilling wells – 
on one occasion drillers from the Canadian oil industry had to be brought in to drill to a 
depth of 3,700 feet.
468
 
 
Despite the enthusiasm of the Edinburgh investors, drought remained a big problem for 
the company, and was one of the reasons that the Australian lands were so cheap to 
invest in.  On average, a drought could be expected to affect at least one or two of the 
Australian runs every three or four years, and could even continue for a number of years 
– for example the years 1898-1902 represented an almost constant drought period 
coming after five years of good water supply.  Shorter but still severe droughts were 
also experienced in 1878, 1882, 1884-5, 1893, 1906 and 1913, with competence 
gradually being developed so that the effects of these droughts could be withstood 
without affecting the financial performance of the NZALC.
469
  This competence became 
more important as the company gradually withdrew itself from the less drought prone 
New Zealand operations, although as early as 1885 Davidson started to plan to avoid the 
effects of future water shortages.  The 1885 drought had seen a loss for Wellshot of 
212,621 sheep in total, costed at £23,221, and leading the Edinburgh directors to 
                                                 
467
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suspend the dividend, even on ‘A Preference’ shares.470  At this point a reserve fund 
was established by Davidson specifically to provide cash to pay costs and dividends 
when drought meant that losses had to be charged to account, although drought does not 
seem to have had such a visible effect on the volumes of wool sold.
471
  More of an effort 
was put into improving water storage and transport although there was an implicit 
acceptance that some losses due to drought were inevitable.  
 
Davidson’s later strategy was to purchase more runs to increase the geographical spread 
of the NZALC’s holdings. This aimed to create a chain of properties running 
northwards from central New South Wales to northern Queensland between which stock 
could be moved if drought struck in a particular area.
472
  This strategy was begun with 
the Piallaway and Wallhallow runs being purchased for £232,000 in 1889 from the 
Assets Company, which despite retaining a large shareholding in NZALC did not itself 
have the same competences in operating farms.
473
  The agents, Lascelles and Alfords, 
were heavily relied upon by Davidson to select possible land for purchase, particularly 
when extending runs.  The investigation process for purchasing new runs in Australia 
was somewhat more rigorous -  the 1897 purchase of Eddington run in Queensland saw 
Mr Hopkins, the manager of Wellshot, deputed to visit it as well as Mr Turnbull, the 
Queensland inspector, and George Drysdale, the director with special responsibility for 
Australia, even though the purchase price was a relatively low £26,000.
474
  This 
suggests that the strategy of the NZALC towards land acquisition had become more 
cautious, requiring agreement at Head Office level, rather than the very scattergun 
approach taken at the time of the original company’s formation in 1867.   Further runs 
were added in the late 1890s and early 1900s, with the acquisition of the Leilavale, 
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Goodunblui and Bangate runs in New South Wales before 1900 and the addition of 
Orandunbrie and Edgeroi estates in New South Wales, and Mount Cornish and 
Hardington runs in Queensland in the years immediately after 1900.  After 1910 runs 
were also purchased in Western Australia, which even at that stage was somewhat 
under-developed.
475
 
 
A policy of portfolio diversification away from sheep was followed to a certain extent 
in Australia, but not into cropping as in New Zealand as the Australian inland climate 
was not suited to arable crops.  Land leasing and operating in the real estate industry 
was not on the agenda in Australia either, because (as noted above) the land was not at a 
premium in Australia when compared to New Zealand.  The policy of stock 
improvement was continued in Australia as it was in New Zealand, with some specially 
bred stock being moved from New Zealand to Australia.  Stock improvement through 
breeding was also sought in the cattle industry, particularly in cross breeding Angus 
cattle with breeds that had already been imported.  The NZALC also increasingly 
entered the dairy farming industry in Australia although there was no attempt to enter 
downstream dairy manufacturing directly there.   
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Table 5.3 Five yearly cattle and sheep numbers 
 
Year Sheep in 
New 
Zealand 
('000s) 
Sheep in 
Australia 
('000s) 
Total 
Sheep 
Carried 
('000s) 
Cattle in 
New 
Zealand  
Cattle in 
Australia  
Total 
Cattle  
Carried 
1880 446 258 704 9,800 1,100 10,900 
1885 412 282 694 6,600 600 7,200 
1890 382 684 1,066 5,300 4,100 9,400 
1895 384 668 1,052 4,700 4,900 9,600 
1900 271 543 814 5,500 28,600 34,100 
1905 175 812 987 2,000 28,200 30,200 
1910 81 1,555 1,636 400 39,500 39,900 
1914 60 1,575 1,635 500 100,400 100,900 
Source: Davidson, William Soltau Davidson, 1846 - 1924, p. 133. 
 
As is clear from Table 5.3, cattle numbers were increased from just over 1,000 to over 
100,000 in the period from 1880 to 1914, and particularly rapidly after 1900, although 
the importance of this increase should not be overstated when compared with the 
absolute volumes of sheep kept in Australia, passing the one million mark by 1910.  
Cattle were kept on the same runs as sheep for most of the period, although presumably 
in the more fertile areas closer to water supplies – it is noted that 25,000 head of cattle 
were included in the Eddington purchase, for example.
476
  After 1912 four runs were 
purchased specifically for the 100,000 plus cattle now on company books.
477
  Before 
this the exact apportionment of the Australian properties between sheep and cattle was 
not discussed in detail at board level. Perhaps pragmatically, the exact allocation of 
animals to pasture was not something discussed by the board but was left to the 
management on specific runs to determine, although returns relating to numbers were 
compiled.  There appears to have been no deliberate policy to enter the cattle industry 
recorded at board level, although Davidson does imply in his autobiography that he 
wanted to move in this direction.  If the Net Proceeds column in Appendix 6 is to be 
believed, however, Davidson’s policy of focusing simply on pastoral activities in 
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Australia, and particularly on the export of wool from Australia, paid dividends in the 
longer run, particularly after 1900. 
 
The NZALC also followed a policy of career employment in Australia as well as in 
New Zealand, and the practice of recruiting as cadets promising young Scots, many of 
whom were recommended to the company by their fathers, was continued.
478
  This 
policy continued to reduce dependence on the employment of locals for the NZALC, 
which also moved some of its younger employees from New Zealand to Australia as the 
need for them in New Zealand decreased.
479
  On some occasions Davidson even gave 
letters of recommendation to immigrants personally known to him, asking the 
Melbourne agents or station managers to help them find work in Australia even none 
was available on the NZALC’s own estates.480  Although the numbers of such recruits 
were relatively small, the NZALC still brought some Scottish commercial talent to 
Australia, some of which may well have dispersed into other sectors.  From this 
perspective it is puzzling that Malcolm Prentis does not mention the NZALC at all, 
either as an engine of immigration or as an important Scottish organisation, in his Scots 
in Australia which looks at the individual cases of a selection of agricultural and 
commercial immigrants.
481
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
 
In the longer run, the activities of the New Zealand and Australian Land Company 
became complex and varied before gradually settling back to the company’s original 
purpose of operating livestock farms, although mostly in Australia in the years before 
1914.  In this process the company evolved in numerous ways - firstly by entering the 
real estate business in the 1880s, something which was never really considered in the 
Morton era. This was followed, although temporarily, by the vertical integration of 
production down the value chain when the company also became involved in 
manufacturing and even marketing in the UK to a limited extent.  Vertical integration 
into freezing and the dairy industry was pursued initially as the market outside the firm 
was not yet able to provide these opportunities.  Finally came the exit from vertical 
integration and a concentration again on the core competence of livestock farming as 
the secondary market in freezing and dairy processing expanded.  High level managerial 
responsibility still remained concentrated in the Scottish Head Office (although now 
moved to Edinburgh) but with some important differences from the Morton period.  
Firstly Davidson operated entirely as an internalised employee of the NZALC – he did 
not see the NZALC as a vehicle of his own merchant house. Unlike Morton he did not 
have the incentive of holding a substantial percentage of NZALC shares, having only a 
tiny minority share of 0.80% in 1878 compared to Morton’s combined personal and 
trust holdings of 50.4%.
482
  Davidson’s main incentive was his remuneration package, 
initially set at £2,000 a year but frequently increased.
483
   
 
Arguably, this completed the NZALC’s transition to a form of managerial capitalism, 
and with the Assets Company acting as a holding company with its shareholding 
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composed of the creditors of the City of Glasgow Bank after 1882, shareholding was 
now dispersed far more widely than previously.  The Edinburgh office also operated 
with its own secretariat of clerks employed directly by the company who dealt with the 
flow of information coming back from Australasia.  Smaller networks of clerks also 
existed in Melbourne and Dunedin – although in 1908 Davidson opened a new company 
office in Sydney to replace the Melbourne agents with a permanent Superintendent of 
Australian Estates on the staff.
484
  Payroll functions for senior staff and accounting 
generally were carried out by these offices, which collated the accounts sent in by the 
station clerks, but everything was also referred to the Edinburgh office to be checked.  
The Head Office, and Davidson personally, also managed marketing in Britain of the 
company’s exports from New Zealand, as well as working closely with wool dealers.  
Crucially, the decisions relating to how much wool or meat to ship back to Britain were 
taken by Davidson and approved by the board on a regular basis.  Although 
shareholding links were formed with distribution firms like Nelson Brothers (of whom 
Davidson was a board member), and the wool dealers Williams and Overbury & Co. 
(who owned a 1% stake in the merged company), the company left marketing to 
them.
485
  These firms performing distribution functions could then be considered a 
cluster which formed a trading system for the NZALC – however, it is clear that the 
NZALC was central to this trading system rather than simply being one small part of it, 
and there is no evidence to suggest any managerial overlap between these firms.  A 
system of constantly renewed contracts between a cluster of firms helped to keep 
transaction costs down while each member of the cluster was able to concentrate on its 
strengths. 
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Davidson consolidated the structure that Morton had already put in place to manage the 
company, but as a personality he dominated the organisation as a whole, although 
Thomas Brydone in New Zealand and William Drysdale in Australia, among others, 
had an important role to play.  What seems to make Davidson different is that he had a 
very ‘hands-on’ style of management – having gone through the cadet system with the 
C&O, he always remained interested in farming, and worked enthusiastically on 
farming problems like pest control and improving irrigation.  Having a farming 
background rather than the usual accountancy or legal background meant that Davidson 
also did not believe that he could simply operate the company remotely from Edinburgh 
– although he spent most of his time in Edinburgh, on his visits to Australasia he 
inspected progress there on the various properties and on some occasions helped local 
management to put his policies directly into practice.  
 
This farming background seems to have been what stopped Davidson from turning the 
NZALC into a company completely focused on real estate as someone whose 
background was in finance might have done – instead, the earnings from divestments 
were ploughed back into the farming side of the business.  As we saw in Table 5.3, 
even as late as 1914 the NZALC still had 60,000 sheep in New Zealand – so eventually 
even there the focus was moved back to livestock farming.  This is not to say that 
Davidson simplified the company’s operations to the extent that value was not being 
added, however – breeding programmes were continued, to make the quality of the 
livestock as high as possible.  At the same time, the Australian properties were used to 
gain the highest scale economies possible, necessary because more farmers were 
targeting the frozen export market as well as the wool market, thus cutting the expected 
margins, although obviously prices could be maintained at a higher level for livestock 
of better quality. 
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Overall, then, in the Davidson era control was extended from Edinburgh even further 
into the company’s operations than had been the case before 1878.  Although day to day 
decisions were not necessarily referred to Edinburgh for approval, large expenditures 
were still referred to Edinburgh, and control over the general strategic direction of the 
company remained there.  The NZALC stopped short, however, of becoming a full M-
form style organisation; the role of the Head Office never became a purely consulting 
one, and although the Australian and New Zealand branches were given more control 
over operations as the company grew, this control never really developed to the stage 
where the company superintendents could make policy changing decisions without 
ultimate approval from the board.   
 
For certain, the increasing level of political independence from the UK of Australia and 
New Zealand appears to have made little difference to this situation either – in fact the 
board minutes still refer to ‘the colonies’ even after Australian federation in 1901 – and 
the possibility of moving management, or even the company registration, from Scotland 
was never considered.
486
  It remained useful to the company to have its base in Britain, 
which continued to be the most important export market for its products and the main 
source of capital, until the eventual sale of NZALC to the Australian company Dalgety 
Ltd. in 1968.  What is more curious is that no consideration was given to the idea of 
moving this base to London, given the closer physical links with the wool, dairy and 
meat brokers that would have been possible in doing so.  The NZALC then remained a 
Scottish Free-Standing Company because its Head Office remaining in Scotland 
appears to have been culturally and managerially significant to the firm even after the 
host economies had began to mature.  It was essentially the Scottish element that kept 
together what would otherwise have been a disparate set of agricultural properties – 
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with a Head Office in Australasia; it is unclear that there would have been any 
advantage in managing these farms as a group. 
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 Chapter 6 - Ownership and Control – Free-
Standing Companies in the United States 
 
This chapter will examine the Arizona Copper Company and the California Redwood 
Company to analyse how they operated as organisations and how far they created 
managerial systems suitable to operate across the Atlantic. 
 
6.1 The general experience of Scottish Free-Standing Companies in the 
United States 
 
 
This chapter will follow on from Chapters 4 and 5 by examining the extent to which 
Scottish management had a genuine influence upon the success or failure of Scottish 
Free-Standing companies in the US.  This will again involve the examination of the 
structures used by such companies and will include a detailed examination of two 
particular ‘case study’ companies, again looking at the issues of governance and how 
they split into separate firms.  This will also be contrasted with some of the secondary 
evidence relating to other Scottish owned and some English owned FSCs in the US and 
their relative performance.  The chapter will end with some conclusions about the 
relative performance of Scottish FSCs in the US and the underlying reasons; in 
particular, looking at why Scottish firms appear to have been less successful in the US 
than in British Empire countries. 
 
In Chapter 3 we saw that New Zealand attracted the largest Scottish FSC in terms of 
paid capital in the 1862-1885 period (the New Zealand and Australian Land Company) 
but the US was the most popular host country for Scottish FSCs, with as many as 43 
companies being formed to invest there in those years.  This number included 15 
companies seeking to take advantage of the ranching boom on the then South-Western 
frontier, 11 generally interested in some form of land speculation and 10 with interests 
in mining, usually for metals such as gold, silver or copper.  We also know that the US 
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attracted interest from FSCs outside Scotland; in fact, Scottish registered FSCs were 
only a minority in this specific field. As Clark C. Spence notes in his classic study, 
some 518 UK based joint stock companies
487
 were formed to invest in US mining 
between 1860 and 1901 in the area that he roughly defines as ‘the West’ alone.488  
Further, at least 101 of these (and probably more) were reconstructions of previous 
failed concerns and at least 143 companies did not start actual mining work.
489
  The 
Scottish element here, (21 companies) may appear insignificant but, as with the NZALC 
in the previous chapter, the actual size of venture was important.
490
  The Arizona 
Copper Company (ACC), established in Edinburgh in 1882, had the second largest 
nominal capital (£875,000) of any of the companies named by Spence, to the date of its 
establishment.     
 
By the time of its reconstruction in 1884 the ACC had a paid capital (including vendor’s 
shares) of just under £700,000. The largest FSC named by Spence, with £1,000,000, 
was the high-profile London based Emma Silver Mining Company established in late 
1871 to operate in Utah.  This company was promoted in Great Britain with much 
fanfare through the media, its promotion gaining the attention of ‘City Intelligence’ 
column in The Times newspaper on 10
th
 November 1871, alongside a meeting of the 
Court of the Bank of England and a discussion of Spain’s financial position.491  In a 
period when politicians held great public respect, the company recruited three MPs and 
the heir to a peerage on its board, as well as the US minister to the United Kingdom.
492
  
However this high profile start soon turned into a high profile disaster: the Emma 
Company slowly stagnated throughout the 1870s due to a combination of mine 
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collapses and poor management. Most of the shareholder’s capital was lost, while 
pamphleteers made use of the opportunity for satire afforded to them.
493
 Most of the 
entrepreneurial impetus for the Emma project originated with London and US based 
promoters, but according to Spence, around half the shares offered to the public were 
purchased by Scottish based investors.
494
  Therefore the Emma Company was to some 
level a Scottish concern in terms of ownership but not control; further, this bad 
experience appears not to have dampened the enthusiasm of Scottish investors for the 
US or mining investment, but encouraged them to bring the entrepreneurial impetus to 
Edinburgh. 
 
The ACC will form one of the two case studies for this chapter as it is a rare case of a 
mining FSC that overcame the initial challenge of organisation and became profitable in 
the long term.  One of the big problems faced by many mining FSCs was the need for 
minerals brought to the surface to be extracted from the original ores which were 
valueless. This chemical problem was often neglected by the management of such 
concerns (and, naturally, promoters did not mention it to prospective shareholders) but 
the ACC was successfully able to integrate downstream, and further increased its 
prospects of success by investing from the start in the necessary transport links to the 
mainline railway system. 
 
The other case study for this chapter will be the Edinburgh-based California Redwood 
Company (CRC).  This was a short lived FSC which was formed to take control of 
several large tracts of redwood forest on the Californian coast north of San Francisco.  
Chapter 3 showed that Scotland was home to six logging, one sawmill operating and 
                                                 
493
 For instance Spence reproduces an anonymous satirical pamphlet published in 1872 entitled A New 
Nursery Ballad, embellished with finely-engraved Portraits of some of the most Emmanent [sic] Men of 
the Day, price to English subscribers. £1,000,000. Ibid., pp. 183-190. 
494
 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
 202 
two timber tract owning FSCs.  Of these, four were in the US, two were in Canada and 
one aimed to operate on both sides of the US/Canadian border.
495
  A further venture in 
the timber tracts category invested in timber in Norway, and the West Pacific Company, 
also mentioned in Chapter 3, attempted to operate a sawmill in Japan.
496
  This 
company has been put into the logging Specific Industrial Classification as it intended 
to carry out all three stages of the process, rather than being either simply an investor in 
forestry property or soley a manufacturer.  Little attention has previously been given to 
the importance of FSCs in the lumber industry, even though the ownership of timber 
tracts in particular would suit an FSC interested in a ‘hands-off’ management style. The 
CRC intended to integrate downstream into sawmills, railways and even shipping, 
which would have posed a vast management challenge to any start up company - let 
alone one based 6,000 miles from the site of operation. This case study will propose that 
this company was a typical FSC failure in that it failed by taking on a non-viable 
business to begin with.  This would be counter to Jackson’s proposition that this 
company’s failure was a result of falling foul of land laws after the company’s San 
Francisco managing agents were found guilty of participating in a land grabbing 
swindle.
497
  This proposition was later picked up by Wilkins in her standard history of 
foreign investment in the US but is not the complete reason for the company’s failure: it 
was later restructured as the Edinburgh and San Francisco Redwood Company to take 
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over some of the original assets before declining, with the final decision to wind up 
being taken in 1902.
498
 
 
Finally, this chapter will assess the suitability of the US as a location for Scottish FSCs.  
Although the US attracted many Scottish emigrants, they do not appear to have come in 
numbers to the areas of the US in which Scottish FSCs were common.
499
 This contrasts, 
for example, with the significant numbers that we see in southern New Zealand and 
some parts of Australia where Scottish pastoral companies operated.  Scottish FSCs 
frequently relied on people with a different institutional background to themselves to act 
as their managing agents in the US, usually with an American background.  It was also 
often the case that prospective American managing agents or vendors would pitch their 
ideas to prospective FSC boards in Scotland, meaning that the initial entrepreneurial 
venture originated in the US. This chapter will draw some conclusions about whether 
managerial power in these firms remained in Scotland or was transferred to the US, and 
whether this managerial power relationship was beneficial for FSC success. 
 
6.2 Previous Firms and Other Links 
 
 
As with Australia and New Zealand, Scottish firms had been linked to the US before the 
1880s, although the early 1880s saw a huge increase in interest in investment 
opportunities there.  Investors had also been interested in the US through other channels 
of investment such as (US registered) railroads since at least the 1850s
500
 and through 
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the investment trust movement from the early 1870s.
501
  Therefore it might be expected 
that interest in forming FSCs would follow, making the US the main host country for 
Scottish Free-Standing Company promotion by 1885.  As noted in Chapter 3 as early 
as 1837 investment companies, such as the Illinois Investment Company, started to 
appear with interests in the US Mid-west although their exact field of interest is unclear. 
W. T. Jackson suggests that one such firm, the Galena Investment Company, was 
formed as a lead mining venture, indicating that there may have been some direct 
investment carried out by these companies
502
 – alternatively, they may simply have 
been involved in lending to US entrepreneurs.   
 
The earliest Scottish FSC to enter the US was the Glasgow Port Washington Iron and 
Coal Company Ltd., which was formed by Glasgow investors in 1872 to mine and smelt 
iron in Ohio.  This company had a nominal capital of £250,000 and lasted until 1881, 
but would appear to have been a highly speculative venture as members of the same 
syndicate were also involved in the Tuscan Gas company, in Italy, which was clearly an 
un-related business.
503
  Formed in the same year, also by a Glasgow syndicate, was the 
Utah Cottonwood Mining and Smelting Company Limited, set up to purchase a copper 
mine in Utah, although this firm only lasted for around a year.
504
  Scottish investors 
appear not to have got involved in the mining investment boom of this period and 
remained mostly disinterested in the US, with only four further US hosted FSC 
promotions, two in mining and two in land until the end of the 1870s.
505
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Notable among these four promotions was the Glasgow Californian Land Company, 
formed in 1877, which pursued an ambitious land reclamation project in the San 
Joachim Delta near Stockton, California.  This was an attempt to drain Roberts Island, 
one of many low lying marshy islands in the delta region, through a system of dykes 
and levees and absorbed around £355,000 worth of capital by 1881. The Glasgow 
Company initially met with relative success as the island was successfully drained and 
leased to settlers by the early 1880s with agricultural activity being expanded, only for 
one of the key levees to burst in March 1884, flooding the island.  Although the break 
was closed and the flooding had actually improved the quality of the agricultural land, 
the company was left with high liabilities and resolved to wind up in early 1886.
506
  The 
other land company to be promoted was the better known Dundee Land and Investment 
Company of 1878.
507
  Despite the name, this company purchased property around the 
western US, and was a venture of the Dundee based syndicate of the investment trust 
pioneer Robert Fleming, the Earl of Airlie, and the newspaper proprietor John Leng.  
This company was not unsuccessful but chose to exit direct land ownership in 1882 to 
concentrate on trust holdings and was reconstituted as the Dundee Investment Company 
which later became part of the well known Alliance Trust.
508
 
 
The Dundee Land and Investment Company also foreshadowed one of the most 
important movements of Scottish FSCs into the US (which Chapter 7 will examine in 
more detail), when it added powers to keep sheep and cattle to its Act of Association in 
1880.  This was also the year of the registration of the Prairie Cattle Company, the first 
of 15 cattle firms to be registered in Edinburgh which raised a combined total of £3 
million over the 5 years of speculation until 1885.  Despite the notable record of 
Scottish FSCs elsewhere in pastoral investment (see Chapters 4 and 5), these 
                                                 
506
 Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 1873, pp. 214-216. 
507
 BT2/844 Dundee Land Investment Company Ltd. registration file. 
508
 Gilbert, A History of Investment Trusts in Dundee 1873 - 1938, p. 35. 
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companies were not successful in the long term and most were wound up or sold their 
land to local farmers by 1910.  It is worth noting that many of these firms were 
successfully established and as many as 13 out of 15 firms appear to have successfully 
carried out the purchase of a ranch and started farming, though not always with great 
success.  This compares favourably with Scottish mining FSCs in the US where perhaps 
5 out of 10 companies registered before 1886 started operating.
509
 A key phenomenon 
in the ranching industry was the US based promoting agent, – of these the most 
important was Frank L. Underwood of Kansas City through his agency practice of 
Underwood, Clark and Company.  Underwood made a trip to Scotland in 1880-1 during 
which he first successfully promoted the Prairie Cattle Company to J. Duncan Smith, 
the manager of the Scottish-American Mortgage Company, before travelling on to 
Dundee.  There he convinced enough members of that city’s relatively small capitalist 
class of the merits of investing in ranching to help start the Texas Land and Cattle 
Company, one of the less successful cattle ventures.
510
  By 1882 these moves 
encouraged those left out of the Texas scheme in Dundee (including Robert Fleming) to 
establish two further ranching FSCs, and eight others were established in Edinburgh.   
 
Underwood seems to have managed to exploit very well the relative isolation of these 
two separate parts of the Scottish capital markets, and it is curious that he did not also 
target Glasgow, which was by far the larger of the Scottish stock exchanges.  It is only 
possible to speculate that this may be because of the recent difficulties in that city 
following the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank, or possibly that investors were 
suspicious of FSC type investments in Glasgow because of the implication of the New 
Zealand and Australian Land Company in the bank collapse.  A further possibility may 
be that Underwood was interested in a quick return from any company successfully 
                                                 
509
 This is based on the NAS BT2 collection of registration files looking at companies that existed for 
more than two years without a voluntary winding up resolution. 
510
 Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 1873, pp. 76-77. 
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promoted with no interest in its long term management. He may have been aware of the 
relative success of the NZALC and thus that Glasgow based investors would be 
comparatively well educated in running overseas pastoral businesses.  This seems likely 
in the light of his rapid disagreement with the Scottish boards of the Prairie and Texas 
companies as well as their subsequent poor performance.
511
  What is certain is that 
Underwood’s visit to Edinburgh and Dundee helped to fuel the ranching mania, and 
interest in other FSC promotions of the early 1880s on the east coast, barely involving 
Glasgow despite that city’s closer trading connections with the US.  And so it is that 
Edinburgh was home to both the case study FSCs discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
511
 Ibid., pp. 87-89.  The Prairie’s directors cancelled their management contract with Underwood by 
1883 as they felt his share of the profits too high, while the board of the Texas Company found that 
Underwood was forcing them to pay a 12.5% dividend due to his entitlement to half of all dividends over 
10%. 
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Table 6.1 California Redwood Company and Arizona Copper Company Directors 
California Redwood 
Company 
Arizona Copper Company 1882 Arizona Copper Company 1884 
Sir George Warrender Bt. 
(Chair) 
John Guthrie Smith (Chair, Sherrif, 
Aberdeen) 
George Auldjo Jamieson 
Edward L. I. Blyth C.E. George Auldjo Jamieson (Chair) Sir George Warrender Bt. 
R. Bruce Johnston W.S. William Lowson (manufacturer, 
Dundee) 
Colin James MacKenzie 
(solicitor) 
Thomas Nelson (Publisher) Thomas Jarron Gordon W. S. John Wilson (Merchant, 
Edinburgh) 
Patrick Stirling (of 
Kippendavie) 
Michell Thomson (Timber 
Merchant) 
 
William John Menzies 
W.S. 
James Duncan Smith (managing 
director, Scottish American 
Mortgage co)) 
 
David Evans (Merchant, 
Eureka, California) 
  
James D. Walker 
(Merchant, San Francisco) 
  
 
 
a) From the California Redwood Company Limited Registration File, NAS BT2/1261. 
b) From the Arizona Copper Company Limited Registration File, NAS BT2/1144. 
c) From the Arizona Copper Company Limited Registration File (second registration), NAS BT2/1375. 
 
6.3 Structure and Organisation: The Arizona Copper Company 
  
Underwood did not confine his promotional activities to ranching.  He also had an early 
role in the Arizona Copper Company scheme which he promoted to the same Edinburgh 
syndicate to whom he promoted the Prairie Cattle Company.   The members of this 
syndicate were also directors of the Scottish-American Mortgage Company.
512
  The 
solicitor and Scottish-American Mortgage Company Managing Director J. Duncan 
Smith sat on the board of the new company alongside Edinburgh merchants William 
Lowson and Mitchell Thomson, Writer to the Signet,
513
 Thomas Jarron Gordon,  the 
chairman of the Prairie Company, John Guthrie Smith (also of the London based 
Maxwell Cattle Company), and the Chairman was George Auldjo Jamieson.  Jamieson 
                                                 
512
 Ibid., pp. 17-18. Jackson notes that Duncan Smith and Lowson were both founding directors of 
Scottish-American in 1876. Gordon had signed the Memorandum of Association as a subscriber 
originally while Guthrie Smith was Chairman. 
513
 The Writers to the Signet are an independent society of Scottish solicitors who have the authority to 
pursue cases in the Court of Session and who use the professional title ‘Writer to the Signet’ or W.S.  
Although this title does not designate any special powers to solicitors holding it, it did tend to be used by 
solicitors to emphasise their authority, hence its inclusion here. 
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was a Chartered Accountant whose most important previous role was that of liquidator 
of the City of Glasgow Bank and who would thus have had some involvement with the 
affairs of the NZALC Company.  Until 1885, the ACC also shared its Edinburgh 
premises at 62 Frederick Street in the New Town with the Prairie Company.
514
  Table 
6.1 above shows the directors of the California Redwood Company and those of both 
incarnations of the Arizona Copper Company. 
 
Underwood was promoting the ACC scheme in Edinburgh on behalf of Julius 
Freudenthal and Charles and Henry Lesinsky who were interested in selling the copper 
claims they owned in Clifton, Arizona, under the name of the Longfellow Copper 
Company.  The Lesinskys had themselves purchased the property from brothers James 
and Robert Metcalf, its original discoverers, for a total of $30,000 between 1872 and 
1874.
515
  Previous writers appear to have made errors with the price at which the 
Lesinsky brothers sold the mine to the ACC. W. T. Jackson and Hyde both insist it was 
$1.2 million
516
 while the actual sale contract appended to the registration file
517
 gives a 
figure of £583,000, at 1882 prices, which converts to $2.8m.
518
 Either way, the 
Lesinskys made a substantial profit on selling underground assets whose real value was 
difficult to determine, and which still required a large capital investment to make them 
workable.  The Longfellow Company had invested $75,000 in building an internal 
narrow gauge railway to provide site access, and an indeterminate amount in building 
                                                 
514
 NAS BT2/1003 The Prairie Cattle Company Ltd. and BT2/1144 The Arizona Copper Company Ltd. 
registration files. 
515
 Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times to the 1990s, p. 
114. 
516
 Ibid., p. 117., Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 1873, p. 166.  Its 
not entirely clear where these accounts sourced this figure. 
517
 NAS BT2/1144 The Arizona Copper Company Ltd. registration file. 
518
 Lawrence H. Officer and Samuel H. Williamson, Computing 'Real Value' over Time with a Conversion 
between U.K. Pounds and U.S. Dollars, 1830 - 2006 (2007 [cited 13th December 2007]); available from 
http://www.measuringworth.com/exchange/. 
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smelters which were largely ineffective.
519
  The ACC acquired the Longfellow site at a 
premium, with much improvement, including mainline rail access, still required to make 
it workable in profitable volumes. 
 
The Clifton mine site was relatively large although it could be considered a single site 
concern as all of the mines owned by the company were within a few miles of each 
other.  Figure 6.1 illustrates the company structure as it would have existed around 
1884.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
519
  Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times to the 1990s, p. 
115. 
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Figure 6.1 The Arizona Copper Company Structure, c. 1884 
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Scotland
United States (mostly Arizona)  
Source: This has been extrapolated from an examination of a collection of documents on this company 
held at NAS in GD282/13; of particular use in doing this has been the report of Mr Robertson’s visit to 
the mines – see NAS GD282/13/154.  Both Jackson and Kerr note that J. Duncan Smith was listed as 
Managing Director of the ACC, a post which he also occupied with the Scottish American Mortgage 
Company.  If this is so, then he can not have been very active in this position at the ACC, as his name 
very rarely appears in the documents left behind by the company.
520
   
 
 
The short geographical distance from the company’s US base at Clifton, which was in 
effect the ACC company town, allowed management in the US to be concentrated in the 
hands of one general manager there.  There was no manager with authority at board 
level based in Scotland.  The only elements of the Arizona Copper Company to be 
based in Scotland were the board and company headquarters and the Arizona Trust and 
Mortgage Company Ltd., which was formed during the reconstruction of 1884 to aid in 
refinancing the ACC, which is referred to further below.  This meant that, although the 
board retained some executive authority, its role within the company was a passive one, 
                                                 
520
 Kerr, Scottish Capital on the American Credit Frontier, p. 61. Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: 
Investors in the American West after 1873, p. 166. 
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and more managerial control over specific decisions remained firmly in Arizona.  
Below the level of general manager, several business units were inherited from the 
Longfellow Company – including four mine sites, a town site and five company stores, 
smelting facilities and the internal tramways.   
 
By necessity the ACC also integrated forward into transport, constructing the Arizona 
and New Mexico Railway. This 71 mile long railway built by the ACC from Clifton to 
connect with the Southern Pacific’s El Paso – Tucson section of the transcontinental 
route at Lordsburg in New Mexico appears to have been managed as a separate unit 
with a local incorporation. The railroad was fully financed by the ACC at a cost of 
£300,000, and its management were theoretically responsible to the Edinburgh Head 
Office.
521
  A failed attempt was made at the time of acquisition from the Lesinskys to 
make the complex even larger by purchasing the mines of the neighbouring Detroit 
Copper Company, itself a US internal proto-FSC owned by Detroit capitalists.
522
 
Further revenue both for the ACC itself and for the railway was secured by carrying the 
copper mined by the Detroit Company via the internal tramways and then the 
railway.
523
 The mining claims of the Detroit Company were conveniently situated 
between those of the ACC, although this meant that further investment in the ACC 
tramways and the main railway was necessary. 
 
The lack of an Edinburgh based manager clearly meant that overarching authority was 
vested in whoever was placed in charge at the Clifton site.  Initially an American, Mr 
Wendt, was the General Manager for the whole site with over-reaching authority – 
                                                 
521
 NAS GD282/13/155, Memorandum by the Chairman of the Arizona Copper Company January 1884. 
522
 Jackson, The Enterprising Scot: Investors in the American West after 1873, p. 166.  This was a proto-
FSC in the sense that it was a company with a remote Head Office within the US, in a similar way to a 
free-standing company. 
523
 NAS GD282/13/155, Report by J. A. Robertson, C.A., Edinburgh to the Directors of the Arizona 
Copper Company Ltd., p.6. 
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Wendt was inherited from the Longfellow Company and fell out with the Edinburgh 
board fairly quickly, being fired by early 1884.
524
  Wendt had apparently been given the 
post because of his expertise in mining - this was not popular with the Edinburgh board 
as they felt he did not have the expertise to cut costs as they would like.  Further, the 
board relied on sending non-executive representatives to Arizona to check on what was 
actually happening there as they did not succeed in establishing a relationship of trust 
with Wendt.  This seems to have been founded on the belief that because the ACC was 
not sending back quick returns Wendt must somehow have been shirking, rather than 
overseeing the profitable development of the mines.  Although it is difficult to establish 
whether or not Wendt was a hugely effective manager the board’s treatment of him does 
seem to have been especially harsh.   
 
One complaint made in early 1884 by Jamieson, by this point Chairman after the 
resignation of J. Duncan Smith, was that Wendt was sending to Edinburgh negative 
telegrams regarding the ACC’s performance,  particularly with regard to the expense of 
working the smelters.
525
  Wendt also reported that he was trying to win smelting 
business from other mine owners in the area, presumably because the smelting works 
represented massive sunk costs of around £60,000 for the company and could not be 
fully utilized at all times.
526
  Chairman Jamieson’s response to this betrayed his lack of 
expertise in this area and his possible prejudice against Wendt – he claimed that by 
doing this Wendt was implicitly suggesting that the mines were not as copper rich as 
previously claimed.  Jamieson had failed to realise that relying upon the ACC’s output 
                                                 
524
 Ibid., p. 4.  Wendt’s first name remains elusive as it is not mentioned in any of the sources which refer 
to him, although he may be the Arthur F. Wendt who, according to Hyde, visited the property in 
December 1879 on behalf of a “Firm in Baltimore to whom the Owners of the Longfellow Mines had 
applied for Advances, Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial 
Times to the 1990s, pp. 116-117.  Neither Hyde nor Jackson, the two main previous writers on the subject 
of the ACC, mention Wendt’s role as General Manager for the ACC at Clifton.  According to Hyde, 
Arthur F. Wendt was a mining engineer and metallurgist. 
525
 NAS GD282/13/155, Memorandum by the Chairman of the Arizona Copper Company January 1884. 
526
 Ibid. 
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of copper ore to utilize the smelters was a potential source of inefficiency, particularly 
as not all the ACC’s mines were constantly fully productive and that it would take even 
more capital to make them so.
527
  Jamieson also accused Wendt of extravagance, 
claiming that he was operating as an engineer rather than a manager, making expensive 
but needless alterations to the smelting machines and related machinery.
528
 
 
This naivety about the mining and more generally the copper, industry appears to have 
been characteristic of the Edinburgh board in general.  The first emissary sent to inspect 
the works in Arizona, J. A. Robertson, wrote of his disappointment at not seeing much 
evidence of copper deposits at the mines – although he recognised that he would not see 
a ‘mountain of copper’, he complained that the works Wendt showed him did not show 
much sign of containing rich ore and particularly that the ores of ‘immediate value’ had 
been stripped away.
529
  This was despite the fact that Robertson was supposedly 
encouraged by Wendt to speak to the mining captains and foremen in charge of the 
individual works about them, though perhaps he did not know what questions to ask.  
While it is not necessarily the case that these men would have the highest levels of 
expertise themselves, they probably knew more than Robertson.   
 
It is unlikely that a solicitor without any geological training would know what to look 
for in this regard – and he could scarcely be considered an authority on the subject – but 
because the board and shareholders knew Robertson they seem to have believed him as 
an expert, against the word of Mr Wendt.  This would seem to suggest that the board 
                                                 
527
 While vertical integration can reduce transaction costs and hold up problems by internalising these 
transactions, a severe disadvantage of it can be that it increases the challenge of management, particularly 
if a firm does not possess expertise in the business into which it is vertically integrating.  Therefore 
another manager with suitable expertise often has to be hired to introduce this expertise – but creating 
new moral hazard and potential hold up problems if their contract is not adjusted correctly.  See P. 
Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1992), p. 
159. 
528
 NAS GD282/13/154, Report by J. A. Robertson, C. A., Edinburgh to the Directors of the Arizona 
Copper Company Ltd., p. 4. 
529
 Ibid, p. 6. 
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generally mistook financial acumen for commercial acumen. In any event Mr Wendt 
appears to have used the funds sent to the US to try to develop the mines as far as 
possible, including expanding the internal tramway system the full seven miles to the 
most distant mining site.
530
  This he did despite suffering setbacks outside of his control, 
such as a serious mine collapse in the main Longfellow shaft not long after the change 
of ownership in 1882.
531
  This represented a major blow to the directors' hopes of 
making quick profits out of the ACC as it meant much of the engineering work in 
establishing the shaft, which had previously been the most productive of the four main 
sites, had to be redone and to a higher standard.  Worse still, this collapse had affected 
the company just as the tramway and rail connection were completed, meaning that 
these expensive assets were being under-utilized and cash flow was impaired while the 
Longfellow mine was brought back on stream.
532
  Meanwhile, productivity at the other 
three mining sites remained extremely low and it is unclear how far these were actually 
being operated – the Queen site had produced only 1,000 tonnes of ore since opening, 
while the Longfellow before the collapse had produced about 50,000 tonnes.
533
  In 
addition the ACC had paid for a total of 66 claims, many of which were presumably 
added to the prospectus to make the company look attractive to investors; although in 
reality these claims were too small to operate efficiently.
534
 
 
Once the directors had fired Wendt, they replaced him with a board of management 
made up of the lower level mining captains and railway and smelting superintendents.  
According to Robertson, this group were more competent than Wendt, although his 
                                                 
530
 NAS GD282/13/158, Arizona Copper Company Ltd., Copy Minutes and Excerpts – description of 
company properties, p. 24. 
531
 Ibid., p. 1. 
532
 Ibid., p. 1, and Report by J. A. Robertson, C. A., to the Directors, p. 2. 
533
 Copy Minutes and Excerpts, p. 1 and p. 25. 
534
 Ibid., p.1. 
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reasoning for this seemed unclear – possibly it was down to their specialism.535 By 
removing a layer of management there was the potential to reduce agency problems on 
the Clifton site itself, as the new committee members were much closer to the parts of 
the process that they were managing than Wendt had been.  However, Robertson does 
remark particularly on the skill and expertise of the smelting superintendent, a Mr 
James Colquhoun, who seems to have been the only Scotsman on site.
536
  It is 
interesting to note that after eight years of committee management Colquhoun was 
promoted to the role of General Manager in 1892, just as the ACC entered its most 
successful period in the 1890s and 1900s.
537
  It seems likely that Colquhoun was more 
trusted by the board because of his ethnic background than Wendt, although by this 
stage the company was more financially secure and had no need for a scapegoat for its 
problems.  It also suggests that the committee structure had made communication more 
difficult as there was now no single person to co-ordinate communication to and from 
Edinburgh on the Clifton side. 
 
In 1884, in addition to getting rid of Wendt, the directors took a novel approach to the 
approaching insolvency of the ACC.  Instead of winding up the company, as might have 
been expected in many smaller failed FSCs, they re-structured by registering a new 
company in Edinburgh and transferring the name and shareholding to it for equal 
value.
538
  Then a separate Edinburgh registered trust company, the Arizona Trust and 
Mortgage Company, was formed to raise new capital through ordinary and debenture 
stock, initially mortgaging £250,000 to the ACC to make the investments necessary to 
                                                 
535
 NAS GD282/13/155, Report by J. A. Robertson, C. A., Edinburgh to the Directors of the Arizona 
Copper Company Ltd., p.  4 and p. 8. 
536
 Ibid., p. 6. 
537
 Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial Times to the 1990s, p. 
130. 
538
 See the registration documents NAS BT2/1144 for the 1882-1884 company and BT2/1375 for the 
1884-1921 company.  BT2/1144 contains documents giving permission to transfer the name and 
shareholding. 
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start production on a large scale.
539
  This agreement was modified over the years but 
appears to have represented a successful use of the limited liability laws to isolate debt 
holdings in order to make the ACC profitable.  Clearly, with the ACC in deep financial 
difficulty, it would not have been attractive to any existing bank or even to a Scottish 
owned mortgage or trust company,  so the best solution open to the ACC was to 
integrate vertically into providing its own finance – something that the directors were 
experienced in.  Thus in the longer run the directors were able to make the ACC 
function as a company working in tandem with Colquhoun in Clifton, despite the firm’s 
earlier difficulties. 
 
6.4 Structure and Organisation: The California Redwood Company 
 
Contemporary with the experience of the ACC was that of the California Redwood 
Company Ltd.  This company was registered in July 1883 with a nominal capital of 
£900,000, making it the fourth largest FSC project undertaken in Scotland before 
1886.
540
  The project was extremely ambitious from the start, the aim being to purchase 
159,000 acres of Redwood forest in two separate locations north of San Francisco 
together with coastal sawmills and shipping capacity.
541
  It was believed that a huge 
export market in wood for furniture could be opened up to Europe and Australia, as well 
as via the transcontinental railroad to the Eastern United States.  The rationale behind 
this appears quite simply to have been the supposition that California Redwoods were 
the largest trees in the world and therefore ought to yield huge quantities of wood – it 
                                                 
539
 The registration file for this company is in NAS BT2/1304.  A series of memoranda between the two 
firms can be viewed in NAS GD282/13/155. 
540
 NAS BT2/1261 – the California Redwood Company. 
541
 NAS GD282/13/123 Report of Brown and Eheler, 1
st
 May 1883. 
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was hoped to harvest 100 million board feet of timber per annum for export.
542
  It was 
believed that because Redwood did not contain rosin it was more durable than wood 
such as pine which contained rosin, being less flammable and less prone to decay due to 
weathering.
543
  As with many similar schemes, the vendors, including the San Francisco 
lumber merchants Russ & Co., and the previous timber landowners Jones & Co., were 
to be paid in a mixture of deferred and ordinary shares and debentures.
544
 
 
The company’s inception in 1883 was again not initiated in Scotland - it was the result 
of a pitch by James D. Walker, a representative of the San Francisco firm of Russ & 
Co., who travelled to Britain to attempt to find capital for the scheme.
545
  Walker 
followed a similar path to many promoters of mining projects in the US and elsewhere, 
travelling first to London to attempt to find capital there – first promoting the project as 
‘The Redwood Company’.  Walker then moved on to Edinburgh where he sought out 
Sir George Warrender, who was already particularly active in the FSC promotion 
business, holding directorships of three other FSCs involved in the US, including the 
only ranching company to be involved in California, the California Pastoral and 
Agricultural Company Ltd. This company enjoyed moderate success ranching in the 
San Joaquin Valley east of San Francisco, surviving into the twentieth century.  
Warrender also provided headquarters premises - California Pastoral shared with 
California Redwood and two others at 123 George Street in Edinburgh’s New Town.546  
Some attempt was made to test the reliability of Walker’s claims about the properties in 
                                                 
542
 NAS GD282/13/123 – California Redwood Company prospectus fourth proof, 1883.  This measure is 
the standard used in the lumber industry of the US and Canada – 1 board foot is the volume of a piece of 
timber 1 foot square and one inch deep, or 1ft x 1ft x 1in. 
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Blair and Francis More, dated 4
th
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 See NAS BT2/1129 for the Directors and registered address of headquarters of the California Pastoral 
and Agricultural Company Ltd.  The other two companies were the Scottish American Land Co Limited, 
headquartered at 123 George Street from 1881 and the Scottish Pacific Coast Mining Company Limited – 
see NAS BT2/957 and BT2/1018. 
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spring 1883 – Walker hired two forestry consultants from Toronto to write a report 
about the properties involved.  These were Mr Browne, a civil engineer, and Mr Eheler, 
who was described as a ‘bushranger’.  They explored the forests on foot and on 
horseback for about four weeks and, perhaps unsurprisingly, sent back a positive report, 
despite by their own admission having previous experience only in pine.  They even 
claimed that, once deforested, the land could be used for cattle more profitably.
547
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
547
  NAS GD282/13/123 Report of Brown and Eheler, 1
st
 May 1883. 
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Figure 6.2 The California Redwood Company Structure, c. 1883-85 
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Source: This has been extrapolated from an examination of a collection of documents on this company 
held at NAS in GD282/13; of particular use were the reports and correspondence file GD282/13/123 and 
the scrapbook GD282/13/143.  NAS GD282/13 is part of a much wider collection of documents under 
NAS GD282 from the Edinburgh law firm Messrs Davidson & Syme W.S., 1468-1977.  Access to this 
collection and permission to publish the information regarding the ACC and CRC in this thesis has been 
kindly granted by their successor firm Dundas & Wilson CS LLP. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the structure that the CRC attempted to adopt almost from its 
inception.  Here the similarity with the ACC structure is clear, with no management 
function being based in Scotland. Instead, managerial control rested to a large degree 
with the San Francisco agents Russ & Co, and their onsite General Manager, David 
Evans. Evans was appointed on the strength of his thirty years, previous experience in 
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the lumber trade
548
 and based at the main sawmill and logging site at Eureka, some 200 
miles remote from the agency office in San Francisco and in an area of very recent 
settlement.  This was compounded further by the lack of any rail communication to 
Eureka or to the secondary site at Trinidad, a further 20 miles up the coast. A telephone 
line was established between Eureka and Trinidad and to the main Eureka logging 
camp, although crucially this was not connected to San Francisco where cables could be 
received from Edinburgh.
549
 The lack of rail communication meant that the company 
had to acquire a small flotilla of coastal ships to carry logs to the San Francisco Bay for 
onward distribution.  A lumber yard was purchased at the station of Tormey, on the 
Central Pacific Railroad, and also with water access on the east side of the bay for this 
purpose, although a separate sales office was also maintained in San Francisco with a 
dedicated sales director.  
 
Evans was given a potentially wide range of powers at Eureka – not only over the 
logging teams who were dispatched into the forest, but effectively over the sawmills at 
both Eureka and Trinidad,
550
 the shingle mill at Eureka, the shipping operations of the 
company, and also over the harbour and town site owned at Eureka.  In addition, there 
were two short narrow gauge railways already constructed to access the woodlands 
owned by the company, and a third line under construction.
551
  Despite their small size, 
two of these railways were registered as separate companies in California.  Further, a 
separate California Redwood Company was registered in California due to concerns that 
                                                 
548
 GD282/13/143 booklet ‘The California Redwood Company Limited: Report submitted to the 
shareholders by Messrs Blyth and Menzies on their return from California’, p. 14. 
549
 Ibid., p. 12. 
550
 The company was in fact supposed to own four sawmills, three at Eureka and one at Trinidad, 
although one of these was on an offshore island, Indian Island, in Humboldt Bay. 
551
 Of the three railways owned, the fully owned line was a short three mile route at the Trinidad site 
which extended from the harbour to the mill owned there and then into the forest.  The second was the 
Humboldt Logging Railway, which operated thirteen miles of track extending inland from Eureka.  The 
third was the part completed Bucksport and Elk River Railroad which was intended to extend thirteen 
southwards from Eureka into the forest.  All these railways were intended to be extended when necessary, 
as logging operations required.  NAS GD282/13/143 Report to the Directors of the California Redwood 
Company Ltd., by John Blair and Francis More, dated 4
th
 December 1884, p. 12 and pp. 32-3. 
 223 
an overseas based company would not be legally allowed to hold land in California, and 
this had separate board members, each with their own small shareholdings.
552
  David 
Evans, along with Charles H. King and Joseph H. Russ of Russ & Co., were registered 
as directors in Scotland but clearly could not easily attend meetings of the rest of the 
board – the travel time between Scotland and California being at least two to three 
weeks minimum. 
 
It is clear that even if the CRC had been an entirely Californian based company it would 
still have suffered from problems of management.  This can be partly inferred from the 
fact that the previous owners of part of the land, a local firm called Jones & Co., had 
wanted to sell at all in a business with such allegedly good profit potential. After the 
handover it quickly became clear that not all of the CRC’s assets were as valuable as 
they had first appeared to be. While Evans was claimed to be a competent manager, he 
was expected to manage all of these diverse parts of the firm to gain economies of scale 
in production almost from the start.  Perhaps not surprisingly, this proved more difficult 
than the Edinburgh directors were led to believe – it was calculated by George Auldjo 
Jamieson that the firm needed to harvest 30 million square feet of timber per year, but 
only about 10 million square feet was cut in 1884.
553
  Hold ups in completing the 
railway lines were partly to blame – this was an especial problem on the Humboldt 
railway, part of which had been washed away in the winter of 1882-3 and required 
rebuilding to a higher standard than Jones & Co. had previously constructed it to.
554
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Although rail transport is not usually necessary for logs as they can be floated down 
rivers, in this case it was believed that the use of rail would speed up the delivery of 
logs to the sawmills. It was thought that it would only be possible to send logs 
downstream in winter, and that the method was particularly unreliable way as they 
could become trapped.  The plant in the sawmills was also not all of a satisfactory 
standard to allow this level of production either, with at least one of the sawmills said to 
be ‘under repair’ and the remaining mills not capable of processing a high enough 
volume of logs.
555
  Additionally, one mill had to be converted into a workshop for the 
railway rolling stock and the maintenance of the equipment for the other mills. It also 
emerged that the Elk River Railroad, one of the two narrow gauge logging railways, 
was not yet completed to operational standard.
556
  The directors enjoyed a brief 
honeymoon period at the end of 1883 and into 1884 when the company showed a small 
initial profit,
557
 but financial problems started to become apparent throughout 1884 as 
expenditure on assets rose without any substantive returns, and shareholder pressure 
built up in Edinburgh. 
 
The CRC therefore had severe problems of agency even within its host operating 
environment.  These problems were accentuated by the worsening relations between 
Evans, the Californian board, and Russ & Co., on one side and the Edinburgh board and 
shareholders on the other.  Problems were already arising because the chain of 
command in California between the agency and direct employees of the CRC was 
particularly vague, with Russ & Co’s exact role except as a representative one being 
very unclear.  Communication between Russ & Co. and Edinburgh by telegram and 
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letter also appears to have been very infrequent and the Edinburgh board relied on the 
reports of their occasional emissaries for information on happenings in California.
558
   
 
The first visitors, sent in spring 1884, were Mr Edward L. I. Blyth, a civil engineer, and 
William John Menzies, Writer to the Signet, both members of the Edinburgh board.  As 
with the emissaries sent by the ACC, it is unclear that these two had much specific 
knowledge of the lumber industry – although in addition they were accompanied by a 
Mr Mitchell Thomson, an Edinburgh timber merchant, and the Reverend Andrew Paton, 
a Church of Scotland minister and ordinary shareholder.
559
  Paton’s presence on this trip 
appears to have been intended entirely to reassure ordinary shareholders that the 
company was sound, helped by his highly respected social status, and he contributed a 
very entertaining essay about his adventures on company property to the report of the 
visit that was circulated to shareholders.  Thomson was also supposed to reassure the 
shareholders with his experience as a timber merchant, although it seems unlikely that 
an Edinburgh based timber merchant would have much specialist knowledge about 
Californian Redwood trees.  Thomson also contributed a report of his visit, in which he 
mostly talks about the very high quality of the wood; but then admits that he had no 
specific knowledge as to the production costs of lumber and so could not comment on 
them.
560
  Interestingly, he commented that the combined shipping costs of $4.75 per 
thousand feet of lumber from Eureka to San Francisco seemed very high compared to 
the cost of bringing lumber to the east coast of Scotland from Sweden or Russia, and it 
is reasonable to assume that he might have some knowledge about this.
561
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Meanwhile Blyth and Menzies themselves also wrote a fairly descriptive report – they 
rode through the company forests for four days to inspect the sizes of the trees.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, they reported back that they were satisfied with the size of the trees 
and that these should produce enough lumber to make the company’s predictions of 
output possible.
562
  Even if Blyth and Menzies had the expertise to have any misgivings, 
it seems unlikely that they would have reported negatively if this would cause a run on 
the CRC’s shares back in Scotland.  The main negative comment they made was a 
rather vague statement about Jones & Co. having run down its logging capacity and 
about the fall in lumber prices in the area, though naturally it was hoped that the 
opening of the yard at Tormey would allow access to East Coast US markets and for the 
company to absorb any problems with falling lumber prices.
563
  Blyth and Menzies had 
also spent some time consulting with Mr Walker and Mr King of Russ & Co., though it 
emerged that Walker had not previously been to the Eureka site.
564
  Blyth and Menzies 
also pointed out that the secondary site at Trinidad was not being exploited much yet, 
and that more capital would be required to open it up fully.
565
  They also spent ten days 
with Evans at Eureka where they reported a positive opinion of his managerial skills, 
noting that he had started ‘the most complete system of bookkeeping’ making it 
possible to see the cost of operating each ship, logging camp and sawmill.
566
  
 
Evans was further praised for introducing ‘several changes and economies’ although the 
nature of these economies was not elaborated upon, except that he was apparently 
keeping a very tight grip on cost control, right down to the rations eaten in the logging 
camps.  Again it seems unlikely that Blyth and Menzies would necessarily be aware of 
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what would represent good practice in managing the concern, apart possibly from 
bookkeeping experience, and likely that they would have allowed Evans to impress 
them with the detail of what he had done.  The general effect of this visit on company 
policy, either in California or in Edinburgh, seems to have been relatively slight, and the 
discussion at the shareholder’s meeting convened on the deputation’s return gave the 
impression of being one held between spectators rather than direct actors.  Discussion 
was mostly very descriptive of events taking place remotely and where there was 
concern, for example, over the high level of capital expenditure in California, there was 
little talk of managerial intervention from the Edinburgh side to reduce it. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting visit came in late 1884.  John Blair, W.S., and Francis 
More, C.A.,
567
 were sent to visit California with particular terms of reference, the most 
important being to investigate the commercial capabilities of the company, but in 
addition to investigate the original formation of the company in the US.
568
  This had 
come about due to the continuing poor financial position of the company, which caused 
concerns to be raised that the vendors had not been entirely truthful in terms of the 
manufacturing capability of the original assets, and that either a new share capital 
arrangement be sought with the vendors or legal action be pursued against them.  The 
accounts were a particular cause of concern, as Mr Walker was thought to be 
withholding information about the true state of accounts in California, and concern was 
also growing over Mr Russ’ private undertakings at Eureka which were not part of the 
company.   Blair was under strict orders to ensure that Mr Evans be restricted only to 
overseeing operations at Eureka and that finance be removed from his control. The sale 
of the northern site at Trinidad was also to be considered.  Although the board had 
communicated by letter both with Mr Evans in Eureka and with the partners of Russ & 
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Co in San Francisco, it was now clear that trust had broken down.  This did not create a 
helpful atmosphere for Blair and More’s visit. 
 
On his return in December 1884, Blair’s report of his visit was not circulated to the 
shareholders.  This is perhaps not surprising, given that he exposed shortcomings with 
the original prospectus and sale contract, and the fact that the company now needed to 
call up extra capital just to survive without defaulting. Firstly it was claimed that 
Walker had received some parcels of land in his own name from Jones & Co. in 
payment for disposing of their lands. Further, Walker had been paid £15,000 for the 
successful flotation of the company by Russ & Co. – although this would not seem 
dubious as it might be expected that a professional company promoter would be paid for 
his services.
569
  On examination of the land titles, it was discovered that the company 
were in fact only joint owners of much of the 72,000 acres with others, presumably 
meaning that the other joint owners had to be compensated for their share of the sale 
value of any timber.
570
  Blair also claimed that the quality of the timber was lower than 
originally stated: the proportion of clear lumber was only 50%, not the 70% alluded to 
in the original prospectus which had been prepared using information supplied by 
Walker.   
 
Evidence of correspondence between Walker and Evans was reproduced by Blair, 
suggesting that Walker knew that expanding production to 50 million board feet of 
timber in the first year would be impossible, and that it was also realised that there 
would be no market for a large proportion of this output.
571
  Details of overspending by 
the company in California were also repeated – Blair suggested that the conversion of 
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the mill on the mainland into a machine shop had been a crucial error as it had meant a 
large expenditure in moving it to Indian Island where operations had not been restarted 
as the new mill had not been completed.  This had meant that the company was left with 
only three functioning sawmills rather than four.
572
 
 
Blair went on to report on the status of the CRC’s liabilities and assets, and was 
particularly concerned about the status of a £50,000 high-interest loan with the Nevada 
Bank which had been taken out by Russ & Co. rather than raising debentures in San 
Francisco originally intended by the promoters, in addition to around £76,500 of short 
term debt in smaller loans and overdrafts.
573
  He then went on to examine the 
company’s revenue producing potential, finding that, with timber prices having fallen 
15% since the company was established, the realisable price in the San Francisco 
market was around $20 per 1,000 feet.  This was also approximately the company’s cost 
of producing the timber and transporting it to San Francisco. In analysing the overall 
value of the assets, Blair found, as we might expect, that the company had paid too 
much for them, but that, in view of the falling price of lumber, the best course of action 
would be to hold on to the land without felling the trees in order to keep them as an 
investment.
574
  Blair had sought advice on the issue of alien company ownership in 
California and found that this was legal, except in the case of the shipping side, where 
foreign ownership of US registered vessels was not permitted.
575
   
 
Hence there were a number of issues on which the Edinburgh board had been misled, or 
perhaps had allowed itself to be misled through a lack of active management.  Although 
Blair had chased both Walker and Russ & Co. to repay various sums that he believed 
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had been dishonestly taken out of the business, his final recommendation was that the 
company be wound up rather than raise further subscriptions to attempt to repay its 
outstanding debts.
576
  Although the directors attempted to continue by privately lending 
their own money to the company, Blair’s report effectively spelled the end for the CRC. 
The company finally entered liquidation on 28
th
 April 1885, with George Auldjo 
Jamieson and Francis More appointed liquidators, and Blair as their legal advisor.
577
  
The partners of Russ & Co. then attempted to claim that Blair and More had been biased 
and had merely tried to speed up liquidation as they would benefit.
578
  Claims also 
surfaced that the interests of the private syndicate in which Jamieson, who had 
withdrawn from the board of the CRC before its incorporation, and the directors were 
alleged to have participated to buy Redwood lands illegally, conflicted with those of the 
CRC.
579
  This was alleged to be because the CRC’s land shut these lands off from sea 
access, although it would presumably be in the directors’ interests to continue to hold 
the CRC lands as such if that were the case.  In any event, it appears that the CRC 
would have collapsed despite the allegations of land grabbing by shady private 
syndicates as it was a non-viable business very weakly controlled from Scotland. 
 
6.5 Conclusion: To what extent were these two companies managed 
from Scotland? 
 
 
It is clear that the California Redwood Company and the Arizona Copper Company, 
respectively the fourth and fifth largest Scottish FSC promotions before 1885, did not 
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have histories as successful as those of the two Australasian hosted companies dealt 
with in Chapters 4 and 5.  The ACC achieved longer term survival and ultimately 
brought its shareholders the longer term reward of purchase at a premium by Phelps 
Dodge,
580
 a US based mining company. However, it came close to collapse during the 
first two years of its existence,  and thus ran the risk of becoming a Scottish parallel to 
the better known Emma Silver Mining Company collapse of the 1870s, which arguably 
represented an even worse case of speculative mismanagement.
581
  Parallel to this, the 
California Redwood Company collapsed with the loss of probably around £500,000 of 
mostly relatively small investors’ capital and leaving apparently few social benefits for 
the Humboldt Bay area.  The subsequent failure of the replacement Edinburgh and San 
Francisco Redwood Company which took over those parts of the CRC not returned to 
Russ & Co. further suggests that this business was not viable in the long term, or at least 
not suited to long term FSC ownership.
582
 
 
As companies, both the ACC and the CRC represented fairly typical examples of the 
free-standing form in the sense that they represented two different projects pursued by 
two distinct but loosely interlinked groups of capitalists in Edinburgh.  At registration at 
least, there were no interlocking directorships – this occured only when the ubiquitous 
Sir George Warrender joins the board of the re-constituted ACC in 1884, probably to 
lend that company some credibility with the wider investing public.
583
  It was not yet 
clear that the CRC was about to fail and confidence still remained in his cattle project, 
the Prairie Cattle Company. In addition, Warrender had traded off his status as a 
Baronet to promote these companies and could do so with the ACC too in order to raise 
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confidence in the trust company set up to recapitalize the ACC, the Arizona Trust and 
Mortgage Company.  Most directors of both firms could count themselves as members 
of either the legal or the accounting profession in Edinburgh and it is likely that they 
knew each other at least socially, if not professionally.  Some linkages do exist outside 
the formal board structures – Mitchell Thomson, the timber merchant sent by the CRC 
to inspect that company’s lumber reserves in California, was also a founding director of 
the ACC.
584
  This was despite the fact that it seems unlikely that a timber merchant 
would be competent to advise a mining company in any capacity.   
 
More notably, the high profile Chartered Accountant George Auldjo Jamieson, in 
addition to being a director of both the old and new ACC, served as accountant and then 
liquidator to the CRC.  Jamieson had become a fairly important figure in Scottish 
business generally by the late 1870s, partly due to his role in forming the Society of 
Accountants (of which he served as president after 1882) and partly because of his role 
in liquidating the City of Glasgow Bank.
585
  In view of Jamieson’s wider career, his 
involvement with the ACC in restoring its credibility is seen as an important stepping 
stone onwards to greater things for him, including directorships in the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and the North British and Mercantile Insurance Company.  It is unclear, 
however, how far this renaissance in the fortunes of the ACC was down to tighter 
management after 1884. Jamieson was able to ensure that the new managing committee 
structure at Clifton distributed resources well enough to ensure that the ACC was still 
around to profit from the Secrétan corner of the copper market in the late 1880s which 
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helped to ensure its profitable survival in the longer run.
586
  On the US side, a linkage 
also existed in the San Francisco finance house of Faulkner, Bell & Co., who acted as 
financial advisors to both the CRC and the ACC. 
 
 
There were also very close links between the investment trust world and these two 
FSCs.  For instance, William J. Menzies had founded the Scottish American Investment 
Company in 1873 and sat on its board along with the publisher Thomas Nelson and 
Edward L. I. Blyth, both of whom joined him on the board of the CRC.
587
 Meanwhile, J. 
Duncan Smith was also the managing director of the Scottish American Mortgage 
Company whose other directors interlocking with the ACC included William Lowson, 
Thomas J. Gordon and the chairman was John Guthrie Smith, who was also Sheriff of 
Aberdeenshire and Kincardine.
588
  Because of these interlocking directorships, it would 
be tempting to suggest that the two companies were in effect simply branches (or even 
subsidiaries) of the two trust companies, but this does not appear to have been the case.  
Instead, the trust companies remained strictly separate businesses from the Free-
Standing Companies.  Although they also invested in the US, they restricted their 
lending and stockholding to either direct mortgaging to small lenders or holding small 
proportions of US companies.   
 
In the case of the Scottish American Investment Company, this was restricted to not 
more than one tenth of a single security in order that a balanced portfolio could be held 
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to minimise risk.
589
  By extreme contrast, the ACC and the CRC represented very 
speculative investments, too speculative for the investment trusts to purchase stakes in.  
The same group of actors were able to use the limited liability system to take personal 
risks, using these FSCs as totally separate investment vehicles from either the 
investment trusts or their day to day professions.  Therefore these companies 
represented a form of speculation – and their success or failure was not very important 
within the context of a wider portfolio. This meant there was less of an incentive to 
spend as much time on these companies aside from the occasional board and 
shareholder’s meetings required to maintain their registration. 
 
This, then, would further suggest that the boards of both companies had little real 
incentive to further develop management structures based in Edinburgh, let alone find 
anyone prepared to give up enough time to operate as an Edinburgh based manager for 
these and other Edinburgh based FSCs, even operating as the manager of a suite of 
companies.  It is possible to argue that the boards of these companies represented more 
than passive investment clubs, in that a keen interest was taken in the results of these 
firms and that there was some limited interest in operating as a principal.  The role of 
the principal for both companies was implicitly limited – the principals would monitor 
activities in the US as best they could, and occasionally make recommendations relating 
to how problems could be solved.  Most importantly, underperforming agents could be 
dismissed.
590
  Beyond this point, however, the control of the principals in Edinburgh 
was very limited – not even the project of these single project companies was chosen by 
their boards, being left instead to vendors such as Frank Underwood based in the US 
who approached potential boards to pitch projects.  This was in effect a transatlantic 
system of venture capital.   
                                                 
589
 Gilbert, A History of Investment Trusts in Dundee 1873 - 1938, p. 5. 
590
 Such as in the case of the ACC dismissing its General Manager Mr. Wendt in Arizona in 1884, 
although the CRC did not fire Mr. Evans, its underperforming manager at Eureka. 
 235 
Unlike in the Australasian case, the genesis of these projects did not rest in Scotland but 
in the US – and further, the entrepreneurial impetus, if it existed at all for these firms, 
also rested in the US. There was no concept of investment decisions for these 
companies being referred to Edinburgh, meaning, for instance, that managers in the US 
were free to spend extravagantly without a budget while not especially attempting to 
raise income.  Instead, accounts were simply sent back for examination, and if any real 
concern about performance was raised it came from small shareholders who stood to 
lose more, or from the press.
591
  In addition, the US based managers were able to create 
the impression that they were better suited to make decisions because they had alleged 
expertise in mining or in the lumber industry, meaning that the Edinburgh directors who 
had no specific experience in either industry were more likely to defer to them.  Usually 
these managers were non-Scottish and working in areas where there was little Scottish 
cultural influence; the fact that the ACC performed better after a Scottish manager, 
James Colquhoun, was put in place provides further evidence that the Home Office has 
more authority in an FSC when its agents have some form of common interest with it.  
This bond would appear to outweigh even the incentive of vendor’s shares or other such 
inducements that were often offered.   
 
Further, there was no opportunity for an internal market in knowledge within the firm, 
none of the members of either board had any real expertise in either mining or forestry 
to offer, and none were willing to travel to the US to offer it.  These companies fit more 
closely with Wilkins’ original thesis of an FSC that does not engage in knowledge 
transfer between home and host country, and which relied upon intermediaries to 
provide expertise.
592
  It is not just that these companies did not transfer high level 
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technology – they did not transfer any technology at all, because these were both 
industries more specific to the US.  Scottish firms had little experience in the copper 
industry at this stage – and there is no evidence of any attempt to involve Charles 
Tennant, the Tharsis chairman, and his chemical interests in the ACC,
593
 nor did they 
have any specific experience in working with California Redwood trees.  It is not as 
though the CRC attempted to replant trees native to Scotland such as the Douglas Fir in 
place of the Redwood trees as it felled them, or as though it exported any new methods 
or machinery in forestry.  Likewise, the ACC did not export any engineering equipment 
for mining, smelting or railway building or operation; everything used for these 
purposes was US made, perhaps because any equipment imported to the US would be 
subject to tariff.
594
  The ACC did not even send its copper to Swansea in Wales, the 
centre of the British copper industry, for refining – it was instead sent to Pope, Cole & 
Co. of Baltimore, Maryland for refining.
595
  Neither did either firm carry out any 
recruitment in Scotland – the Scottish smelter James Colquhoun was already with the 
Longfellow company when the ACC took it over.   
 
The management of risk through these companies also seems unusual in that we might 
expect a separate FSC to have been established for each stage of the production process 
rather than larger vertically integrated companies.
596
 For instance, in the case of the 
California Redwood Company it is unclear why separate FSCs were not formed for the 
logging, milling, property and distribution elements of the business, and likewise why 
the Arizona Copper Company could not have had separate FSCs for the mining, 
smelting, property and distribution elements of its business.  Both Scottish and English 
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merchant houses appear to have used these kinds of structures to greater effect in India, 
for example.
597
 As mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, in New Zealand the Scots even 
attempted this with the separate New Zealand Meat Preservation Company until the 
NZALC internalised processing and distribution, although they later withdrew from 
vertical integration.  The main apparent rationale for this integration would seem to be 
that both the ACC and the CRC, if split, could have created economic relationships with 
only one supplier and customer, assuming that the ACC’s smelters did not take business 
from the Detroit Company.  Such an arrangement would be reminiscent of Williamson’s 
classic Fisher Body and GM case, in which a supplier and customer merged because the 
transaction costs of singular governance were lower than if both firms continued 
independently.
598
 
 
In the cases of the Arizona Copper Company and the California Redwood Company, 
managerial control did not successfully extend from Scotland into the US.  This 
situation existed because little real attempt was made to extend control to the US.  
Instead, these companies were more speculative ventures for Scottish capitalists - 
although it was hoped that these ventures would be successful, the board members were 
mostly passive as their main incomes came from other sources.  The main internal 
market in these firms was in capital, and in profits being returned to Scotland.  No 
specie was retained in Scotland for procurement purposes there – the entire stock was 
sent to the US for allocation.  Control of these assets rested instead with managers based 
thousands of miles away in California or in Arizona.  Although having managers closer 
to the main field of operation would appear logical, their principals in Edinburgh found 
motivating these managers more difficult and gave them little incentive to ensure the 
success of these businesses. In addition these managers were expected to suddenly start 
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organizing and operating vertically integrated businesses with no clear incentive 
structure.   
 
The Home Office was in effect a superfluous unit to these firms which simply vertically 
integrated into Scotland to find capital inputs.  The Arizona Copper Company then 
represented a case of Free-Standing Company which worked successfully in the longer 
run but only as a successful speculation – perhaps this is all that is necessary in mining 
because it eventually managed to justify the existence of its home office.  The 
California Redwood Company could not do this - its head office did not add value to its 
Californian operations which would have been better left in the hands of local capitalists 
controlling each stage of the production chain separately.  These two companies then 
offer us two good examples of situations in which the Free-Standing Company does not 
offer the optimal organisational form.  
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Chapter 7 - Livestock FSCs in the US: how far 
were the Scottish cattle companies of the 1880-
1900 period Scottish controlled? 
 
This chapter will examine the role of Scottish Free-Standing Companies within the 
cattle ranching industry of the American West in the late 19
th
 century with a specific 
focus on the Matador Land and Cattle Company and how it operated as a company, 
again with a focus on internalisation. 
 
7.1 The Western Range Cattle Industry 
 
 
This chapter will follow a slightly different outline to the previous chapters: it will in 
detail follow the career of one company, the Matador Land and Cattle Company, but 
will also include examples of practice from other Scottish owned cattle firms in this 
period.  This approach has been taken because the basic history of the Matador 
company has been relatively well laid out, particularly by Pearce, although there is 
room for improvement as Pearce often simply repeats primary sources.
599
  Additionally, 
a reasonable amount of evidence about the management practices of many of the other 
Scottish firms in this sphere is available, particularly through the memoirs of John Clay, 
a Scottish ranching consultant who was employed by many of the ranching FSCs of the 
period.
600
 Evidence from this will be used to make some comparison between the 
Matador and its less successful counterparts in terms of the degree of management from 
the Head Office that these companies enjoyed.  This chapter will also examine the 
Matador itself in more detail to place its organisational structure within the framework 
used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
The most important body of previous writing on the subject was a volume entitled When 
Grass was King: Contributions to the Western Range Cattle Industry Study, a set of 
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three essentially separate monographs relating to different elements of the range cattle 
industry published in 1956.  In the first 124 pages, Maurice Frink examines the origins 
of the industry and its rise in the hands of domestic pioneers.  At the end of the book 
Agnes Wright Spring fills 107 pages writing a biography of the American cattle 
entrepreneur John W. Iliff.   The central section of the book, much longer at 187 pages, 
is taken up by W. Turrentine Jackson, who examines British participation in the 
industry.  This allocation of space would then suggest that the British were arguably the 
most important contributors to the range cattle industry in this period.
601
  This issue will 
be examined, starting with the entrepreneurial impetus behind the Scottish investment in 
the industry and then moving into examining the role of the Head Office in such cattle 
companies as the firm matured.  Again as in previous chapters, the emphasis will be on 
whether management power was concentrated in Scottish hands or in the hands of 
agents in the USA.  Further to this will be the extent to which these Scottish owners 
attempted to add value to these cattle ranches, or whether this was again a set of purely 
speculative ventures destined to enjoy only a short life. 
 
Table 7.1 shows all 16 cattle companies registered in Scotland between 1880 and 1886.  
An unknown number of other schemes were promoted but failed to make it to the 
registration phase. 
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Table 7.1 Cattle Company promotions in Scotland 1880-86 
Company 
 
Date 
Registered 
Nominal 
Capital 
(£) 
HQ City Locations of ranch 
property 
Opera-
tional? 
Prairie Cattle Company 
Limited 
30/12/1880 200,000 Edinburgh Colorado, New 
Mexico and Texas 
Y 
Texas Land and Cattle 
Company Limited 
28/12/1881 240,000 Dundee Texas Y 
Missouri Land and Live 
Stock Company Limited 
21/03/1882 100,000 Edinburgh Missouri,  Kansas, 
Arkansas and Indian 
Territory 
Y 
California Pastoral and 
Agricultural Company Ltd. 
08/06/1882 250,000 Edinburgh California Y 
The Wyoming Cattle 
Ranche Company Limited 
28/08/1882 200,000 Edinburgh Wyoming Y 
Western American Cattle 
Company Limited 
13/09/1882 220,000 Edinburgh South Dakota, 
Wyoming, Montana 
N 
Matador Land and Cattle 
Company Limited 
04/12/1882 400,000 Dundee Texas Y 
Hansford Land and Cattle 
Company Limited 
08/12/1882 210,000 Dundee Texas Y 
Deer Trail Land and Cattle 
Company Limited 
22/01/1883 400,000 Glasgow Colorado N 
Western Ranches Limited 19/01/1883 112,000 Edinburgh South Dakota, 
Wyoming, Montana 
Y 
The Swan Land and Cattle 
Company Limited 
30/03/1883 600,000 Edinburgh Wyoming Y 
Montana Sheep and Cattle 
Company Limited 
08/07/1884 100,000 Edinburgh Montana Y 
Cresswell Ranche and Cattle 
Company Limited 
06/02/1885 320,000 Edinburgh Texas Y 
Chalk Buttes Ranch and 
Cattle Company Limited 
15/04/1885 30,000 Greenock Montana Y 
Deervale Ranche Company 
Limited 
13/07/1886 10,000 Glasgow Texas Y 
Source: These values are taken from the registration files of these companies held in the National 
Archives of Scotland. The registration file catalogue numbers are respectively: BT2/1003, 1075, 1101, 
1129, 1151, 1155, 1181, 1182, 1198, 1203, 1225, 1312, 1369, 1433, 1450, 1545. 
 
 
Of the 15, only two did not become operational, and of these one scheme, the Western 
American Cattle Company was later re-promoted as Western Ranches Limited to 
purchase the same property, the ‘VVV’ ranch in the South Dakota/Wyoming 
borderlands.
602
  It should also be noted that although more ranching FSCs were 
promoted in Scotland than in London, around five or six London concerns were 
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promoted including the Cattle Ranche and Land Company and the Powder River Cattle 
Company, both of 1882.
603
   
 
An unknown but substantial number of cattle companies were incorporated in the US as 
well, some on the East Coast, such as the Francklyn Land and Cattle Company which 
was incorporated in New Jersey in 1882 with a nominal capital of $3,000,000 (approx, 
£600,000) and which had its headquarters on Wall Street.
604
  It seems likely that many 
of these concerns, whether purchased by FSCs from Britain or by companies originating 
on the US East Coast, were in reality too small to be incorporated and had no real need 
to seek outside capital, or were otherwise not viable businesses to begin with, often 
covering territories too wide or diverse to control easily.  Inevitably, some of these 
firms were promoted for incorporation by their owners only to cash in, dumping the 
problems of future management in what was still an emerging industry into the hands of 
new managers and directors. As will be detailed further below, it took some time for 
ranch managers to develop their ranching competencies, and numerous mistakes were 
made early on, which principals back in Scotland did not have the experience to correct. 
 
The range cattle industry in the western US had gradually emerged in the late 1860s and 
in the 1870s as settlers had slowly started to move into the areas west of the Mississippi.  
Much of this area, either prairie land or the eastern foothills of the Rocky Mountains, 
had been grazed by wild buffalo which were hunted to near extinction by the first 
settlers.  This region was then thought to be ideal for rearing cattle, particularly around 
the foothills or where valleys broke the prairie, affording animals some shelter in 
addition to possessing plenty of grass.
605
  The ranching movement started in Texas and 
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to some extent in Kansas, but gradually gravitated northwards as settlement, particularly 
arable farming, started to establish itself.  New opportunities presented themselves – the 
ultimate goal of the ranchers was to sell their beef to the growing packing industry 
which was establishing itself around the stockyards of Chicago and St. Paul. At this 
stage ranchers and their stock faced long trails on foot to the nearest rail connection.
606
  
It has also been suggested that new demand was created by the emergence of mining 
operations in states such as Colorado and Montana, as well as the need to feed the 
navvies building the railroads westward.
607
   
 
In response to these new trends ranches started emerging further north, in eastern 
Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska, and cattle were moved there from Texas.  These 
states also had the advantage of a more plentiful grass supply over the summer months.  
At this time ranching was a relatively simplistic farming operation operating at quite a 
basic level – ranchers and their cowboys took advantage of the loosely defined property 
rights to range their cattle freely over wide areas.  This did not involve improving 
irrigation, growing straw or fencing in any form and thus the barriers to entry were low, 
requiring only some hired hands and horses, and the ability to construct a few simple 
cabins for accommodation and a corral for cattle ready for market.
608
 Cowboys 
established themselves as a distinct group of workers as their main job during the 
summer months was to patrol the boundaries of ranches, herding back stray cattle that 
might be claimed by neighbours (although it is unlikely that this was reciprocal where 
neighbour’s cattle had strayed into the patroller’s ranch). 
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The opportunity for the involvement of outside capital in this trade seems to have 
emerged from the convention which developed that the owner of access to water 
courses could secure the ‘range rights’ for a whole area, thus eliminating the problems 
of common grazing.
609
   This meant that corporate farmers could secure the rights to 
hundreds of thousands of acres on which large herds could be grazed freely with the 
minimum attention necessary.  This convention appears to have been first reported in 
the UK by Clare Read and Albert Pell, who were sent by the UK Government’s Royal 
Commission on Agriculture to investigate cattle rearing in the American West as 
imports of beef from the US, both on the hoof and chilled, were beginning to become a 
political issue.   
 
The live trade had emerged in the late 1860s at a stage when animal importation into the 
UK was allowed freely. Ranchers and livestock commission men in the US were eager 
to use Europe as a potential outlet for their products, as the domestic market in the US 
was not yet large enough to absorb all their production.  It should be noted, however, 
that there is little evidence as to the geographical origin of these cattle in the US, partly 
because the industry was so disorganized at this point.  The UK government had come 
under pressure from domestic farmers to limit these imports, partly due to concern at 
falling prices due to exposure to competition, and partly due to the fear of importing 
livestock disease.  The issue of livestock disease was dealt with through the introduction 
of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act of 1878 which provided that if disease was 
detected in a specific country or diseased animals detected in a shipment from a certain 
country, then restrictions could be put in place to control the movement of such animals 
into the UK.  This resulted in US imports (along with imports from many continental 
European countries) being restricted to slaughter in the port of importation from 
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1879.
610
  Ironically, this forced the importers to become more industrialized and 
arguably made them more competitive when selling their beef on the British market – 
the two ports licensed for these imports were the long established Foreign Cattle Market 
at Deptford in London and a new facility opened in Birkenhead in 1879.
611
  As these 
supplies represented consignments of at least 400 head, larger than the small 
consignments typically sent to cities by domestic farmers, the imported supplies could 
be chilled for onward distribution and the railways were able to charge lower freight 
rates for these bulk consignments.
612
 Even more controversially, consignments of 
chilled beef, which started to arrive in reasonable numbers from the US in around 1877, 
did not even require a butcher to sell to the final consumer, often being sold by other 
traders such as greengrocers.
613
 Perhaps not surprisingly, these practices began to 
provoke some interest within the meat trade – although there is not much evidence to 
suggest that interest was provoked among Scottish investors. 
 
The three Dundee based companies, the Matador, the Hansford and the Texas 
companies, also emerged in the wake of the establishment of a stock exchange there in 
1879.
614
  Dundee was not a very big city, with a population of only 142,000 in the 1881 
census, and the stock exchange would appear to have been more of a civic pride project 
than reflecting any genuine need to raise capital.
615
  Although at first the stock exchange 
merely listed local utilities such as the gas company, it facilitated the establishment of 
the Matador, Hansford and Texas companies.
616
  Shareholding in these three firms 
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remained remarkably concentrated in the Dundee area – Dundondian investors held 
42% of the Matador, and 47% of the Texas company by 1888. This local shareholding 
may have encouraged the Boards of both companies to be better principals, although the 
local nature of the shareholdings meant that such shareholders were small, and thus 
would have been required to act collectively to threaten the board.  The average stake of 
holding in the Matador was just 0.19%, while that in the Texas company was 0.26%.
617
 
 
7.2 The Matador Land and Cattle Company - Management Strategy 
and Structure 
 
 
Previous writers on the subject such as Clay and Pearce have covered the formation of  
companies such as the Matador Land and Cattle Company but do not tell us much about 
their structure and how they were actually designed as organisations.
618
  Further, these 
works do not look at how far companies internalised information, and do not 
systematically consider related topics such as recruitment and procurement.  This 
section intends to do this more clearly.  Pearce reproduces a number of primary sources 
without analysing their wider significance – to some extent this chapter will draw on the 
sources used by Pearce as well as new primary source material.   It will be clear from 
the discussion above that a cattle FSC typically comprised a Scotland based board of 
directors, who registered the company to a ‘brass plate’ address.619  The main employee 
in Scotland was usually the company secretary whose responsibility was to 
communicate with the actual management who were usually US based.  The Matador 
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was fairly typical of this pattern, with a small Head Office first at 104 Commerical 
Street, before moving to 13 Albert Square in 1885.
620
   
 
Little evidence survives as to how much these offices were actually used to transact 
company business and whether the board actually met there or would have met 
somewhere more convenient.  Both the first and second addresses were shared with 
Mackay & Mess, Alexander Mackay’s accounting practice, and any accounts being 
returned from Texas would be handled by this practice rather than clerks being 
employed specifically on behalf of the Matador at this address.
621
 For certain, this 
address did not have any facilities large enough to hold the AGM, which was held 
instead at Lamb’s Hotel in Reform Street, a venue which also held the AGMs of the 
Texas and Hansford companies.
622
  Below Head Office level, a US Head Office was in 
early 1883 established in Fort Worth, Texas, distant from the Matador ranch, which was 
approximately 260 miles to the west.
623
  Figure 7.1 shows how the company was 
structured in the early 1880s.  
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Figure 7.1 The Matador Land and Cattle Co. Structure, 1882-5 
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Source: This chart has been derived from the Matador Land and Cattle Company Annual Reports and 
Accounts for 1883, 1884, 1886 and 1887, as well as correspondence between Campbell, Somerville and 
MacKay from 1883 and 1884 taken from The South West Collection, Texas Tech University Archives, 
Lubbock, Texas, copies held by the University of Dundee Archive Services A258 6B Box 13 Folder #8. 
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The decision to locate an office in Fort Worth appears to have been taken to give access 
to the telegraph and postal networks, which were not yet well established in the Texas 
Panhandle.  A. M. Britton, the vendor who was given the title manager as part of the 
sale contract, was manager in title only, spending most of his time on new land 
development schemes that were irrelevant to the Matador.
624
  This is why he is not 
shown as part of the line of command in Figure 7.1, but is instead shown as being on a 
limb. The board seem to have tolerated this situation because Britton’s remuneration 
was only $2,000 per annum plus a 7% profit share after the shareholders received a 20% 
dividend.
625
  The board were therefore not paying Britton any substantial amount in the 
difficult early years of the company.  Instead, the chain of command continued through 
William Fife Sommerville, on paper the assistant, and then formally promoted to 
manager when Britton left after the board agreed to release him with a $7,500 payment 
in 1885.
626
  Harry H. Campbell, who was in charge of the ranch under US ownership, 
was given the title of ‘Ranche Superintendant’ under the new Scottish ownership.627 
 
The idea of the chain of command seems, however, to have been a little confused – at 
first, at least, it was unclear exactly where responsibility lay.  Mackay in Dundee wrote 
to Sommerville regularly to ask for updates on progress, and Sommerville was expected 
to get this information from Campbell and relay it to Mackay for approval.
628
  
Essentially Sommerville was expected to take the important decisions, Mackay to 
approve them and Campbell carry them out.  In this framework Mackay’s role was 
effectively a regulatory one, although it should be noted that he was very conscientious, 
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personally visiting the ranch every year, accompanied by one of the directors.
629
 
Mackay was no mere absentee despite his outside interests, and his remuneration cannot 
have been huge. The annual reports typically put non-interest home charges in a range 
of £1,000-£1,300 including salaries, office charges, stationery, travelling expenses, bank 
charges, cable charges and other miscellaneous costs, out of which Mackay had to draw 
his salary and presumably the director’s fees as well.630 Perhaps more motivating was 
his holding of 200 Matador shares at a par value of £1,200, though this represented only 
0.4% of the company.
631
    
 
Mackay also took a direct interest in the relationship between Sommerville and 
Campbell, often communicating with Campbell directly to back up Sommerville’s 
word.  Campbell had been given a lot of latitude in the way that he ran the ranch under 
Britton and so was not used to operating with superiors, and he also disliked the 
administration work asked of him by both Sommerville and Mackay.  Particularly 
annoying to him, according to Pearce, was been the board’s insistence that he seek the 
manager’s approval for all expenditures exceeding $500, although this may be 
understandable as Britton was frequently out of the office and difficult to contact, 
already a problem in a district where postal deliveries were particularly sporadic.
632
  A 
ranch post office was opened in 1886, presumably to handle not only the internal post of 
the Matador Company but also that of its employees.
633
  Misunderstandings in 
communication did not help either, as Campbell seems to have mistrusted the fact that 
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Mackay would write to Sommerville in Forth Worth as well as writing to Matador, 
presuming that this meant that Mackay did not trust him to give accurate returns.  
Campbell aired this grievance to two visiting directors in early 1884, forcing Mackay to 
apologise in his next letter, and to explain that this was necessary to give the 
shareholders a clear view of the company’s progress.634 
 
Pearce suggests that Campbell’s difficulty in adapting to the need for accountability on 
the ranch seems to have been one of the early problems faced by the Matador company, 
because it relied too much on Campbell who probably lacked many of the accounting 
and administrative skills necessary to run the ranch in the way that Mackay and 
Sommerville would have wished.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Campbell was a poor superintendent of the ranch – in fact, if the accounts for 1883, 
1884 and 1886 are to be believed, the ranch was profitable, selling 4,817 head in 1883 
and 8,587 head in 1884, culminating with sales of nearly 13,000 head by 1886.
635
  Even 
in 1887, when the previous winter was generally considered to be the worst yet 
experienced in terms of losses to the range cattle industry as a whole,14,605 head still 
found their way to market and a small profit was realised.   
 
These figures would tend to suggest that Campbell was good at his job as a rancher, 
considering that he still managed to find saleable cattle after a bad season.  Perhaps his 
superiors in Fort Worth and Dundee should either have taken more care over appointing 
a ranch superintendent (although to some extent they were restricted by the contract 
made with Britton when purchasing the ranch) or at least have provided some 
administrative support to Campbell, provision for which appeared not to have been 
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made initially.  Instead, Sommerville was left chasing Campbell for accurate accounts 
such as herd classifications and payroll listings to comply with the demands of the 
auditors.
636
  Campbell, of course, would have been used to employing people on a 
casual ad hoc basis when necessary (and this was very much the culture of the west), 
and was possibly not even accustomed to using cheques to pay wages but simply paid in 
cash.   
 
The biggest error of the Matador Company in its first ten years was undoubtedly that a 
proper herd count was not taken when the company took over the Matador ranch, nor 
was this done until as late as 1892, when Sommerville’s successor Murdo MacKenzie 
undertook a count.
637
  At the time of purchase, the prospectus claimed a total of 41,138 
cattle, and this figure was used as the initial basis for the herd size; to this was added a 
purchase of an additional herd said to be ‘exceeding 20,000 head’ from a neighbouring 
ranch sourced by Campbell with the directors’ permission.638  The 1883 annual report 
then claimed an exceptional calf crop of some 20,844 which was stated to consist of 
calves actually branded.
639
  Hence, after the 1883 season’s sale of 4,816 head, it was 
thought that 77,200 cattle remained in the herd and this number was used to continue 
the running total calculated every spring after round-up and every fall after sales.   
 
The spring round-up itself was probably not entirely reliable as, particularly before 
extensive parts of the range were fenced, it represented something of a free for all.  Its 
purpose was to attempt to ascertain how many cattle had survived the winter. The 
winters on the plains were too severe for the normal line riding work to continue, 
making it difficult to assess what the new spring calf crop was or was likely to be. This 
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was usually carried out in co-operation between all the ranches sharing a common range 
area, but unsurprisingly could be subject to free rider problems particularly with regard 
to claims over calves.  Obviously, although a cow might have been branded by one 
ranch, its calf would not yet be branded, and inevitably some unscrupulous cowboys 
might try to claim calves that belonged to others by branding them before the joint party 
was able to round them up. This was particularly the case where ‘maverick’ calves were 
concerned, these being calves that had wandered away from their mothers.
640
  Further 
difficulty in the round up was often caused when cattle frequently wandered very long 
distances to escape bad winter weather, or even slipped through gaps in any fences that 
existed.  Although the Matador did have a policy of aggressively fencing its lands we 
can assume that the entire 419,176 acres shown on the 1884 balance sheet were 
probably not all covered initially.
641
  Therefore the calf crop may not in fact have 
reflected the true productivity of the herd and could have exaggerated its size. 
 
We can assume that the number of cattle sold was more likely to be accurately reported 
as it represented revenue that was more easily accounted for. However, the company did 
not have access to a nearby rail connection (Matador itself did not get a rail connection 
until 1913, when the Motley County Railroad was opened), and for some years trail 
driving of the cattle to markets in the north was necessary.
642
  Therefore it is also 
possible that some cattle did not survive the whole trail, or escaped during the trail, as 
they were simply herded across the plains where no defined highway existed.  The core 
of the problem was that around 60% of the company’s capitalization was based on the 
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number of cattle held as the company’s core asset according to market price.643  This 
meant that the herd was valued at about twice the value of the company’s land 
throughout the 1880s.  The result of this was that when Mackenzie finally carried out a 
count of the herd in 1892 it was estimated at 97,000 head, but found in reality to be only 
70,200.  The nominal capital had to be written down from £500,000 to £400,000 and £2 
per share written off, something which proved embarrassing for a company that was 
thought to have a higher standard of governance than its peers.
644
 
 
A similar issue was that, in originally promoting the Matador, Britton had given the 
impression that the company would have access to around 1,500,000 acres of range 
rights covering the whole of Motley County, half of Cottle and Dickens counties and 
one third of Floyd County.
645
 Or rather, this was the amount of land that the prospectus 
claimed the company would have at its disposal after purchasing outright 100,000 acres 
giving access to water courses by blocking out other possible competitors for the land.  
There is no evidence that any proper surveying was done or that maps (so far as they 
existed) were used in doing this. Instead, the ranch was visited by Sommerville and 
Robert Fleming, with the assistance of a Patrick Carnegie, prior to purchase in autumn 
1882.  Carnegie’s credentials are somewhat dubious, but he seems to have been 
commissioned because he had a relatively local connection on the Scottish side – being 
from Newton, Kincardineshire, about 50 miles north-east of Dundee. He also claimed to 
have been successfully engaged in the US cattle business for nine years, and may 
therefore have been able to judge the quality of a Texan cattle range.
646
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Pearce claimed that Sommerville had previous experience in ‘the cattle business in 
northern Britain’, but it is unclear where this idea came from.  Sommerville appeared in 
the 1876 Dundee Directory as a jute merchant,
647
 and Fleming, who was a skilled 
financier but had no farming experience, would probably not have had much idea what 
they were looking for, or at, in this property.  The extent of 1.5 million acres seems to 
have been chosen simply because it was a convenient number, and one which would 
sound suitably massive to prospective shareholders. The prospectus made no mention of 
how such a large estate might be managed.  In fact, additional land was purchased right 
away to bring actual holdings up to 374,717 acres by the end of 1883, although in 1884 
Sommerville re-assessed the realistic range rights open to the company to be in the 
region of 900,000 acres.  Much of this land represented range rights – land claimed by 
the company but which still remained in the public domain - although only the company 
could access it as they held the water sources around this land. Holdings on the balance 
sheet continued to be expanded gradually, reaching 435,000 acres by the end of 1886.
648
  
The acreage claimed for range rights was never considered an asset and so never 
counted on the balance sheet, but it did represent a potential claim about the possible 
operational efficiency of the firm (to the untrained eye, at least) and seems likely to 
have put some premium on the market value of the company, even if it did not represent 
the accounting error that the mis-estimation of the herd size had created. 
 
 
As noted above, the later 1880s were a period of difficult trading conditions in the range 
cattle industry generally, particularly after the difficult winters of 1885-6 and 1886-7 
depreciated the quality of the stock and reduced the calf crop.  This began to cast doubt 
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on the viability of range ranching as a business model.  As mentioned above, in range 
ranching the cattle were allowed to wander freely with the minimum attention, and this 
meant that it was often difficult for stock to find any kind of shelter in the winters.  
When snowfall was particularly heavy, cattle were deprived of food, poor visibility 
meant cattle could easily wander long distances or fall down ravines, and in some cases 
the cold could kill them.
649
  In addition, ranches did not arrange for any winter feeding 
at first.
650
  There was certainly no question of rounding up 70,000 cattle and putting 
them in a barn over the winter, and in fact the conditions were often too bad for riders to 
go out – many ranchers paid off their cowboys entirely during the winter months.651  
Exposing the core assets of a business in this way might appear foolish at best, and a 
form of gambling at worst, but the limited previous experience of ranching in the prairie 
states meant that the understanding of extremes was quite limited.  The most 
experienced ranchers in the west at this point had been in business only around twenty 
years at the very most, and more still were incomers from further east or abroad.  
Further, no weather records for the region existed so the extremes were unknown. 
 
According to John Clay, the winters of 1884 and 1885 had also been relatively severe in 
the panhandle, causing the Matador to lose 5,000 of its calves in 1885, representing a 
fall of almost 20% from 24,136 in 1884 to 19,501 in 1885 and 21,226 in 1886.
652
 Clay 
has suggested that the company managed to work its way around such disadvantages by 
careful accounting, although because the company was not aware of the exact size of its 
herd the full scale of losses was not apparent.
653
  In reality this may have helped to keep 
the Matador in business through the difficult trading conditions of 1886-7, when 
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numerous small ranchers foreclosed and most of the other ranching companies ran into 
difficulty from which they never completely recovered, although in the annual report for 
1887 Mackay actually claimed that the winter in the panhandle had been relatively mild 
compared to conditions in the cattle regions further north.
654
  This allowed the company 
to take advantage of the fact that its cattle would have been in a better condition than 
those of its competitors to sell for a premium, despite the loss of over £1 from the head 
price of cattle – 14,605 head fetched £34,893 in 1887 (nearly £2 8s per head) compared 
to the £48,116 made by 12,947 head in 1886 (over £3 14s per head).
655
   
 
The company also fought back from this depression by largely abandoning the 
assumption that range ranching could be relied upon, and by investing increasingly in 
new fencing to create a system of paddocks where cattle could be prevented from 
wandering or being mixed in with the stock of others. This was nothing new to the 
Matador – fencing and improving water supplies had been a stated aim from the 
beginning, but the pace of these improvements quickened after the mid-1880s.  As early 
as 1884 a new fenced pasture for steers was erected to keep them separate from the 
cows, with apparent great success in creating ‘greater freedom and quietness to the 
cows’ as well as reducing the amount of competition that the male cattle, usually used 
for beef, had for grass.
656
  In 1886 this was followed with the addition of fifteen 
branding corrals, to assist with the spring round-up.   In the same year the fencing in of 
the ranch was almost completed, restricting the movement of the stock to the areas 
owned outright by the company and so saving in property rights problems such as those 
with maverick calves, and reducing the need to ride as far to round up stray cattle.    
Two new wells with windmill pumping machinery, which required no labour to operate, 
were also added and even the accommodation facilities for the cowboys were 
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improved.
657
  In the report of his autumn 1887 visit, Mackay even noted that Campbell 
was presently introducing a new way to plan the branding and selection of cattle for 
sale, so as to reduce the extent to which the cattle were disturbed, essentially so that 
they spent less time running.
658
  Through better planning of these activities, it was 
hoped that the cattle would not be moving around as much, thus remaining fatter and 
more valuable.   
 
Campbell and Sommerville seem to have been the driving forces behind a lot of these 
improvements, using their practical experience rather than relying upon orders from 
Dundee, although their actions were still subject to approval and Mackay personally 
visited to see that improvements budgeted for had actually been carried out.  As he 
stayed for four weeks, he could perhaps also get a feel for how effective the 
improvements had been.
659
  By sending the same person to Texas to do the monitoring 
each year, the directors ensured a reliability in inspection which meant that, as Mackay 
became more familiar with the ranch, Campbell would be less able to conceal problems 
than he would if someone different were sent each year.  Conversely, as Mackay came 
to trust Campbell more, then regulatory capture was possible as Mackay was likely to 
be less strict in inspecting Campbell’s work on the ranch.   In addition Sommerville and 
Campbell could actually expect that this inspection would take place, and plan 
accordingly.  In this fashion the Matador began to lay the foundations for the future 
success that lay ahead despite the difficult conditions for the industry that prevailed in 
the 1880s as a whole. 
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By 1890 some recovery was becoming apparent in terms of conditions, with grass being 
reported as abundant in the summer of that year.  William Sommerville gave notice of 
his retirement in May 1890 although he died before being able to pass the reins over to 
his successor, Murdo Mackenzie.
660
  Mackenzie was a Scot resident in Trinidad, 
Colorado, and was approached about the job by Mackay and John Robertson, the 
director who had accompanied Mackay on his autumn 1890 visit to the Matador ranch.  
Mackenzie had come to the attention of the directors through his previous post as 
financial manager for the Prairie Cattle Company in the US, before taking over as its 
manager in 1889.  In these roles Mackenzie had managed to sort out some of the 
problems caused by Underwood’s mismanagement of the company in the early 1880s, 
although trading conditions had not been good for the Prairie Company during the late 
1880s either.  Mackenzie had previous experience both as an estate factor in the north of 
Scotland and in the insurance and banking industries.
661
   
 
The Prairie Company’s survival in this period had been down to Mackenzie’s cost 
cutting and systematic management of its three ranches, with expenses having been cut 
by around $30,000 a year.
662
  After the scare of nearly losing their money in the mid 
1880s, the Prairie Company’s shareholders, who had paid more attention to the US 
affairs of the company, and had carried out an investigation into the running of the 
ranches which criticized Mackenzie’s style, and he resigned. The standard of this 
investigation was somewhat dubious as the influential Scottish ranching consultant John 
Clay, by this stage a recognised expert who had experience of the operations of many 
different ranches, refused to take part. Clay complained that the main auditor was 
someone that had been blacklisted by the Wyoming Live Stock Growers Association for 
his ineptitude.  This investigator had described Mackenzie as a ‘good, industrious and 
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successful salesman’ but said there was too much ‘red tape etc. etc.’663  This was not to 
the taste of some of the Prairie shareholders, but it impressed  Mackay and Robertson 
who hired Mackenzie for exactly that same reason. 
 
Figure 7.2 below shows the structure of the Matador Company after Mackenzie took 
office.  Under Mackenzie the company grew by reinvesting profits from operating on 
one large single ranch to operating four properties by 1912, and in the 1890s Mackenzie 
began to put in place the structure to expand in this way.  Campbell had also resigned 
following the departure of Sommerville, and was replaced by Arthur Ligertwood, an 
ally of Mackenzie’s, as Superintendent at Matador.  Controversially, and despite the 
opposition of Mackay and the directors, Mackenzie moved the US Head Office of the 
company to his own base at Trinidad, Colorado, 365 miles from the ranch (compared to 
Fort Worth, 264 miles from it).
664
  Mackenzie argued that this would be beneficial as 
the new office would be closer to the markets for summer fattening of cattle in more 
northerly states and also to the stockyards in Chicago.
665
  For sure, there was likely to 
be some agglomeration economy as the new base was closer to Cheyenne, Wyoming, at 
this point the unofficial headquarters of the range cattle industry with its cluster of 
management agents and banks specialising in agricultural loans, and representing a 
meeting place for ranchers generally.
666
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Figure 7.2 The Matador Land and Cattle Company, c. 1900 
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Source: This chart is derived from A262.3C, Box 6 Folder #2 Correspondence, MacBain, Ligertwood 
1901-03 of the Southwestern Collection, Texas Tech University – copies held by University of Dundee 
Archive Services.  This was the arrangement of the company’s ranches in 1901-03 when the company had 
two ranches, one at Matador and the other at Alamositas, in Oldham County, Texas. 
 
Apart from a difficult trading period in the early 1890s when 1893 had been a bad 
drought year, coinciding with financial difficulties in that period, the Matador’s 
financial position began to stabilise, although earnings remained tight and in that decade 
dividends were paid only in 1896, 1897 and 1898.
667
  The pattern of operation had 
become more settled within the company, with an increasingly sophisticated breeding 
programme being implemented on a fairly experimental basis, including the injection of 
the blood of big boned bulls into cattle with the objective of creating bigger boned 
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animals capable of carrying more meat.
668
  One further important internalisation 
occurred – the company commissioned its own surveyor, R. M. Kenney, to make 
accurate surveys of the land to which title was held.  This was particularly important 
after the abandonment of range ranching and with the increasing incursion of settlers 
into the area – land disputes became common, particularly as early mapping of the 
region had not been entirely accurate.  This helped the Matador to ensure that it had 
fenced its property correctly in a way that could be defended in court, and having a 
surveyor to give evidence in cases of land dispute was useful.  Much to the annoyance 
of Mackenzie, Henry H. Campbell’s first act when leaving office in 1891 had been to 
lay out a town site at Matador, two miles from the ranch, and petition for its recognition 
as the seat of Motley County, much of which the Matador ranch occupied, and having 
himself elected county judge.
669
  For the first few years, the Matador Company secured 
the election of officials who favoured its interests, but after the 1896 elections the 
settlers held control, with the result that judges were likely to side with them. Hence it 
was extremely useful for the company to have a surveyor aligned with it to give 
evidence in court whenever necessary.
670
   
 
7.3 How far were cattle firms such as the Matador Scottish? 
 
 
The experience of the Matador suggests that Scottish owned cattle companies were 
capable of long run success despite the poor fortunes of many of its competitors, 
particularly in the late 1880s and early 1890s.  The Matador endured until 1951 when, 
with interest in the potential of Texan oil reserves, shareholders almost unanimously 
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voted to sell the company to a consortium represented by Lazard Brothers of London 
for a total price of £7,450,000.
671
  The Matador was one of only two Scottish owned 
cattle companies to survive until after the First World War, and the only one to survive 
until after the Second.  Of the Matador’s competitors, the Swan Land and Cattle 
Company was the next longest surviving, being wound up in 1925,
672
 while the Prairie 
Company managed to survive until 1914.
673
 Western Ranches continued to survive but 
was re-formed as Western Ranches and Investment in 1911, remaining a Free-Standing 
Company but with a much more passive role simply as a land management company, 
selling or leasing its land to small settlers.
674
  Of the Matador’s two Dundonian 
competitors, the Texas Land and Cattle Company was wound up in 1908 after selling all 
its land,
675
 and the Hansford Company was wound up in 1912 after persistently poor 
returns.
676
   
 
Scottish ownership of the cattle industry in the American West declined, but cattle 
ranching as an industry did not decline in the western states.  Many of the independent 
ranches which were never incorporated, such as the JA ranch in the northern panhandle, 
continued to operate well into the twentieth century, and some survive even today.
677
  
Some of the US owned incorporated firms also survived for much longer, such as the 
Francklyn Land and Cattle Company, which was reorganised as the White Deer Trust 
following bankruptcy in 1886 and eventually liquidated with the intention of exploiting 
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the mineral rights in 1957.
678
  There is also no doubt that many of the ranches owned by 
Scottish companies continued as ranches after their ownership had ceased, or were 
subdivided into smaller properties. 
 
As noted in section 7.2 much of the entrepreneurial initiative for the incorporation of 
these ranches came from the US West itself rather than originating in Scotland.  In 
addition, the idea that Scottish companies were floated either because of existing 
comparative advantage in farming in Scotland or because of the interest in opportunities 
to enter the export trade back to the UK would appear to have been overplayed, 
particularly by Kerr and Jackson.  Kerr suggested that the Scots were more likely to 
invest in Texas, whether in cattle or in mortgaging because the Scots ‘felt more at home 
in pastoral country than did the English’. He provides little evidence for this claim 
except that the Scots had already invested in pastoral activity in Australia, despite the 
fact that this alone does not necessarily mean that there was a link between pastoral 
activity in Scotland and overseas investment in it.
679
   
 
On the Scottish side, it is true that few farms were incorporated companies at this stage 
so there was little opportunity for farmers to expand their businesses in the traditional 
multinational sense, although there were a number of large estates which had experience 
of operating as large livestock rearing concerns.  Certainly, the owner of one of these 
was William Smith, of Benholm Castle, Kincardineshire, one of the directors of the 
Matador who appears to have gained his seat on the board as a result of his cattle 
breeding experience.  However, apart from visiting the US on occasion with Mackay, 
Smith seems to have had relatively little input into how the Matador Company was run.   
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The Matador also did not represent any sort of use of the limited liability laws by 
farmers to set up a separate venture in the way that the Dundee jute owner operators 
appear to have done with their overseas operations – of the 531 Matador shareholders in 
1889, with the exception of Smith, only 1.74% of the company was owned by people 
who gave their occupation as farmers, representing a nominal shareholding of £5,226.
680
  
Smith himself held 2.04%, or just over £6,000 – not a huge investment either.  In the 
case of the Texas Land and Cattle Company, there might be a slightly more compelling 
case in that a group of eleven farmers, mostly from rural Brechin,
681
 owned shares with 
a nominal value of £9,700, but this still represented only 2.02% of the equity.
682
  
Further, of the people we can assume to have had most direct impact on these 
companies on the Scottish side, the directors (if only because they met to discuss it from 
time to time) apart from Smith, had very little connection with the cattle trade.  In the 
case of the Matador, apart from Smith one director was a general merchant, another a 
partner in a firm of jute spinners and weavers, one, Robert Fleming was an investment 
trust manager, and one, John Robertson, was a general merchant.
683
   
 
In the context of the live or chilled meat export trades, there is little evidence that the 
Matador and the other Scottish cattle companies intended or even attempted to export 
cattle back to Scotland, or to the UK more generally.  Intermediaries were already 
becoming organised domestically in the US in the form of the meat packing companies 
even in the late 1870s, and companies like Swift, Armour, Morris, Cudahy and 
Schwarzschild & Sulzberger were becoming increasingly organised and industrialising 
their production to attain a near national oligopoly in the US from the mid 1880s 
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onwards.
684
  By 1900 Armour, Swift and Morris had all established UK subsidiaries 
which specialised in the sale of chilled beef in the UK – there was no need for 
companies such as the Matador to use their Scottish presence to market these products, 
if indeed any Matador beef reached the UK.
685
  After 1900 the transatlantic trade in 
beef, live or chilled, slowly dwindled as the growing US population consumed the 
supplies instead, without any need to look for an outside market.
686
 The idea of ranching 
FSCs representing involvement in the US cattle trade by the Scottish cattle trade would 
appear unsubstantiated. 
 
7.4 How Scottish were the Ranching FSCs? 
 
 
Arguably more fundamental is the degree to which these companies could be considered 
Scottish as organisations – the degree to which there was a Scottish influence in them, 
and how far that mattered.  The picture here is somewhat mixed - we know that there 
was a lot of Scottish emigrant capitalism in the US West in this period, and examples of 
it abound and can easily be confused with foreign investment.  Some of these emigrants 
also came from a farming background, or had been professional farmers on aristocratic 
estates in Scotland and so brought certain skills or knowledge with them.  In this mould 
was John Clay, a consultant who would fit into the Wilkins scenario of the FSC that 
required help from an intermediary or outside contractor.  Clay was the son of a farmer 
from Berwickshire, and had started his career administering the estate of a neighbouring 
farmer.  Clay was sent to the US originally as a sub-commissioner for the 1879 Royal 
Commission on Agriculture, which was taking some interest in the US as a source of 
beef supply at this time.  After reporting for this, Clay stayed in North America, 
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working for a livestock importer in Canada for a while before being hired to inspect the 
property being considered for the Californian Pastoral and Agricultural Company.
687
   
 
From this point Clay made a career as a ranching consultant throughout the 1880s, 
1890s and 1900s for both foreign owned and US domestic enterprises.  In this role he 
was given managerial authority over the US properties of the Californian Pastoral 
Company, the Wyoming Cattle Ranch Company, Western Ranches Ltd and later was 
hired to help rescue the Swan Land and Cattle Company after it was abandoned by its 
original promoter.  Clay also built up a massive list of contacts throughout the industry 
from the level of the meat packers and stockyard owners, to the managers of the cattle 
companies and all the way down to various individual small ranchers, also helping to 
establish trade organisations to bring these disparate groups together.
688
  By working on 
different ranches and with different people, he became an expert in best practice over 
time and was able to transfer this knowledge from establishment to establishment.  Clay 
did not represent an internal force for any of the companies that he worked for – he was 
not himself sent by them, but rather adopted by them on the strength of previous 
achievements.  Arguably this was a source of weakness as well as strength, as Clay was 
not able to commit to these companies full time and spent much of his time travelling 
between different ranches.  Yet these companies required Clay’s expertise precisely 
because of their own lack of it; Clay did enjoy some success with the Californian, 
Western Ranches and Swan Companies under his management, but all of these firms 
either failed or moved out of cattle ranching before the First World War. 
 
At the Matador there is little evidence that any operational knowledge was transferred 
from Scotland, particularly as Campbell and Ligertwood, the two successive ranch 
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foremen, seem to have stuck with tried and tested techniques to run the ranch.  It is 
worth mentioning, however, that while Campbell was American, both Ligertwood and 
Mackenzie’s Trinidad office accountant, Henry H. Johnstone were Scottish, although 
they had been in the US for some time working under Mackenzie.
689
  William Fife 
Sommerville was sent directly from Dundee by the directors, although he was less 
involved with the agricultural side of the firm and more with the financial and legal side 
– and it is here that the Scots seem to have made the most impact on the Matador as a 
business.   
 
Firstly, as already discussed, Mackay and Sommerville oversaw the introduction of 
record keeping and accounting to the Matador ranch, despite the resistance of Campbell. 
Of course, this system was not introduced flawlessly – notably with regard to the failure 
to count the cattle owned by the company - but a system was introduced which helped 
the company become more effective in tracking its assets and may have helped it to 
survive the crisis years of 1887 and 1893.  This would also have improved transaction 
cost economies, particularly by establishing a consistent payroll which was on paper 
and with standardised wage levels to prevent disputes – particularly dangerous in a 
situation where most people were armed and no legal organisation yet existed.
690
  Of 
course, when Mackenzie took over in 1891 and organised a count of the stock in 1892, 
it was a simple matter to update the accounting system to reflect this.  Mackenzie was 
not sent directly by the Matador directors, having been sent out by the Prairie Company 
to be finance manager alongside the American management.
691
  He effectively 
represented a direct appointment to the Matador, in that Mackay appointed him after an 
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interview conducted in the US.
692
 However, Mackenzie did not rely on the Matador’s 
links with Scotland for any apparent knowledge transfer, although he continued to add 
value to the company’s assets and improved the Matador product by continuing to 
invest in fencing, new wells and irrigation systems, through cattle breeding and 
ultimately by expanding the company’s holdings.  The required know-how and 
resources were easily sourced in Texas from local contractors, whom the Matador used 
with great success.
693
 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
 
The Matador has been widely acknowledged as a successful and long lived example of a 
Scottish Free-Standing Company - more generally, the Scottish-owned cattle companies 
have been noted for their contribution to Scottish foreign investment.  These companies 
also had some role to play in the early settlement of the swathe of country running from 
Wyoming through Colorado to the Texas Panhandle, although as there were ranchers 
there already it is possible to argue that this would have happened anyway. Competition 
for land from settlers removed a lot of the competitive advantage of these cattle firms, 
particularly with regard to property rights, with management spending a lot of its time 
on land disputes or disputes regarding the theft of livestock from open ranges.  The 
Matador stood out among these firms for its move away from range ranching in the 
mid-1880s, long before other firms in the industry did so.  The Matador also led the way 
administratively and was unusual in appointing managers from the home country as 
well as having a regular discipline of visits from the company secretary and one of the 
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directors, though it did have the potential weakness of always having its US Head 
Office based away from its operations.  
 
Mackay’s role is interesting as it suggests what potential good practice brass plate 
capitalism could have been like. He was effectively the main manager of the company’s 
affairs in Scotland but not on a full time basis, acting as an intermediary between the 
board and the operations in the US.  Mackay was there as a regulatory device for the 
board members who, having their own concerns to operate, did not have time to oversee 
what the Matador’s agents in the US were doing.  The board members meanwhile acted 
as the public face of the company to the shareholders, who never met the real 
entrepreneurs whom they had funded, but who were presented with impressive reports 
about what the management were doing.  Mackay did not have an entrepreneurial role, 
but his function was to supervise the entrepreneurs - in the earlier period Campbell and 
Sommerville, later Ligertwood and Mackenzie - to make sure that they maintained 
transparency within the firm.  This arrangement worked well after the company 
expanded from the management of a single property into multiple properties.  The 
supervisory relationship already established between Mackay and the ranch 
superintendants kept the transaction costs of expansion low. 
 
It is possible to argue that, for the purposes of running the Matador ranch, the Scottish 
Head Office was surplus to requirements – and the same would be true of a number of 
other ranches which were offered to Scottish investors.  Indeed, John Clay notes that in 
some of the companies with which he had involvement the Head Office was a real 
burden, and that incorporation had led to extravagance as it turned simple farmers into 
managers.  This was not just a Scottish phenomenon either – when asked to help the 
London based Cattle Ranche and Land Co., which had run up a $400,000 deficit on its 
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balance sheet by 1885, Clay had to organise a whole new workforce as the previous US 
management had employed too many foremen and also had a costly Kansas City 
office.
694
  On the Rocking Chair ranch, owned by English aristocrats, the management 
were in the habit of killing the stock for their own consumption on a very regular basis – 
something which would have been much less common before cattle ceased being the 
assets of the ranchers themselves.
695
 On the Scottish side, the Swan Land and Cattle 
Company was a similar culprit in terms of extravagance – it had built a general 
headquarters, a farming headquarters, and a cattle headquarters all on separate sites; 
separate houses were built for different foremen (dormitories were the usual policy 
elsewhere) and the company paid a chef at each of its seven locations, although these 
constituted only one big property.
696
  However, the supervisory presence of the Head 
Office along with the delegation of Sommerville as a close ally to the directors in the 
Matador’s case seems to have stopped this sort of situation from developing, with most 
resources devoted to capital expenditure on improvements such as fencing and 
improving the water supply.  In this way the Dundee Head Office had some positive 
role to play, although it is hard to suggest that the original Matador Company as 
incorporated in Texas would have been any worse performing had it not sought Scottish 
owners.   
 
For the US range cattle industry as a whole, then, Scottish capital, management and 
control were probably unhelpful in the long run: many of the firms involved were not 
large enough to require large scale managerial organisation nor were they the large 
firms that the vendors made them out to be.  Further, in many cases the directors of 
these FSCs saw them only as a form of portfolio investment.  The case of the Matador 
would appear to be a little different - the Dundee directorship was still mostly remote 
                                                 
694
 Clay, My Life on the Range, p. 165. 
695
 Ibid., p. 167. 
696
 Ibid., p. 102. 
 272 
from the cattle industry but skilled enough in management terms to be able to oversee 
the US side of the company to avoid the worst abuses of this industry.  The Matador, 
then, could be considered at least partly a Scottish managed company, even if most of 
the detail of the management remained in the hands of the US personnel. 
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Chapter 8 - Comparative chapter: How did 
control vary between FSCs in different host 
nations? 
 
This chapter brings together the evidence from the four previous chapters to compare 
the practices in internalisation and management style of the five companies studied, it 
also examines the impact of the Scottish Head Office on the five companies studied. 
 
 
8.1 Introduction: why is control important? 
 
 
This chapter will bring together the issues discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 with 
regard to control in Free-Standing Companies. It will compare the practices of the five 
different Free-Standing Companies discussed in detail so far, with particular reference 
to the issue of control.  So far this thesis has explored each company with regard to its 
headquarters arrangement, decision making process, and the actual structure put into 
place in each organisation.  This chapter will compare these five companies, which 
outwardly appear very different, focusing on the fact that although they operated in 
geographically different places, their headquarters were all located relatively close 
together.  From a Wilkins perspective we might expect some similarities to occur in 
organisation between the five companies, especially with regard to the Head Office’s 
position within each company and the level of control that it has over the operations of 
the company in the field.  Knowledge spillovers in terms of administrative techniques 
between the various Free-Standing Company Head Offices might also be expected due 
to their proximity.  The chapter begins by examining why control is considered 
important in the cases of these companies. 
 
The issue of control in Free-Standing Companies is crucial principally because FSCs 
are at a natural disadvantage in terms of the principal-agent problems experienced by all 
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firms that involve more than one individual.  Classically principal-agent problems occur 
not just because an agent is believed to be shirking when in the employ of the principal, 
but as a result of the principal being unable to afford to monitor the agent closely 
enough.
697
  If it is too costly for the principal to monitor the agent, then the agent will 
have inside information about the value of its own performance, and as such will be 
able to make less effort to reach the level of output required by the principal as the 
principal will not be aware that the agent has failed to reach the level of output required.  
In a domestically based firm operating on a single site, such as the jute or linen mills 
which were prolific in eastern Scotland in this period, such monitoring costs did exist as 
these enterprises were too large for principals to be everywhere, but the costs were 
relatively low as firms could easily monitor the output of their employees.  Strict 
hierarchies could be enforced through a system of foremen, and shirking would be 
punished by a system of bookings and fines, with dismissal as the ultimate sanction. 
 
Where a Free-Standing Company differs is that the agents of the firm are not just on a 
different site, but also usually on a different continent, vastly increasing the costs of 
monitoring.  In terms of monitoring costs an FSC is not even comparable to a firm with 
its headquarters on different sites: and to its operations say, for instance, a firm such as 
William Dixon and Sons, which had its headquarters in Govan near Glasgow but owned 
mines in the Blantyre, Carfin and Lesmahagow areas of Lanarkshire, about 25 miles 
away at the most, as well as operating mines and an iron works in Govan itself.
698
  
Although a firm such as Dixon’s would have had higher monitoring costs over its 
remote establishments than over its Govan establishments, these are relatively 
                                                 
697
 H. Demsetz, Ownership, Control, and the Firm (New York: 1988), p. 123.  For instance, even in a 
small firm it may be difficult to monitor employees adequately because it may be too costly to identify 
the people responsible for shirking or otherwise abusing their positions, if this abuse is at a level where its 
costs are lower than the cost of enforcement. 
698
 A. Slaven, "Earnings and Productivity in the Scottish Coal-Mining Industry During the Nineteenth 
Century: The Dixon Enterprises," in Studies in Scottish Business History, ed. P. L. Payne (London: 1967), 
p. 217. 
 275 
insignificant when compared to the monitoring costs of a Free-Standing Company with 
its operations on a different continent. 
 
In the Dixon’s case monitoring costs would have consisted mostly of salaries for its 
officials who would be expected to manage labour and other resources to maintain 
production at the levels required by head office, set according to the need for coal for 
the ironworks and also according to the market. These officials could be given orders 
and report back to Head Office via domestic post, telegram and possibly later telephone, 
and if required to attend Head Office for any reason, or if senior management wanted to 
audit the mining properties, the train journey necessary was only about two hours in 
each direction.
699
  Additionally, banking was easy to handle as the firm’s bankers would 
have had local branches or agents able to carry out the agent’s business in the same set 
of accounts as the principal, and obviously the currency remained the same.  The 
financial costs, and the time costs, of monitoring were thus relatively low, and there was 
probably no need to employ anyone at the head office to act as a monitor.   
 
By contrast, monitoring for any of the FSCs mentioned in this thesis had much higher 
costs both financially and in terms of time commitment than for a domestic company.  
Further, these higher costs reduced the possible frequency of monitoring activity which 
may have acted as a disincentive to monitoring in some cases.  In the case of companies 
hosted in the US, monitoring from the perspective of Head Office meant 
communication by international telegram, which was much slower than domestic 
telegram as it had to travel through more nodes, or by letter which took at least a 
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week.
700
  There was no transatlantic telephone link until the mid-1920s so there was no 
question of direct voice communication.   
 
Auditing was also harder and probably required at least two months of a person’s time – 
allowing at least two weeks to travel to the location, remembering that there was not 
just a long sea journey from Glasgow but also a long land journey in the US, usually 
from New York to wherever the company properties were, and the land journey could 
take up to a week.
701
  The California Redwood Company’s properties, for instance, 
were particularly inaccessible, requiring not just a long overland train journey to San 
Francisco but also another sea journey up the coast to Eureka due to the lack of a rail 
connection there.  Despite this, the advantage of the monitor having a long travel time to 
the property was that the monitor then had an incentive to spend a longer time at the 
property – as in the case of the Matador’s secretary Mackay spending four weeks a year 
at the Matador ranch.
702
  Although there is not much evidence surviving of how FSCs 
handled bank accounts, banking would have been more complicated for companies 
hosted in the US because of the need to hold accounts with local banks. Capital could be 
sent to the US and profits sent back by wire transfer; at least in this period the existence 
of the gold standard, adopted by the US in 1871, meant that exchange rate fluctuation 
was not the problem that it would have been before 1871 or at present.
703
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In Australasia currency fluctuation was not yet an issue, as neither Australia nor New 
Zealand had a distinct currency as yet and so there was not even the cost of conversion 
to worry about.  The Australasian banking system was distinct, however, and the cost of 
monitoring activities there higher again than in the US.  Funds were transferred back 
and forth in the form of cash or as credit notes.  As previously noted in Chapter 3, 
communications with New Zealand in particular were unreliable, and letters seem to 
have been sent in duplicate via San Francisco and Brindisi in Italy to ensure that they 
arrived, also taking about two months to travel.
704
  Telegraph did not reach Australia 
until 1871, five years after the original NZALC was formed, and New Zealand even 
later.  Additionally many of the NZALC’s farms in both countries were some distance 
from a telegraph office and other communications.  Auditing was rare in the Morton 
period for the NZALC and the C&O but relatively frequent under Davidson, who 
regularly travelled backwards and forwards between Australasia and Scotland, despite 
this taking up to three months every time.
705
  The cost of this auditing was thus very 
high in terms of time, and financially in terms of paying for Davidson to travel – but his 
familiarity with Australasian conditions as an experienced insider was one of the factors 
which qualified him so well for the role.  
 
Control is clearly important because it allows a firm to develop a framework to reduce 
the costs of monitoring, and in this way can help to reduce principal-agent problems.  
Control is partly achieved by incentivising agents to create institutional cohesion; 
another element seems to be more cultural.  To investigate this, this chapter will also 
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compare how Scottish these companies actually were institutionally, particularly with 
regard to their recruitment policies, but also in terms of their interaction with local 
institutions. The chapter will use the following three core questions to examine the level 
of control exerted by principals, or the Scottish Head Office of these FSCs: 
 
1. At what level do principals control decision making? 
2. How far do principals internalise information flows? 
3. Does the principal have a positive role in the organisation? 
 
This chapter will now examine these questions in turn, contrasting the approach taken 
by each company. 
 
8.2 At what level do principals control decision making? 
 
 
The role taken by principals in decision making in any organisation is important. In his 
examination of successful domestic companies in the US, Chandler drew much 
attention to the importance of decision making and its delegation.
706
  For Chandler 
delegation was important when a company operated over more than just a single site 
and clearly this has importance too for Free-Standing Companies operating over long 
distances as well as on multiple sites.  Many of the companies studied by Chandler 
(most classically DuPont and General Motors) also developed into very large 
organisations before they adopted the M-Form structure as a solution to the problem of 
the dilution of managerial authority which can develop when a number of large firms 
are merged.  In this thesis the situations coming closest to this combination of a large 
number of individual units have been the Canterbury and Otago Association, the New 
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Zealand and Australian Land Company, and the Californian Redwood Company, and 
for all three of these companies the division of managerial authority was difficult to 
define initially.   
 
Both the C&O and the NZALC represented multiple mergers of a number of different 
‘associations’ and private holdings of land in both Australia and New Zealand.  These 
holdings varied widely in terms of their climate and suitability for agriculture as well as 
the level of development within them and the potential for such development.  As both 
colonies represented frontier territory of very recent western settlement, the staff 
inherited from the previous owners also showed a lack of experience both of large scale 
farming and of the conditions specific to both countries.  This was a particular problem 
for the NZALC which found itself with numerous properties in the cold and wet climate 
of Southland in New Zealand and in the arid inland regions of Australia.  For the C&O, 
with its four main estates concentrated in the more fertile Canterbury region, 
management was a little easier.  The shared Head Office under James Morton of the two 
companies in Glasgow also started out relatively inexperienced in FSC management.  
There were some initial problems, in particular a suboptimal allocation of resources, as 
a result of a misallocation of funds immediately following incorporation – most notably 
in the early purchase of steam ploughs by Morton for the New Zealand properties, made 
in 1866 at a cost of £4,000.
707
  The land on the vast Edendale estate in particular proved 
to be too boggy for these steam engines which simply sank into the mud, and they then 
languished in storage before being sold on to a sawmill in 1872.
708
  Local management 
was also given funds in excess of requirements.
709
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Davidson later claimed that the Invercargill agent of the company had been much too 
extravagant in this period, and reports filtered back to Glasgow of overspending, 
particularly on unauthorised land purchases, fencing, livestock, and managerial 
quarters.
710
  However, almost immediately after incorporation, the board had begun 
work on devising the hierarchy to be used in both New Zealand and Australia, with 
Morton drafting a set of rules and regulations for the conduct of business in New 
Zealand as early as December 1867, which were quickly approved and copies 
dispatched to the agents, inspectors and managers of the company in New Zealand.
711
  
This was accompanied by the appointment of a Colonial Agent (with travelling and 
office expenses paid alongside a normal salary of £2,000) intended to travel between the 
properties in a supervisory capacity.
712
 Despite this, the company fell out with its first 
colonial agent over an alleged misappropriation of funds initially, suggesting that the 
board having its own man in New Zealand was not necessarily the total solution to the 
problems.
713
   
 
Despite the early difficulties, a system gradually evolved at both the C&O and the 
NZALC whereby most major decisions about investment were referred to Head Office 
back in Scotland, along with the regular sending of reports and accounts, and this 
system was maintained after the two firms merged in 1877.  Most important were 
decisions relating to any form of land transaction, as they were at the heart of both 
companies’ asset base – but even transactions of less than an acre were relayed to 
Glasgow for board approval, with exact measurements in roods and perches and details 
                                                 
710
 NAS GD435/7 minutes of NZALC Board meetings 30
th
 December 1867, 4
th
 February 1867 and 24
th
 
February 1868,  Ibid., pp. 85 - 86. 
711
 NAS GD435/7 minutes of meetings of NZALC board 30
th
 December 1867, 31
st
 January 1868. 
712
 NAS GD435/7 minute of meeting, of NZALC board 31
st
 January 1868.  
713
 NAS GD435/7 minute of meeting, of NZALC board 4
th
 July 1869. 
 281 
on who the land had been sold to or purchased from.
714
 This continued especially when 
the company had later shifted its focus in New Zealand from agriculture to real estate.
715
  
Similarly, most capital investment projects were put before the board for consideration 
– such as the boring of wells in Australia and the construction of a dairy products 
factory in New Zealand.
716
  From the early 1880s onwards Thomas Brydone, the New 
Zealand superintendent, sent his plans for the agricultural year ahead to Glasgow to be 
approved by the board, and the board generally approved the manager’s plans regarding 
wool exports.
717
  In this period Davidson frequently made important ‘on the ground’ 
decisions during his visits to Australia and New Zealand.  This is not to say that the 
company was completely centralised around its Head Office – though the Head Office 
held plans of the actual estates, the detail of how the estates were run was left to a large 
degree in the hands of management on the ground themselves as long as they remained 
productive – although control of their remuneration packages remained in the hands of 
Head Office as an incentive.
718
 
 
On the US side the closest arrangement in terms of control over decision-making to that 
of the NZALC was that used by the Matador Land and Cattle Company.  Here Mackay 
as Company Secretary based in Dundee performed a role that may appear similar to that 
of the general manager at the NZALC or the C&O: he acted as an intermediary between 
the board and the US manager in terms of information. Mackay received 
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correspondence from the Matador’s US managers, including the agricultural and 
financial results as well as some more general correspondence about improvements and 
so forth, but did not have an active managerial role himself.
719
  His function was more 
to act as a spokesman for the directors than actually to manage – this was left to the 
manager on the US side, who could be more independent in terms of resources than the 
NZALC’s managers in Australia and New Zealand could be.   
 
A crucial difference here is that until 1902 the Matador remained a single estate 
organisation, although a relatively big one, and as such had no problems of co-
ordination between estates as did the NZALC.  At the same time, however, the entire 
capital of the Matador was invested in this single estate and herd, perhaps meaning that 
devolving management to the US side was more risky – therefore the close supervision 
of the manager and ranch superintendent by the secretary made sense.  An example of 
this supervisory arrangement would be Mackay’s early insistence to the ranch 
supervisor, Campbell, that he refer all expenditures of over $500 (just over £100) to the 
US manager for approval – not back to Scotland.720  Therefore Campbell was being 
very tightly monitored by the manager rather than the secretary – the manager was 
deciding how to allocate the resources, while the secretary was simply trying to ensure 
that the manager monitored the superintendent’s use of resources.  Mackay was very 
thorough in terms of monitoring – in reality his main time commitment to the Matador 
Company must have been his visit to the ranch every autumn, on which he was always 
accompanied by one of the directors.  It is worth noting, however, that in contrast to 
Davidson, who had started his career as a cadet labourer for the C&O and had become 
something of an expert in farming in Australasia, Mackay and his director companion 
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came from a mercantile or clerical background, and so it must have been easy to conceal 
problems from them, particularly in the earlier days of the Matador.
721
 
 
The two companies studied in which the Scottish principals reserved least decision 
making power for themselves were the California Redwood Company and the Arizona 
Copper Company.  These companies were closely related to the Scottish American 
Investment Company and the Scottish American Mortgage Company respectively. Both 
represented diversifications for their management, although not for the investment trusts 
themselves. This influenced the management style of the directors, who again relied 
upon their secretary to receive correspondence from the US, but there is no evidence 
that this secretary was expected to do much of the actual monitoring work as in the 
Matador case.
722
  Although some financial data was sent back, and some 
correspondence would have taken place (of which, unfortunately, none survives), the 
main monitoring activity carried out appears to have been in the form of visits. In the 
case of the CRC, the actual directors themselves, or emissaries appointed by them, 
visited Eureka and the company’s wider forestry properties on two separate occasions – 
but, critically, the representatives sent on the two visits were different, meaning that the 
management at Eureka could exploit the unfamiliarity of their visitors.
723
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 For notes on Davidson’s background, see his memoirs, Davidson, William Soltau Davidson, 1846 - 
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accountant and whose practice, Mackay and Mess, shared the Matador’s Dundee Head Office – see The 
Matador Land and Cattle Company Ltd. First Annual Report (Dundee, 1884), p. 2. Dundee City Library, 
Lamb Collection, Cat no 200 (35). 
722
 The secretary of The California Redwood Company was J. Campbell Penney, also a chartered 
accountant, see NAS GD282/13/143 Report by the Directors of the California Redwood Company 
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st
 December 1883, which was authored by Penney.   
723
 See NAS GD282/13/143 booklet The California Redwood Company Limited: Report submitted to the 
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Report to the Directors of the California Redwood Company Ltd., by John Blair and Francis More, dated 
4
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 December 1884, p.2. 
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The CRC’s operations remained within the control of the original promoters, and 
agents, San Francisco based Faulkner, Bell & Co, although they themselves had little 
communication with Eureka.  Similarly the ACC sent a chartered accountant to Arizona 
to interview the incumbent manager, Mr Wendt (inherited from the previous owners), 
and the mine captains about the prospects of the mines.
724
  The ACC went furthest in 
attempting to control the actions of its manager in Arizona, firing him on the grounds 
that he was not operating the mines profitably enough, even though much of the 
evidence suggests that he was actually trying to maximise profit by winning refining 
business from other mining concerns in the area.
725
  From the beginning Wendt had 
received little support from the Edinburgh directors, who simply appear to have 
assumed that he would be able to exploit all 66 mining claims purchased by the 
company straight away.
726
  Significantly, the smelting superintendent, James 
Colquhoun, was Scottish, and, after the ACC’s reconstruction in 1884 with cross 
funding by a trust company, George Auldjo Jamieson as chairman helped to strengthen 
links between the Head Office and Arizona, although effective authority over 
organisation seems to have remained at Clifton.  Later, in 1892, Colquhoun was 
appointed general manager at Clifton by Jamieson.
727
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8.3 How far do principals internalise information flows? 
 
 
Closely related to the question of how far down the structure principals were able to 
reach is that of internalisation.  According to Coase, firms internalise functions or 
information to reduce transaction costs, internalising if the marginal cost of an 
additional transaction exceeds marginal revenue or advantage.
728
 When a firm 
internalises transactions it is supposed that if a transaction occurs within the firm then 
instead of being a market transaction it becomes only an accounting transaction.
729
  
Free-Standing Companies are often unusual in terms of internalisation, particularly as 
many FSCs, such as the CRC, relied on local agency firms that were not direct 
employees of the firm to provide some management functions in host countries.  More 
generally, in the Free-Standing Company scenario the Head Office is often either 
seeking access to a certain resource or attempting to exploit a certain market, and hence 
the actual resources are brought within the firm along with control of information over 
them.  For instance, the NZALC and the C&O both took direct control over sheep 
farms, rather than simply purchasing wool from New Zealand or Australia on the open 
market.  Clearly the intended market for the products of each company had an impact on 
the structure chosen for each company and hence on the importance of information 
within them – the C&O and the NZALC were crucially different from the others looked 
at here in this respect: their focus was firmly on the woollen export market to the UK, as 
well as the meat extracts market and later the frozen meat and dairy products markets.  
At the Matador there was no apparent intention to export beef to the UK, the focus 
being on the expanding meat packing trade in the US.  Meanwhile, the CRC had some 
ambitions to export to the European market generally but also to the Australian market, 
but its directors suffered from a low awareness of the potential of any of these 
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markets.
730
  As a copper producer, the ACC could technically have had global 
ambitions, but evidence suggests that its main customers were copper merchants on the 
eastern seaboard of the US.
731
  
 
The Matador, the CRC and the ACC were therefore much more reliant on creating their 
own linkages to procure information about market conditions in their host countries 
than the C&O and the NZALC were.  Often some external agency was more important 
for doing this than an internal agency. The Matador was relatively successful in linking 
in with other players in the market, particularly in forming its partnership with John 
Clay of Western Ranches throughout the 1890s for fattening on Western Ranches’ 
range in Wyoming and South Dakota before having Clay sell the cattle at market in 
Chicago.  Later Clay continued to act as a selling agent for the Matador.    By the early 
1900s the Matador was also co-operating closely with neighbouring ranches, which 
were not seen as competitors, and information seems to have flowed between the 
Matador and its neighbours relatively freely, with Mackenzie and neighbours such as 
Fred Horsburgh of the Espuela Cattle Company frequently exchanging information as to 
the prevailing conditions and the calf crop, and frequently meeting socially as well.
732
  
As noted above, there is some evidence that the ACC had established contacts with 
chemical producers in the US, although the Edinburgh board seem to have done little to 
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encourage the original ACC to make linkages, believing instead that if production was 
maximised then sales would look after themselves.
733
   
 
The ACC had a potentially useful US contact in its promoter, Frank Underwood, but as 
with cattle Underwood’s interest was merely a financial one, and he attempted to sell 
his interest in the ACC as soon as financial problems started to arise.
734
  The CRC also 
had a lot of potential for local linkages with Faulkner Bell & Co., although they appear 
to have done little to find outlets for the lumber once it reached the company’s yard at 
Tormey on the Central Pacific Railroad, and depression in the lumber market was used 
as an excuse.
735
  The CRC might, of course have been more successful in marketing 
their timber if they had managed to produce it in quantities that were viable to export; as 
already noted, the CRC had a timber merchant on their board who might have been able 
to find the right linkages to exploit a wider market in the UK.   
 
Back at the NZALC in the 1880s and 1890s Davidson was increasingly successful in 
marketing the company’s meat imports in this way through his directorships at Nelson 
Brothers and the Colonial Consignments Company, both emerging refrigeration firms 
which froze carcasses in New Zealand before transporting them back to the UK where 
they distributed them via their own cold stores. This network was particularly useful 
after the NZALC stopped chartering its own vessels for frozen exports in 1889.
736
  
However, Nelson Brothers in turn were not as successful as some of the English South 
American hosted FSCs/multinationals which were exporting frozen or chilled meat to 
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the UK market in the same period, such as James Nelson and Sons Ltd., which owned 
over 1,000 retail outlets for its own products in the UK by 1914.
737
  It would be 
misleading to suggest that the NZALC were a market leader in the frozen meat industry, 
but they had played an important role in opening it up, and entry to this and the dairy 
industry had only been possible for the NZALC because of the structure they had 
already created to manage information about the state of the wool market. 
 
8.4 Does the principal have a positive role in the organisation? 
 
 
In her 1988 article Wilkins identified a number of FSCs of English origin which were 
hosted in the US between 1870 and 1914, and many of which moved their headquarters 
function across to the US after a few years of operation because they found that the 
English headquarters restricted their competitive advantage, often fulfilling no useful 
role for the company.
738
  The headquarters element is what differentiates a Free-
Standing Company from being a form of portfolio investment – and Scottish investors 
had, of course, already successfully owned shares in foreign companies, most notably in 
the US.  According to Michael Porter, the country that a company’s headquarters is 
located in can often lend it a specific competitive advantage if that country’s home 
market is one that lends itself to particular types of innovation in the sector that the 
company is working in.
739
  Free-Standing Companies do not have the head start of a 
home market, so for FSCs having a home advantage to export is more difficult.  Further, 
if we know how far down inside the organisation principals had effective control, then it 
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is useful to look at what this control was used to facilitate to draw conclusions about its 
usefulness in terms of company performance. 
 
The role of the Head Office in monitoring home markets for the C&O and the NZALC 
while the other companies looked at had to rely on local linkages has already been 
mentioned above. Developing this further, the Head Office might potentially have had 
an important role in recruiting personnel to send to host countries and then supporting 
them by sending resources and know-how.  In terms of recruitment, the C&O and 
NZALC were most visibly active of the companies studied here in recruiting in 
Scotland people to fill senior positions in Australasia .  Both of these companies took a 
career approach to recruitment as well – W.S. Davidson’s recruitment in Scotland by 
Morton and his apprenticeship working among the shepherds for the C&O before rising 
through the ranks of management has already been described; if the company was 
willing to do this for Davidson, it seems likely that others were taken on similar terms, 
particularly in the early days when farm labour was particularly scarce with most 
mobile young men already in Australasia distracted by gold rushes.
740
  Although a 
number of managers were inherited from the previous associations, dismissals were rare 
– this may suggest weak monitoring, but it is also the case that the NZALC gradually 
developed a pension and benefits system to keep management employees loyal for the 
long run.  Later, as the NZALC broke up its New Zealand properties, some of these 
managers bought the remains of the estates from the company and continued them on 
their own terms – back in the 1880s Davidson had already stressed that the managers 
should run the properties as if they were the proprietors.
741
  Davidson also encouraged 
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the managers to keep a diary so that it could be used as the basis of the accounting 
statements and reports to be sent back to Head Office regularly.
742
   
 
The NZALC Head Office by this point was without a doubt the most substantial of any 
of the Head Offices, taking up an entire property, owned outright in Edinburgh’s New 
Town, where it employed at least four senior clerks working under the company 
secretary.
743
  These clerks dealt with the financial and regulatory side of things, 
including applications and payments for NZALC debentures, but they also assisted in 
the collation of data about the company and produced regular accounts on a farm by 
farm basis, as well as assisting Davidson in dealing with wool dealers and other sales 
agencies in the UK.
744
  These clerks were probably also responsible for the day to day 
administration of procurement for equipment, seeds and breeding stock sent to 
Australasia. 
 
This contrasts with all of the other companies looked at in this thesis, which did not 
outright own their registered head office, or any other property in Scotland, with all the 
sunk costs for the company that that entailed. The internalisation of the NZALC Head 
Office seems to have been a measure taken by the board after Morton’s imprisonment 
following the City of Glasgow Bank failure; Morton had based the original Head Office 
and shared secretariat of the NZALC and the C&O at the office of his firm James 
Morton & Co, which collapsed along with the bank.  As well as the reputational impact, 
the newly merged company lost its use of the premises.  Although temporary 
headquarters were found in Glasgow, the fact that the directors were prepared to move 
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to Edinburgh and purchase new premises suggests that the Head Office of the NZALC 
had already started to develop in terms of its central importance for the company.
745
   
 
By contrast the Matador did not purchase its Head Office, but instead operated from the 
accounting practice of its secretary, Alexander Mackay, who probably used his clerks to 
do some of the related administration of this comparatively smaller operation.  In terms 
of turnover the Matador had £30-40,000 a year in the mid-1880s; the NZALC and the 
C&O were already turning over more than £200,000 by 1880; this is alongside the fact 
that the NZALC was a more complex operation.
746
  The other two US companies 
looked at were similarly small relative to the NZALC in turnover terms – the CRC 
turned over just over £66,000 in 1883, and exact figures were not available for the ACC 
which itself is a sign that such records were perhaps not even kept in Edinburgh; there 
was no legal obligation to file a profit and loss account or even a balance sheet.
747
  It is 
possible therefore to argue that these companies did not require such a permanent base; 
the ACC shared its head office with the Prairie Cattle Company until 1885, and the 
CRC shared its headquarters with three others.
748
  Savings could also be made here by 
the syndicates of directors in question by sharing the secretariat between companies, 
something that would not have been possible or necessary for the later NZALC. 
 
It could be argued, then, that these companies were acting rationally in that the size of 
their Head Offices were proportional to their companies simply from the accounting and 
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administration side.  The C&O and the NZALC had also shared a  
Head Office in Glasgow for this reason; the C&O was probably too small to require its 
own Head Office, and it was a similar business to the NZALC with some overlapping 
shareholders and directors, so it made sense for the management and secretarial 
functions of both companies to be contained within a single practice.
749
  By contrast the 
multi-headquartering of the Edinburgh syndicates did not have as much potential for 
synergy; although all of the businesses headquartered together were in extractive 
industries and were hosted in the same country, their activities were quite different and 
required different competences.   
 
In addition the NZALC and the C&O were different in that even when they had a 
combined Head Office, they were actually and actively being managed from their 
headquarters by Morton and Davidson.  From a procurement point of view the 
transaction costs for these managers to be based in Scotland were lower than if they had 
been based in either Australia or New Zealand.  Although the problem of distance 
would then have been reduced, the company would still have required some form of 
procurement agent in Scotland to source inputs that were not available in Australasia.  
These included the English grass seeds used to improve pastures, Lincoln rams to 
improve the quality of the company’s livestock, agricultural and pumping equipment, 
and even weasels used for pest control, and all of these inputs were important in adding 
value to the NZALC’s business activities.  Davidson technically offered the best 
compromise between a manager totally based in Scotland and one based in Australasia, 
as he travelled between the two countries frequently and was able to use his knowledge 
of Australasian conditions to choose the best input for the situation.  This differed from 
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the other companies looked at here; although the principals involved frequently visited 
the operations in the US, they did not have any procurement role. 
 
The procurement, organisational and administrative role of the C&O and the NZALC 
Head Office, then, contrasted with the Head Offices of the ACC and CRC which existed 
effectively for regulatory purposes.  Under the Companies Act 1862 and its later 
versions companies were required to file a Head Office address, but not required to 
carry on any activities there.  This minimal presence could, however, be used to 
reassure shareholders about the trustworthiness of a company – especially as a 
prestigious address in Edinburgh could be rented or shared with an accounting or legal 
practice.  This Head Office and the Edinburgh board and shareholding it represented 
could then be considered less helpful to the ACC and the CRC as firms in terms of 
creating an effective incentive structure.  The Matador’s Head Office, with its more 
active supervisory role, represented a more effective middle ground and it is difficult to 
see why other Free-Standing Companies did not follow this sort of model more often. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
 
The C&O and the NZALC before merger, and the NZALC after merger, were effective 
in developing a long term incentive based control system.  This happened despite the 
fact that the costs incurred in doing so were theoretically higher in terms of distance, but 
both companies managed to gradually devise a workable system to incentivise their 
senior managers in New Zealand and Australia in the long term.  This is not to say that 
these companies were perfect in doing this, but both managed to establish a situation 
where the cost of monitoring was sufficiently low to be worthwhile.  By comparison the 
Matador was also relatively successful in establishing such a structure although 
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monitoring was made a little more expensive initially than it might have been through 
the insistence that the company have a separate Head Office in the US from its ranch, 
creating additional monitoring costs between ranch and Head Office when the ranch 
itself was difficult to communicate with.  The NZALC had separate agency and then 
permanent offices in Dunedin and in Melbourne, and later in Sydney, but then the 
NZALC had a wider portfolio of properties and many more staff to administer.  In 
addition the base in Dunedin was a useful position for coordinating exports, Dunedin 
being New Zealand’s leading port and commercial centre in earlier years, and 
Melbourne holding a similar status in Australia.  
 
It is unclear that either Fort Worth or Trinidad were particularly well placed for the 
Matador in this regard, although Mackenzie did insist on the move to Trinidad because 
it was closer to markets.
750
  The CRC also had a separate managing agency, Faulkner, 
Bell & Co, in San Francisco, which was well placed for marketing but again suffered 
from communication difficulties with the effective headquarters at Eureka.  The CRC 
was less competent at incentivising Russ & Co to act as their agents to help in 
monitoring Evans at Eureka.  Evans was appointed because of his experience in the 
lumber trade but was largely ineffectual as a manager, spending large sums without 
much return, on projects which may not have been viable or even necessary, such as the 
construction of logging railways which were prone to being washed away.
751
  The 
Edinburgh office itself was happy to accept Evans’ expertise in this and assume that he 
was doing the right thing, instead of setting more firm and achievable performance 
targets.  Similarly the ACC management at the Clifton site was left uncoordinated by 
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the Edinburgh office; management there were again paid a salary and given 
accommodation but no guidelines on what was expected of them. 
 
The NZALC organisation was also more effective at internalising information flows, 
and this also helped with monitoring.  Monthly reports were used by the New Zealand 
superintendent Thomas Brydone to help plan production centrally in New Zealand, and 
these plans were approved by the Edinburgh Head Office,
752
 so that it had a stronger 
hand in ensuring that production was well tuned to demand, although it could not 
predict the weather conditions that would prevail during the agricultural year.  The 
NZALC could gradually forecast the possible weather conditions more accurately 
because of their record keeping, and could predict more ably when poor seasons were 
likely to occur.  In addition the NZALC used the scale of its operations to avoid the 
worst effects of bad weather, such as droughts, in the long term developing a chain of 
properties in Australia which would allow stock to be moved according to prevailing 
weather conditions.
753
  The Matador also kept records and gradually became more 
skilled in avoiding the worst effects of bad weather, although this only really became 
possible after the company started to expand its holdings from a single site.   In terms of 
accessing the wider market the Matador was forced to make linkages in the US – its 
Dundee office could not be expected to have any role in this, although perhaps could 
have chosen to do so had the company decided to export beef to the UK.   
 
Some externalisation was needed here, particularly through its deal with Western 
Ranches Ltd. in the 1890s as the Matador did not have its own sales force in Chicago, 
effectively the centre of the US meat trade as the meat packing industry became more 
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industrialised in the 1880s and 1890s.
754
 Sales were also not internalised for the 
California Redwood Company, which proved poor at gauging market demand – 
although the board did attempt to oversee the display of some of the wood at a forestry 
exhibition, they did not take responsibility for marketing the timber in the UK as they 
might have done.
755
  The ACC meanwhile remained mostly a production oriented 
organisation, without much focus on sales or finding regular customers; the Edinburgh 
head office was of little help in this, not even helping to find the ACC contacts within 
the large Scottish or wider British chemical industries.  The US managers at the CRC 
and the ACC were given little incentive to match production with demand; additionally 
the Head Offices of these companies were not as effective at monitoring the financial 
position of their agents – financial problems came as a surprise to the CRC’s Edinburgh 
board in particular. 
 
The role of the Head Office within the five companies studied in this thesis was pivotal 
in their success or failure.  The C&O and the NZALC were successful in the long run 
because their Head Office acted as the centre of the company and helped to unite what 
would otherwise have been a disparate set of different firms into two effective units by 
the mid-1880s – one side in New Zealand, the other in Australia.  This transformation 
was not instantaneous but occurred gradually when agents were given a clear career 
path with long term goals.  In addition a feeling of commonality and company culture 
evolved, particularly with Davidson visiting frequently rather than being an invisible 
principal sending down orders from unseen heights.  In New Zealand after 1879 agents 
were also given the long term incentive that they could eventually become the owners of 
the property that they were responsible for; the possibility of separation for parts of the 
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company was not considered as an incentive for the agents in the other companies 
looked at here.   
 
The Head Office of the NZALC did not just expect to receive profits but was an 
important part of the company, sourcing expertise and raw materials as well as 
providing an institutional bond, and the entrepreneurial impetus behind the NZALC 
came not from New Zealand or Australia, but from Scotland.  The Matador’s Head 
Office was not entrepreneurial but did help to encourage a sense of belonging and 
commonality within the Matador organisation; the secretary and directors visited Texas 
regularly to create this feeling of commonality,  The Matador represented something of 
a half-way house between the NZALC model of the FSC with a very active Head 
Office, and the ACC or CRC model where the Head Office was only very 
representative.  For both the ACC and the CRC, the Head Office was effectively only 
seeking rent from the firm; it represented an imposition in expecting only to collect 
profits (although after having channelled the capital) but not to actually have to 
facilitate the development of the organisation in any way.   
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
 
This thesis has confirmed that the Free-Standing type of company was commonly 
headquartered in Scotland in the late nineteenth century, and that, while the United 
States was an extremely important host economy, such activity was not confined to that 
country.  Thanks to Turrentine Jackson’s pioneering work of 1968, much of the focus of 
Scottish historians on this subject has been on those companies that invested in the US.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis noted that while the US was the most popular country for 
Scottish FSCs, it was not the only country in which the enterprising Scot aimed to gain 
returns.  In fact the US hosted only 37% of the FSCs examined here, still the most 
important host country, but leaving another 63% unaccounted for. Canada and India 
were also important fields of endeavour, although companies investing in Canada were 
distinctly less successful than those investing in the US.  Australasia, in the late 
nineteenth century considered more of a single field of activity than today, was not as 
important in terms of the absolute numbers of company formations but was certainly 
important in terms of the value of capital invested. 
 
The historiography of Scottish emigration to Australia and New Zealand, notably the 
works by Donaldson, Brooking and Richards, and Prentis in both his 1983 and 2008 
versions, has much to offer on the cultural impact of the Scots.
756
  In addition these 
accounts have investigated some of their involvement as settlers in the agricultural and 
banking sectors on both sides of the Tasman Sea, but most of this writing undervalues 
or ignores the contributions of Scottish FSCs to economic development in both 
Australia and New Zealand.  This thesis has shown that Scottish FSCs did have a role to 
                                                 
756
 T Brooking, ‘“Tam McCanny and Kitty Clydeside’ – the Scots in New Zealand,” and E Richards, 
“Australia and the Scottish Connection, 1788-1914,” in The Scots Abroad, Labour, Capital, Enterprise, 
1750-1914, ed. R. A. Cage (Beckenham: 1985), Donaldson, The Scots Overseas, Prentis, The Scots in 
Australia: A Study of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, 1788-1900, Prentis, The Scots in 
Australia. 
 299 
play in economic development in these two countries, helping to open up the interior of 
both and make their economies more viable.  That these writers have ignored the 
important role played by FSCs, with the exception of Brooking who briefly looks at the 
New Zealand and Australian Land Company, is puzzling, because as Chapters 4 and 6 
have highlighted, FSCs helped to facilitate immigration into Australasia and had a 
cultural impact in donating land for schools and Presbyterian churches.  
 
In Chapter 3 this thesis also makes another important contribution.  It is clear that the 
US, Canada, India and Australasia were all English-speaking, and so might be expected 
to interest Scottish promoters, investors and entrepreneurs, since the transaction costs of 
investing in them were lower given the common language.  Chapter 3 highlighted the 
fact that a number of Scottish FSCs were promoted to enter non-English speaking 
countries: as many as 21 in continental Europe and six in Latin America. Few of these 
companies were successful in the long run, and some were undoubtedly unique 
enterprises, but this evidence still suggests that Scottish capitalists were not deterred by 
the lack of a common language when they became aware of business opportunities in 
non-English speaking countries. Scotland’s close historical ties with the continent and 
Scotland’s continued use of Roman law may partly account for this, although those 
looking for continued evidence of ‘auld alliance’ ties with France in FSC activity will 
be disappointed, with the Scots managing to set up only one FSC in that country.  
Commercial linkages and opportunities, particularly in copper and sulphur mining in 
Italy, Portugal and Spain had more of a role to play than any cultural ties.  One such 
linkage was the chemist William Henderson’s sponsorship of the Seville Sulphur and 
Copper Company to provide supplies for his own factories.
757
  Similarly in Latin 
America the opportunities presented by countries undergoing rapid expansion of 
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settlement were equally dynamic in this period, although Scottish capitalists seem to 
have done little in Latin America before 1885 at least.  However, the interest of Scottish 
capitalists in promoting FSCs hosted in these regions goes some way to providing 
evidence that interest continued in non-English speaking countries after 1870, despite 
the long held claim that British foreign investment in general focused more on the 
Empire and the US after this date.
758
 
  
This thesis has contributed to the debate on Free-Standing Companies by highlighting 
three different types of these and noting how the degree of control from Scotland and 
the degree of internalisation varied between them.  Similarly, different levels of 
knowledge transfer have been identified, closely tied to this central issue of control.  
The thesis has argued in favour of Wilkins rather than Schmitz in clearly separating the 
investment trust-type company from the FSC in relation to enterprises that were 
intended by their promoters to operate outside Scotland.
759
   
 
 
Investment trusts represented a form of portfolio investment. They bought securities in 
companies based abroad, in the Scottish case mostly in the US, but did not intervene to 
any great extent in the internal affairs of these companies.  The investment decisions of 
these trust companies remained entirely with their head offices in Edinburgh or Dundee, 
which were their main site of operation. The main function of a trust company was to 
manage its portfolio – the companies held within the portfolio were responsible for their 
own operations.  Many of these companies were portfolio investors, though in some 
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cases they kept a network of agents in host countries, particularly in the US to monitor 
the firms in which they had invested.
760
  Free-Standing Companies are always direct 
investors in the sense that they purchase or invest in operating assets abroad, and 
incorporate these directly into their firm, although they need not be single project 
companies, as has been noted with the NZALC.  The key issue evaluated in the central 
part of this thesis has been how far these companies established control over the use of 
their resources, although there is no question that all of the Free-Standing Companies 
examined here attempted to control the use of their assets more closely than did mere 
investment trusts. In terms of control, the companies studied here fall into three main 
types: a) companies with a high degree of control from Head Office; b) companies with 
supervision from Head Office but not control; and c) companies with very little control 
or supervision from Head Office. 
 
The C&O and the NZALC were the most centrally controlled companies studied, with a 
control structure that became well established from Head Office in Edinburgh right 
down to their on the ground employees in Australia and New Zealand.  These 
companies were the most entrepreneurial in the Schumpeterian sense in that they 
actively created new combinations; the C&O and to a greater extent the NZALC were 
directly led by their Head Offices in setting up new sources of supply of wool, tallow, 
mutton and lamb, beef, dairy products and even frozen rabbits and their skins for the 
growing UK market.
761
 They also helped to settle new areas of their host countries and 
to build infrastructure there, as well as clearing unproductive scrub and bush land to 
transform it to pasture or even land suitable for arable farming. Most notably the 
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NZALC helped to transform New Zealand’s economy by organising the first shipment 
of frozen mutton and lamb carcasses from New Zealand to the UK.  Later it transferred 
dairy technology and know-how to New Zealand, including the recruitment of a dairy 
expert from Denmark who went on to work for the New Zealand government as a dairy 
advisor. These innovations were supported by a properly established institutional 
system which facilitated control; the C&O and the NZALC had a command structure of 
trusted managers almost from the beginning.   
 
The NZALC’s managers were given a reasonable degree of freedom in the way that 
they operated their individual farming properties, but were expected to report back to 
Head Office regularly and to keep within budgetary constraints. By the mid-1870s it 
was expected that all major expenditure decisions were to be referred to Head Office.  
By the mid-1880s the new General Manager of the NZALC, William Soltau Davidson, 
had organised a regular reporting system across the company, including a centralized 
agricultural plan to be set annually for New Zealand. This allowed the company to try to 
set production targets to meet market demand, although obviously this was constrained 
to some degree by droughts and other bad weather.  Davidson was assisted by a 
centralised secretariat at Head Office in Edinburgh which collated the data sent and 
supplied it to the board for their examination.  The NZALC was, then, a highly 
integrated organisation with a well developed hierarchical system yet in essence it 
remained a Free-Standing Company, with none of its operations except its Head Office 
activities being carried out in Scotland.  Wilkins argued instead that knowledge transfer 
was difficult for FSCs, and that this meant that FSCs could not be innovators.  While 
this would appear more true of those FSCs hosted in the US, it was less true of those 
hosted in Australasia, an area of more recent European settlement where it was easier 
for incoming firms to impose their entrepreneurial will onto the economy.  Further, 
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Wilkins and subsequent writers such as Geoffrey Jones were mostly interested in 
London based FSCs – in this thesis we have seen that while some Scottish FSCs did 
engage in speculative practices, they were capable of practising a form of managerial 
capitalism, and arguably became early prototypes for the multinational structures that 
followed them. 
 
As was seen in Chapter 6 the CRC and the ACC had very loose structures of control 
and it is not clear that their Head Offices in Edinburgh intended to control the 
companies centrally.  Both of these companies were the closest to the portfolio 
investment model here. The comparison in Chapter 8 between the approach of these 
companies and those of the C&O and the NZALC illustrated that Free-Standing 
Companies could fit into different operating models. Instead of actively setting up an 
operational system based around the posting of trusted personnel and regular 
communication, these companies relied to a greater degree on their agents in the host 
country than did the C&O and the NZALC.  These agents were inherited from the 
previous owners and were expected to allocate resources to maximise production 
despite their lack of incentive to do so.   
 
The ACC was of particular interest to the thesis as a metal mining FSC – and more 
specifically, the largest Scottish metal mining FSC by capitalization - given the 
generally poor record of Scottish FSCs in this area.  Within two years of its initial 
founding the ACC’s directors were forced to wind up the company and transfer the 
assets to a new company, also registered in Scotland with the same name, since the 
original company had run out of funds, most of which the Edinburgh board alleged had 
been misallocated by the agents in Arizona.  As with the CRC, this misunderstanding 
could be blamed at least as much on the Edinburgh board’s incompetence as on that of 
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their agents. Furthermore, the Edinburgh board did not have much access to expertise 
relating to the copper industry.  The same problem became clear with the CRC which 
also ran out of funds as its directors lacked expertise relating to the timber industry, 
particularly the part of it relating to the use of redwood trees. The Scottish component 
of these companies was restricted to a simple board of directors and these boards did not 
have much to offer their agents in the US. As a result the agents in the US were not 
motivated to any great extent to operate on behalf of the boards.  It was not simply that 
these companies failed to establish a managerial system that could operate across the 
Atlantic (as Wilkins speculated was a problem for many FSCs);
762
 they did not even 
attempt to do so.  Although they tried to adopt an organisational structure, it was 
assumed that all management functions could be retained in the US. The Edinburgh 
boards existed only to represent the companies to their shareholders. 
 
Chapter 7 showed that the Matador Land and Cattle Company was a halfway house 
between these two extremes, with supervision from Head Office rather than control, 
based on the fact that the Head Office lacked expertise in cattle ranching.  In this model 
responsibility for the allocation of resources remained firmly on the US side of the 
company, but US agents were made aware of their accountability to their principals for 
their productive allocation.  The entire management structure in the US was not initially 
appointed by the Dundee board, but the assistant manager and after 1885 the manager 
were appointed centrally.  In addition the Dundee board closely monitored the activities 
of the agents in the US, setting limits on capital expenditure and generally approving the 
decisions made by the US management team. The Dundee board took few executive 
decisions and the size of the Head Office was never expanded beyond sharing premises 
with the secretary, Andrew Mackay’s accounting practice. There was no purchase of a 
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dedicated headquarters building as there was with the NZALC in 1880. The Matador’s 
headquarters did not have any role in purchasing raw materials, marketing, research and 
development, nor much of a role in sourcing new personnel. All of these activities were 
delegated to agents in the US. This system was workable for the Matador because more 
of these linkages were possible in the US than were attractive or possible for the 
NZALC in either Australia or New Zealand.  In this sense the Matador was able to 
become more of a self-contained unit in its host country, and its survival until 1951 
suggests that FSCs which were relatively lightly managed from the host country did not 
necessarily fail. 
 
It has also been argued that a high level of internalisation, as with the NZALC, can help 
to make the Free-Standing model work more effectively in the longer term.  The 
NZALC moved beyond the level of a mere extractive property-based investment, 
entering refining and even manufacturing in what were at the time newly emerging, and 
technologically driven industries.  This defies the supposition that Free-Standing 
Companies were necessarily always speculative. Anyone reading the board minutes of 
the NZALC and the C&O would be left in no doubt as to the long-term strategy of the 
two companies. Although returns were expected, allowance was made for a lead time 
before the best results were procured, and it was realised that the Scottish Head Office 
had a vital role to play in supporting the operational side of the business in this.  
Similarly the Scottish board of the Matador were also prepared to take a long term 
approach with regard to the company’s affairs; although profits were squeezed to a large 
extent by 1887, there was no thought of winding the company up.  Arguably the ACC 
was also a long-term concern to some degree, particularly in terms of its investments in 
transport infrastructure, but the communication between principal and agent in that firm 
quickly veered into irritation at the lack of returns from the company’s operations.  A 
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similar situation manifested itself within the CRC, with annoyance at the lack of mass 
scale production which was inhibiting returns. 
 
At the heart of this thesis has been an issue that has not been considered to a great 
degree by the previous Free-Standing Company literature: the organisational culture 
within Free-Standing Companies.  Within this thesis this organisational culture was 
shaped by the culture of the home nation, Scotland, by the choice of host nation and 
culture there, and also by the dynamics of the industry within which these firms 
operated. The C&O and NZALC were forced to intervene in the market by setting up 
their own trading network which relied on linkages back to the home country.  This was 
necessary because the economies of Australia and New Zealand were not yet developed 
enough to support a substantial enough domestic market in agricultural produce to make 
either company’s undertakings viable. All of the three US hosted companies looked at 
were involved in areas of recent settlement, or in areas where settlement was being 
opened up, but the US domestic market was already felt sufficient to support these 
companies.  Therefore the Scottish element within the C&O and NZALC remained 
important in a way that it did not for the ACC, CRC and for the Matador, although both 
the ACC and Matador latterly relied upon Scottish emigrants in management.  The ACC 
and Matador did not, however, set out to recruit Scottish emigrants in quite as direct a 
fashion as the NZALC did, as neither company sent people directly to the US, instead 
recruiting emigrants that were already there.  The NZALC was able to take full 
advantage of its strong remaining link with the Head Office to recruit young emigrants 
into the company and then create a sense of organisational permanence that meant 
recruits would feel secure enough in the company’s employment to commit to it in the 
long term.  The NZALC was not purely speculative concern, despite its early 
association with James Morton and the City of Glasgow Bank failure; purchasing its 
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own Head Office in Edinburgh and with its dedicated management team it was far from 
a mere ‘brass plate’. 
 
The Free-Standing Company then was, and still is, a unique organisational form which 
was capable of operating in a quasi-Chandlerian fashion as well as in the more familiar 
speculative fashion.  It should be noted, however, that all five of the companies 
examined in detail in this thesis attempted to organise themselves to overcome their 
disadvantage of distance in some way, though some were more successful than others.  
Among the wider population examined in Chapter 3, some were no doubt completely 
speculative but failure in many cases resulted from the failure of the resource that a 
company hoped to exploit rather than from poor organisational structure.  All five of the 
companies looked at in detail here progressed beyond this stumbling block, but the 
California Redwood Company and the Arizona Copper Company were relatively less 
successful at creating a workable organisational structure.  Both failed to establish a 
working relationship of trust across the Atlantic with their US agents and to establish 
where control of the firm should lie. This hampered the commercial progress of both 
companies.  The Matador had difficulty, too, in establishing such a working relationship 
of trust across the Atlantic, but soon found that an arms-length supervisory approach 
could work.  The Dundee Head Office took a supervisory role while the effective nexus 
of the company’s decision making, and knowledge gathering operation rested in Texas.  
Meanwhile the C&O and the NZALC were controlled more rigidly, firstly from a 
Glasgow then an Edinburgh Head Office and progressively established a hierarchical 
system controlled from Scotland. 
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The thesis has shown that Free-Standing Companies can be more of a form of direct 
investment than portfolio investment, and has shown that management control was both 
important and desirable in companies of this type. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Scottish Free-Standing Companies registered 1862-1885 
by four digit SIC Code. 
 
SIC 
Code 
SIC Class Name Frequency 
133 Sugarcane and Sugarbeets 2 
139 Field Crops, Except Cash Grains 6 
174 Citrus Fruits 1 
179 Fruits and Tree Nuts 1 
212 Beef Cattle, except feedlots 16 
214 Sheep and Goats 3 
811 Timber Tracts 2 
1011 Iron Ores 3 
1021 Copper Ores 15 
1031 Lead and Zinc Ores 1 
1041 Gold Ores 7 
1044 Silver Ores 4 
1099 Miscellaneous Metal Ores 1 
1231 Anthracite Mining 1 
1311 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 2 
1475 Phosphate Rock 1 
1479 Chemical and Fertilizer Mineral 
Mining 
1 
2013 Other Prepared Meat Products 1 
2041 Flour and Other Grain Mill Products 1 
2299 Textile Goods 5 
2411 Logging 6 
2421 Sawmills and Planing Mills, 
General 
1 
3251 Brick and Structural Clay Tile 1 
4011 Railroads, Line Haul Operating 1 
4424 Deep Sea Domestic Trans of Freight 1 
4449 Water Transportation of Freight, nec 2 
4813 Telephone Communications 1 
4822 Telegraph and Other 
Communications 
1 
4923 Natural Gas Transmission and 
Distribution 
3 
5199 Non-durable Goods, nec 2 
6162 Mortgage Bankers and Loan 
correspondents 
1 
6321 Accident and Health Insurance 1 
6552 Land Sub-dividers and Developers 20 
8999 Services 1 
 Total 116 
See Appendix 2 for key to SIC codes. 
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Appendix 2 - Company purpose by main host countries 
 
Country SIC 2 
digit 
Frequency SIC 4 
digit  
Frequency 
US 01 1 0174 1 
 02 15 0212 14 
 08 1 0811 1 
 10 10 1011 1 
   1021 4 
   1041 5 
 20 1 2041 1 
 24 3 2411 3 
 40 1 4011 1 
 63 1 6321 1 
 65 11 6552 11 
Canada 01 1 0133 1 
 10 3 1021 3 
 12 1 1231 1 
 14 1 1475 1 
 24 2 2411 2 
 65 6 6552 6 
India 01 6 0139 5 
   0179 1 
 10 2 1041 2 
 22 5 2299 5 
 48 1 4813 1 
Spain 10 7 1021 4 
   1031 1 
   1044 1 
   1099 1 
 32 1 3251 1 
 49 1 4923 1 
Italy 10 4 1021 2 
   1044 2 
 49 1 4923 1 
New 
Zealand 
02 2 0214 2 
 20 1 2013 1 
 61 1 6162 1 
 65 1 6552 1 
Portugal 10 3 1011 1 
   1044 1 
   1099 1 
 44 1 4424 1 
Burma 13 1 1311 1 
 44 2 4449 2 
Argentina 02 1 0212 1 
 44 1 4412 1 
 48 1 4822 1 
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4 digit SIC Codes: 
0133 Sugarcane and Sugarbeets 
0139  Field Crops, Except Cash Grains, not elsewhere classified 
0174  Citrus Fruits 
0179  Fruits and Tree Nuts, not elsewhere classified 
0212  Beef Cattle, except feedlots 
0214 Sheep and Goats 
0811 Timber Tracts 
1011 Iron Ores 
1021 Copper Ores 
1031 Lead and Zinc Ores 
1041 Gold Ores 
1044 Silver Ores 
1099 Miscellaneous Metal Ores, not elsewhere classified 
1231  Anthracite Mining 
1475 Phosphate Rock 
2013 Sausages and Other Prepared Meat Products 
2041 Flour and Other Grain Mill Products 
2299 Textile Goods, not elsewhere classified 
2411 Logging 
3251 Brick and structural clay tile 
4011 Railroads, Line-Haul Operating 
4424  Deep sea domestic transport of freight 
4813  Telephone Communications 
4822 Telegraph and other communications 
4923 Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution 
6162    Mortgage Bankers and Loan Correspondents 
6321 Accident and Health Insurance 
6552 Land Sub-dividers and Developers, except cemeteries 
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Appendix 3 – FSC City of Origin 
 
 
Previous authors have done little to provide us with a clear statement of the cities of 
origin of Scottish FSCs.  Jackson looked in detail at the connections in Edinburgh and 
Dundee which surrounded the US hosted companies studied by him, but did little to 
detail their origins.  Payne, too, carried out little investigation of the geographical 
origins of his early Scottish companies, while Schmitz looks at the geographical 
distribution of private holders of foreign assets and shares in companies investing 
abroad, but not actually at the location of the headquarters of such companies.  The 
Head Office locations of the FSCs in this population are broken down here for the first 
time to give a view not just of who was investing, but of where the entrepreneurial 
energy for these ventures originated. If FSCs are to be considered merely a form of 
portfolio investment, and their headquarters perhaps merely ‘brass plates’, then their 
locations might be expected to be found liberally scattered around Scotland, in 
provincial towns such as Airdrie, Bathgate or Forfar as much as in larger cities.  Wilkins 
has already speculated that “Glasgow, Edinburgh, and possibly Dundee” were of 
importance and additionally this section intends to show the validity of this speculation.  
If, as is argued here, FSCs were not just a form of portfolio investment, then the Head 
Offices of FSCs might be expected to group together to gain access to benefits from 
clustering, such as local knowledge spill-overs in the administration and management of 
such companies.  Skills could potentially be transferred in terms of actual expertise in 
farming or mining, in financial administration or in actually managing or overseeing the 
overseas activity of FSCs. At the farthest extreme, economies of scope could be 
obtained from several companies sharing the same head office and staff – cases of this 
were discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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We might expect that the ‘Big Four’ cities, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee 
would all have been home to a variety of Free-Standing Companies albeit with a 
Glasgow/Edinburgh bias but as Table A1 shows this was not exactly the case: 
 
Table A1 FSC Headquarter Cities 1862-1885 
City Frequency % Nominal 
Capital 
(£,000s) 
% of  
Nom 
Cap 
Paid-up 
capital 
(£,000s) 
% of Paid 
Capital 
Pop. 1881 
Census 
Glasgow 64 55.2% 8967 48.5% 5954 54.0% 511,532 (a) 
Edinburgh 37 31.9% 7670 41.5% 3435 31.2%  289,358 
(a) 
Dundee 10 8.6% 1486 8.0% 1337 12.1% 142,454 (a) 
Inverness 3 2.6% 326 1.8% 275 2.5% 17,965 (b) 
Greenock 1 0.9% 30 0.2% 10 0.1% 68,897 (a) 
Banff 1 0.9% 10 0.1% 7 0.1% 5,841 (b) 
Aberdeen 0 0 0 0 0 0 105,054 (a) 
Total 116 100.0% 18489.9 100.0% 11021 100.0%  
(a) Population of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Greenock and Aberdeen taken from 1881 census – 
Preliminary Report, Scotland 1881, p. 16, Table X – Population of the eight principal towns in Scotland 
in 1871 and 1881, together with the Number of Houses, Families, and Rooms with Windows in 1881. 
(Including Shipping).  Population for Edinburgh includes Leith, technically a separate burgh until 1920, 
which had three companies based within it. 
(b) Population of Inverness and Banff taken from 1881 census – Preliminary Report, Scotland 1881, p. 
15, Table VII – Population &c. of Parliamentary Burghs in 1881 (excluding shipping).  These populations 
refer to those falling strictly within Parliamentary Burgh boundaries rather than the urban area as a whole, 
but these towns are relatively small and thus unlikely to have much population outside the parliamentary 
boundaries. 
 
 
Table A1 shows that Glasgow was indeed the most important city in this period with 
more than half of all FSC promotions in this period.  This might be expected given the 
relative importance according to Michie of Glasgow’s stock exchange in this period in 
addition to its importance as a trading centre,
763
 although not all FSCs based there were 
large flotations.  Almost a third originated in Edinburgh, and Dundee’s role could be 
considered subsidiary at best, with only ten companies registering. If population is a 
determinant of possible activity then it is not surprising that Glasgow was the dominant 
centre. The population of Glasgow at over 500,000 was almost double that of 
Edinburgh, nearly quintuple that of Dundee and 100 times that of Banff.   However, no 
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FSCs at all were registered in Aberdeen, and its earlier involvement with investment 
companies from the 1830s onwards.  The fact that Aberdeen was not home to any Free-
Standing Companies is a significant new finding of this thesis.  Other sizable towns 
which were not home to FSCs included Paisley (population in 1881 55,642) and Perth 
(population in 1881 29,755).
764
 
 
There were some unusual outliers: including three companies registered in Inverness, a 
single FSC based in Banff and a single FSC headquartered in Greenock although only 
two of these outliers, a coffee company operating in India and a cattle company 
operating in Mexico were successful for any length of time.  The cumulative nominal 
and paid-up capitalisations of all companies except for re-registrations have been 
included to give a sense of the values invested, although these don’t reveal a vastly 
different picture in terms of proportions from the absolute frequency of new 
promotions. The main difference is that Edinburgh companies were responsible for 
registering proportionately more nominal capital but did not take advantage of it.   
 
Although some variation between sectors appears in Table A2 below, some consistency 
emerges in agriculture which commanded similar percentages of the nominal capital 
raised in both Glasgow and Edinburgh, although Edinburgh promoters were responsible 
for fewer companies.  FSC based investment in livestock based agriculture (SIC code 
02) is usually assumed to be mostly something that capitalists in Edinburgh and Dundee 
were involved in.  It is true that livestock represented a large percentage of investment 
in Edinburgh, but in fact Glasgow turned a larger proportion of its nominal capital 
issued in this period over to livestock based agriculture than did Edinburgh.  However 
this investment in livestock was made earlier and hosted in Australia and New Zealand 
rather than the US, and concentrated in the hands of fewer companies, including the 
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Canterbury and Otago Association and the New Zealand and Australian Land 
Company, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  What should be noted here 
is that the west coast’s commercial classes did have an appetite for pastoral investment, 
just as those on the east coast did, something not covered by Jackson as a result of his 
concentration on Scottish investment in the US. 
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Table A2 Two Digit SIC Code by Headquarters City, 1862-1885 
 
 Glasgow Edinburgh Dundee 
SIC 
Code 
Freq Nom 
Cap 
(£'000s) 
% of 
City 
Nom 
Cap 
Freq Nom 
Cap 
(£'000s) 
% of 
City 
Nom 
Cap 
Freq Nom 
Cap 
(£'000s) 
% of 
City 
Nom 
Cap 
01 5 770 8.6% 3 97 1.4%    
02 6 2930 32.7% 9 2102 30.0% 3 850 57.2% 
08 2 45 0.5%       
10 25 4039 45.0% 5 1892 16.1% 1 6 0.4% 
12 1 100 1.1%       
13 2 25 0.3%       
14 1 25 0.3%       
20 1 200 2.2% 1 100 1.4%    
22 3 550 6.1%    2 116 7.8% 
24    6 1998 28.5% 1 4.4 0.3% 
32 1 7.5 0.1%       
40       1 160 10.8% 
44 4 1170 13.0%       
48 1 40 0.4% 1 301 4.3%    
49 2 65 0.7% 1 100 1.4%    
51 2 270 3.0%       
61    1 60 0.9%    
63 1 500 5.6%       
65 8 1880 21.0% 10 1020 14.6% 2 350 23.5% 
 
SIC Codes: 
01 Agricultural Production – Crops 
02 Agricultural Production – Livestock 
08 Forestry 
10 Metal Mining 
12 Coal Mining 
13 Crude Oil & Natural Gas 
14 Mining and Quarrying of Non-metallic Minerals (Non-Fuels) 
20 Food and Kindred Products 
22 Textile Mill Products 
24 Lumber and Wood Products (Non-furniture) 
32 Building Trade Products 
40 Rail Transportation 
44 Water Transportation 
48 Communications 
49 Utilities 
51 Wholesalers 
61 Credit Institutions 
63 Insurance 
65 Real Estate 
 
Glasgow capitalists, on the other hand, were more interested than their Edinburgh 
counterparts in SIC category 01 (Agricultural Production – Crops), and most notably in 
metal mining.  Some twenty nine mining companies were formed in Glasgow in this 
period across the four SIC categories that include mining – these being metal, coal, oil 
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and gas, and non-metallic minerals.  This suggests that Glasgow, and its Stock 
Exchange, were already specialising to some degree in foreign mining issues, even 
some years before the gold rush of the 1890s when according to Michie a separate 
trading room was set up for mining and other volatile stocks.
765
  This was partly related 
to the excitement around the success of Charles Tennant’s Tharsis Company in the 
Spanish province of Huelva which is not included here as it integrated downstream  
from 1868 into Scotland (and the rest of the UK), purchasing metal extracting 
companies and establishing its own factory in Glasgow in 1871.
766
  A similar company 
which is included as it had no industrial capacity of its own in Scotland was the Seville 
Sulphur and Copper Company Ltd, registered in Glasgow in 1873.
767
  The main driver 
behind this pyrites company was William Henderson who sought an independent source 
of copper and sulphur for his metal extraction factory in Irvine, Ayrshire.  Seville 
Sulphur and Copper appears effectively to have been a private company never intended 
for stock market flotation – Henderson himself effectively financed the company, 
purchasing 39,994 shares out of a total of 50,000, representing an investment of 
£199,970.
768
  The Seville Sulphur and Copper Company is an example of a mining 
Free-Standing Company which runs contrary to the more typical ‘football pools’ image 
of mining FSCs as a form of gambling based around stock market flotations. Essentially 
this represented a form of vertical integration for Henderson but one which took 
advantage of the Limited Liability laws to ring fence it from his domestic business. 
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 Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in 
Nineteenth - Century Scotland. p. 205 
766
 Checkland, The Mines of Tharsis: Roman, French and British Expertise in Spain, p. 111. 
767
 NAS BT2/507, Seville Sulphur and Copper Company Limited, registration file. 
768
 Ibid.  When Henderson re-registered the company in 1877, the winding up meeting for the original 
company was held at Henderson’s factory in Irvine rather than at the Glasgow Head Office.  The 
Glasgow Head Office was clearly little more than a brass nameplate, probably held by Henderson’s 
solicitors or with a specialist agent; either way the registered address was moved three times between 
1874 and 1886. 
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The two Dundee based FSCs in the textile industry were further examples of FSC 
formation as vertical integration. The jute milling Cox family first set up the 
Camperdown Pressing Company (Limited) in 1868 to operate jute packing machinery at 
the docks in Calcutta, presumably to increase the amount of raw jute that could be 
carried on board ships back to Dundee.
769
  This company was dominated by family 
members with as many as six persons of that surname on the board.  Camperdown 
Pressing did not remain a purely upstream operation - by the mid-1870s the Coxes 
wound up this initial company and registered a new company, the Camperdown Trading 
and Pressing Company Limited with rights to cultivate, and (crucially for the future of 
that industry) manufacture in India.
770
  Incidentally, Lenman notes that the Cox family’s 
core business in Dundee did not become a limited company until after 1900, although 
he downplays their role in India.
771
 
 
Other patterns emerge which have less relation to vertical integration.  More has been 
said in Chapter 7 regarding the lack of a clear relationship between the domestic meat 
industry and the American ranching companies set up in Edinburgh and Dundee.  The 
ten Edinburgh and eight Glasgow based companies within the SIC Real Estate category, 
known as land companies in this period, may have more relation to vertical integration 
in that close ties may have existed with emigration agencies.
772
  A further pattern of 
note is that FSCs in the Agricultural Production (crops) classification originated from 
all centres except Dundee, suggesting no specific pattern as such of interest in them – 
indeed one of the more successful companies was headquartered in Inverness.
773
  The 
nearest to any pattern emerging was a trio of Indian hosted tea growing FSCs in 
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Glasgow, at least two of which, the North and South Sylhet Tea Companies were 
initiatives of the Glasgow based merchant house James Findlay & Company.  Findlay’s 
Calcutta branch, Finlay, Muir & Co., were employed as managing agents in India 
(actually the modern day Bangladesh) which managed the two companies which were 
separated with equal capital until their merger in 1902 into Consolidated Tea and Lands 
Ltd., presumably to share the risk in starting the plantations.
774
 
 
The relative importance of investment in Free-Standing Company promotions to their 
home towns has not previously been explored.  While it has already been discussed 
above that large sums were invested in Free-Standing Companies, it is unclear how 
proportionately important they were to the Scottish economy, particularly in relation to 
the theory that investment funds that could have been used domestically were 
transferred abroad. In order to measure the relative importance of these companies to 
their headquarter cities a per capita measure has been produced.  This has been 
calculated by dividing the cumulative levels of capital raised in each city by year by the 
nearest ten yearly census level.  Relevant censuses were taken in 1861, 1871, 1881 and 
1891; the figures taken are those from within the relevant parliamentary burgh 
boundaries although it is recognised that this does not give an absolutely accurate view 
of population structures especially where cities overspill into neighbouring burghs.
775
  
This also does not make the ratios absolutely exact as population figures were 
constantly increasing year on year with very large rates of increase in some cases – it 
has been assumed here that the census figures will be closest for a ten year period either 
side (e.g. 1877-1886).   
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Obviously it is also the case that just because the Head Office of a company was in a 
certain city it does not mean that all its shareholders were there, but this does give an 
indication of the relative importance of a city as a centre of FSC headquartering 
compared to its population.  While extreme cases such as the Seville Sulphur and 
Copper Company, of which most shares were in the hands of William Henderson 
existed, evidence exists suggesting that shareholding for some companies was 
concentrated around the Head Office city or its immediate area.  For instance, the 
Glasgow based New Zealand and Australian Land Company in 1877 had 113 registered 
shareholdings: of these 58 gave Glasgow addresses, and between them they held 82% of 
the company.
776
  Others were less concentrated but still had enough of a shareholding 
concentrated in the headquarters city to make it a significant factor: in Dundee the 
Texas Land and Cattle Company had 381 shareholdings spread around the UK, and 
even some in the US, but there were still 147 holders who gave their address as being in 
Dundee holding 47.47% of the company between them.
777
  The Matador Land and 
Cattle Company, also based in Dundee had a similar pattern of ownership: there out of 
336 holdings 214 were in Dundee and held 42% of the company.
778
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Table A3 Paid-up capital per thousand population 
 Glasgow 
(£) 
Edinburgh 
(£) 
Dundee 
(£) 
Inverness 
(£) 
1862 3    
1863   49  
1864     
1865 629 60   
1866 85    
1867     
1868 1869 213 168  
1869 63    
1870 677    
1871 89    
1872 346 80   
1873 799 190  6652 
1874 56 107   
1875 874 110 25  
1876 69 42 364 1434 
1877 704   155 
1878 158  61  
1879 145 15 17  
1880 76 963 419  
1881 547 971 746 812 
1882 172 2606 4033  
1883 274 3718 358  
1884 361 2209 350 5281 
1885 163 990 545 53 
1886 493 472 245 27 
1887 368 219  28 
1888 648 171 1066 2929 
1889 487 548 238 301 
1890 357 114 437  
Mean A 404 726 570 1767 
Mean B 362 476 314 609 
 
Mean A: The mean of the values without including years when no capital was called. 
Mean B: The mean including 0 from the years when no capital was called. 
 
Inevitably some distortion takes place in Table A3 as Dundee and Inverness, having 
relatively small populations, appear to have very high calls of capital per annum.  
However with adjustment for years when no capital was called, with Mean B, a clearer 
picture emerges – while Edinburgh was investing more in FSCs relative to its 
population than Glasgow, Glasgow was still investing more than the relatively small 
Dundee market.  However Dundee and Inverness were still managing to invest far more 
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than they might be expected to given the relative size of their populations and economic 
importance generally.  In Glasgow on the other hand promotions did not come in fits 
and bursts but more consistently and this is reflected in its consistent but relatively low 
per thousand figure. 
 
Of most clear interest in Table A3 are the occasions on which investment moves above 
£1,000 per thousand population.  The relative importance of the investment boom with 
cattle, lumber and mining companies being promoted in the early 1880s in Dundee and 
Edinburgh becomes very clear in this table. For every thousand residents of Dundee in 
1882 more than £4,000 was spent on paid-up capital in companies that were based 
there: more than three times the per thousand figure of £746 spent in 1881 and more 
than eight times the 1880 figure of £419.  A similar trend is noticeable in Edinburgh in 
the same period where a figure of £15 for 1879 increases to £963 in 1880 and 1881 
before reaching £2,606 in 1882 and a peak of £3,718 in 1883.  This reflects the 
continuing promotion of cattle and lumber companies throughout 1883 and 1884 in 
Edinburgh and also the fact that those companies already incorporated were calling up 
capital to purchase herds, ranches and even to offset losses.  The influence of both the 
Glasgow spike of the late 1860s and the east coast spike of the early 1880s is also 
starkly clear in the two national measures – pushing the FSC population per thousand 
measure over £1,000 on both occasions. 
 
From these figures it is clear that large scale growth in this period in both Edinburgh 
and Dundee was in stark contrast to the figures for Glasgow which are among the 
lowest for the whole period particularly for 1882 and 1883.  A glance at Table A3 
suggests that this decline was absolute.  This is likely to be partly reflected by 
continuing caution following the failure of the City of Glasgow bank in late 1878 and 
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the resulting lack of funds from this crash.  Over the longer period these figures would 
tend to suggest that Glasgow was always a much more active market than Edinburgh or 
Dundee but that its relative contribution is diminished by its much larger population.  
Therefore when an atypical event occurred – in this case the cattle boom the relative 
importance of Glasgow as a market decreased.  In the longer term Glasgow was always 
the more important arena for Free-Standing Companies to be promoted – particularly in 
the mining industry.  
 
The highest level of investment per thousand population in this period was not found in 
the three main cities – but in Inverness.  According to this measurement the each group 
of one thousand citizens of Inverness spent around £6,652 on FSC shares in 1873.  1873 
is known for its international importance as a year of stock market speculation and this 
interest even appears to have spread to the relatively remote Highland capital where the 
Scottish Indian Coffee Company Ltd. was incorporated.
779
  This was one of the more 
successful Scottish FSCs of the period officially surviving until 1932 although the 
decision to wind up had officially been taken in 1897 when the company sold its coffee 
estates to the New East Union Syndicate Ltd. Similarly high per capita measurements 
occur in Inverness in 1876, 1884 and 1888 as two further FSCs were promoted in 1884 
and 1885 – The Highland Mexican Land and Live Stock Company Ltd. and the 
Comorin Tea Company (Limited).
780
  The capitalisation of the Comorin Tea Company 
was relatively small by national standards – a nominal capital of just £6000 and a paid-
up capital at its height of just £2,555 3s 6d being wound up in 1892.  The Highland 
Mexican Cattle Company meanwhile was large by national standards and raised 
£76,415 in its first issue again giving a large ratio against a city population of just 
17,365 in 1881.  This contributes to Inverness’ figure of £812 per thousand in 1884.  
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780
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Comorin Tea Company (Limited), registration files. 
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Inverness’ role as a centre of foreign investment has not been mentioned in any previous 
writing on the subject, although it remained a particularly unimportant one.  Most 
Scottish FSCs were headquartered in Glasgow or Edinburgh rather than in any 
provincial centres, suggesting that only larger cities had the investment and structural 
capabilities to handle larger numbers of FSCs being based there. 
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Appendix 4 – Canterbury and Otago Association Financial Results 
1867-1876. 
 
Year Book 
Value 
(£) 
Profit 
and 
Loss 
(a) (£) 
Turnover 
(£) 
1867 315,319  44,119 
1868 334,553  57,949 
1869 654,155 14,706 61,752 
1870-
1873 
no figures 
available 
 
1874 871,319 38,681 135,120 
1875 900,234 44,852 136,779 
1876 899,321 25,014 122,288 
Source: NAS GD435/495 Printed Balance Sheets and Reports by Directors 1867-1883. 
a) is inconsistent with Table 4.3 for 1875.  This probably reflects funds from land 
sales or other miscellaneous transactions added to profit. 
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Appendix 5 – New Zealand and Australian Land Company Ltd. 
Financial Results 1867-1900. 
 
Year 
(end of 
March) 
Book 
Value (£) 
Profit 
and Loss 
(£) 
Turnover 
(£) 
1867 51,840   
1868 1,973,192 72,128  
1869 2,046,790 106,368  
1870 2,158,132 141,824  
1871-3 No figures available  
1874 1,815,402 111,987 260,774 
1875 1,858,990 88,265 262,162 
1876 2,014,220 59,667 233,199 
1877 3,834,933 90,371 353,510 
1878 
(b) 
4,148,223 17,441 275,376 
1879 (a) 3,971,155 106,383 204,283 
1880 3,998,598 154,714 251,207 
1881 3,642,999 130,231 226,144 
1882 3,650,957 142,766 279,674 
1883 3,606,701 169,408 308,410 
1884 3,653,859 150,307 309,484 
1885 3,566,902 77,715 230,654 
1886 3,507,282 88,248 235,988 
1887 3,506,027 127,980 272,318 
1888 3,506,578 118,986 272,279 
1889 2,820,375 168,165 308,841 
1890 3,118,158 125,528 341,703 
1891 3,054,084 111,124 351,718 
1892 3,029,497 97,466 313,238 
1893 2,955,491 87,029 321,986 
1894 2,968,688 81,127 301,004 
1895 2,991,573 62,389 276,898 
1896 2,923,758 63,709 272,795 
1897 2,840,583 93,835 296,306 
1898 2,814,372 85,737 301,813 
1899 2,748,279 95,437 323,262 
1900 2,860,798 86,384 347,627 
Sources: NAS GD435/493, 494 and 495 Printed Balance Sheets and Reports by Directors.  1867-1883 
from GD435/493, 1884-1889 from GD435/494 and 1890-1900 from GD435/495.  Includes profit from 
land sales etc. 
a) Does not include Queensland. 
b) New Valuations were made in 1878 upon the merger of C&O with NZALC. 
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Appendix 6 - NZALC Performance in Australia 1877-1914 
 
   Price per bale  
Year to 
31st March 
Bales of Wool 
(‘000s) 
Net 
Proceeds 
(£’000s) 
£ s d Drought 
Losses 
(sheep 
‘000s) 
1877 10.4  15 12 8  
1878 0.0     50.2 
1879 9.7 114.8 11 17 7  
1880 10.1 178.4 17 14 3  
1881 10.2 144.3 14 3 9  
1882 10.5 151.2 14 8 3  
1883 10.1 142.1 14 0 7  
1884 10.9 147.4 13 9 5 212.6 
1885 10.3 112.5 11 17 10  
1886 9.7 111.7 11 10 8  
1887 10.5 141.7 13 10 6  
1888 11.0 141.8 12 18 2  
1889 11.7 168.4 14 8 0  
1890 12.9 198.3 15 6 3  
1891 14.4 188.6 13 2 0  
1892 14.8 170.2 11 10 1  
1893 17.0 196.8 11 11 8  
1894 14.7 157.3 10 14 2  
1895 16.0 156.7 9 16 6  
1896 13.5 151.9 11 5 4 108.5 
1897 15.3 167.3 10 18 0  
1898 15.0 163.2 10 17 9  
1899 15.4 189.9 12 4 5  
1900 13.4 186.7 13 18 11 230.0 
1901 12.4 121.7 9 16 6  
1902 13.0 143.8 11 1 3  
1903 12.1 165.5 13 14 4  
1904 12.4 174.9 14 1 3  
1905 15.5 226.9 14 2 9  
1906 18.6 300.3 16 2 10  
1907 24.0 385.3 16 1 7  
1908 24.6 361.7 14 14 2  
1909 26.0 370.9 14 5 5  
1910 29.9 494.7 16 11 0  
1911 30.4 454.7 14 18 9  
1912 30.5 438.1 14 6 11  
1913 30.5 418.0 16 12 2  
1914 32.4 514.4 15 17 2  
Source: Davidson, W. S., William Soltau Davidson, 1846-1924 (Edinburgh, 1930)., pp. 
138-140. 
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